Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to
report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two
divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving
the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,
under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive
there long before Hood could reach Nashville.
In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in
the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.
Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at
Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at
Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There were
already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,
and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other
departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,
for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted
cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this
time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements
here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about
seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new
levies already spoken of.
About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood
in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which
Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic
appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by
sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of
the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to
cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But
it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying
supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped
that his own possessions might escape.
Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where
he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on
the garrison of that place.
The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;
and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with
the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river
at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it
impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was
navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is
another shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved
down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and
remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and
ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,
because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with
small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had
long since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to
Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying
Hood before he started on his campaign.
On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his
proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender
mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th
of November as the day of starting.
Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the
real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the
cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,
being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. The
left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than
those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened
Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and
meet the right wing at Milledgeville.
Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military
purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to
superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders
for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all
sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,
well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.
His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried
with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were
taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid
movement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to always
keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay
of a few days.
The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance
along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adopted
to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and
culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and
bend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one
side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails
and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The
ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were
loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When a
sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be
set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,
that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that
they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to
increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of
the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it
around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of
Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a
sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs
and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would
bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last
bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain
place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.
The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade
furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the
command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against
pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but
everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The
supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,
and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same
as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of
cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and
occasionally coffee or other small rations.
The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in
collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,
was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were always
on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being
mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use
of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return
again in the evening mounted.
Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;
indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the
romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,
and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of
the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of
the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was
reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they
discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded
to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house,
who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,
saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other
parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.
The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens
again they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must be
suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and
proceeded to appropriate the last one.
Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,
prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who
took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.
Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. On
one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its
mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a
strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our
orders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound,"
said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if
we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.
Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would
seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging
considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any
supplies except such as the country afforded.
On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right
wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannah
destroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remained
over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,
etc., before resuming its march.
The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now
fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the
State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away
even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to
fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to
Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the
command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.
Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to
even retard the progress of Sherman's army.
The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful
invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college
and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the
State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the
army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed
to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other
Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as
could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage
of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little
danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.
The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him
as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were
starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without
object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection
of our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effect
upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons
particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.
Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I
could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would
comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for