Phaedo
become greater after being less.
True.
And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have
become less.
Yes.
And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the
slower.
Very true.
And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more
unjust.
Of course.
And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them
are generated out of opposites?
Yes.
And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two
intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other
opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is
also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which
grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?
Yes, he said.
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition,
cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one
another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not
always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another,
and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?
Very true, he replied.
Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of
waking?
True, he said.
And what is it?
Death, he answered.
And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other,
and have there their two intermediate processes also?
Of course.
Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites
which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and
you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other
waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out
of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the
process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the
other waking up. Do you agree?
I entirely agree.
Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner.
Is not death opposed to life?
Yes.
And they are generated one from the other?
Yes.
What is generated from the living?
The dead.
And what from the dead?
I can only say in answer--the living.
Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from
the dead?
That is clear, he replied.
Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?
That is true.
And one of the two processes or generations is visible--for surely the
act of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.
What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process?
And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather
assign to death some corresponding process of generation?
Certainly, he replied.
And what is that process?
Return to life.
And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead
into the world of the living?
Quite true.
Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the
living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and
this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead
exist in some place out of which they come again.
Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of
our previous admissions.
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown,
I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and
there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of
elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at
last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be
no more generation of them.
What do you mean? he said.
A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep,
he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping
and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no
meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not
be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only,
and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come
again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook
of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form
of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and
nothing would be alive--what other result could there be? For if the
living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all
things at last be swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.)
There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems
to be absolutely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have
not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that
there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring
from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that
the good souls have a better portion than the evil.
Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply
recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in
which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be
impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the
form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged
in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the
moment that I remember them.
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put
a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of
himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right
reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken
to a diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.)
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask
you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter
in another way;--I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether
knowledge is recollection.
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine
of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has
said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still
like to hear what you were going to say.
This is what I would say, he replied:--We should agree, if I am not
mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous
time.
Very true.
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to
ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived
anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something
else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of
knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the
conception?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:--The knowledge
of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
True.
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or
a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of
using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an
image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection.
In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there
are endless examples of the same thing.
Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.
And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has
been already forgotten through time and inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a
lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to
remember Cebes?
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
Quite so.
And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things
either like or unlike?
It may be.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another
consideration is sure to arise, which is--whether the likeness in any
degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but
that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?
Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence
in life.
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
To be sure, he said.
And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of
material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from
them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will
acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another
way:--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal,
and at another time unequal?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as
of inequality?
Impossible, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of
equality?
I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality,
you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been
an act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they
fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object,
observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing,
but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he
who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to
which the other, although similar, was inferior?
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first
saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals
strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known,
and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some
other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the
same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things
aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have
had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to
that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?--for to that
they all aspire, and of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon
as we were born?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous
time?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born
having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the
instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all
other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty,