Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He
did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a
patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many
major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a
department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular
reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I
told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.
Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the
troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he
arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union
people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the
Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been
done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the
written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and
directed to that officer.
Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being
cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of
the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that
all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than
counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was
soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and
Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the
valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.
To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out
from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the
north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,
part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry
were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the
13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number
of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.
I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having
contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent
the going of any more.
To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near
Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the
raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could
teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would
learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.
Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I
would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and
that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi
Department. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the
Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in
case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.
Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that
there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,
and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the
field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going too
fast.
The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the
night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most
of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with
most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up his
line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the
troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of
the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the
old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division
was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,
while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River
to take its place.
This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his
supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew
that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road,
though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position,
and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to
connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge
Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.
As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops
were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with
such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of
about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that
source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon
Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he
made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very
heavy losses to him as compared with ours.
On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were
withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon
Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after
desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of
artillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession
from the 18th of August to the close of the war.
CHAPTER LVIII.
SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE
WINTER.
We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large
force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could
afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through
to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and
detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of
him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being
strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It
kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.
On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah
Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a
considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that
Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to
Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to
get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.
The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy
and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of
Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making
his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however,
he was thrown back on the defensive.
On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the
Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive
him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's
army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington
to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such
orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would
suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to
mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly
through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to
inform him where to meet me.
When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions
of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.
He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out
how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Before
starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his
views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not
take it out of my pocket.
Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his
stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not
have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions and
rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the
stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.
Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he
could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday.
"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I told
him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;
and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After
visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point
on the 19th.
On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when
workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put
it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have
standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but would
try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met
me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he
might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further
information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have
the road cleared for his workmen.
Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, and won a most decisive victory--one which
electrified the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his
bad generalship and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's
division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and