Phaedo
I should very much like to hear, he replied.
Socrates proceeded:--I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation
of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of
my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing
on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only
looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium.
So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether
if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the
help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the
world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that
the simile is not perfect--for I am very far from admitting that he who
contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only
'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in action
and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first
assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I
affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating
to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded
as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do
not think that you as yet understand me.
No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.
There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but
only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous
discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that
cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those
familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all
assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and
the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of
the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.
Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you
this.
Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me
in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything
beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can
be beautiful only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I
should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the
cause?
Yes, he said, I agree.
He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of
those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that
the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty,
I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly,
and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing
makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in
whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain,
but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become
beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give,
either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion
that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or
to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty
beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?
I do.
And that by greatness only great things become great and greater
greater, and by smallness the less become less?
True.
Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and
B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and
would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is
greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by,
and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of
saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of
the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous
absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the
head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference,
would you not?
Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by,
and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or
you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by
magnitude?-for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.
Very true, he said.
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of
one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would
loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes
into existence except by participation in its own proper essence,
and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is
the participation in duality--this is the way to make two, and the
participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let
alone puzzles of division and addition--wiser heads than mine may answer
them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says,
at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a
principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him,
or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow
agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give
an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher
principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of
the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences
in your reasoning, like the Eristics--at least if you wanted to discover
real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never
care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well
pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas.
But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.
What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at
once.
ECHECRATES: Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any
one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of
Socrates' reasoning.
PHAEDO: Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole
company at the time.
ECHECRATES: Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company,
and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?
PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist,
and that other things participate in them and derive their names from
them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:--
This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is
greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of
Simmias both greatness and smallness?
Yes, I do.
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as
the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the
size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he
is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he
has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?
True.
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is
Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is
comparatively smaller?
That is true.
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small,
because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one
by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his
smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe
that what I am saying is true.
Simmias assented.
I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not
only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but
that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or
admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen,
either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the
less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but
will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that;
even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with
Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the
idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like
manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other
opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but
either passes away or perishes in the change.
That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.
Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of
them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what
was admitted before--that out of the greater came the less and out of
the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from
opposites; but now this principle seems to be utterly denied.
Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your
courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that
there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of
opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as
is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with
itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites
are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the
opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them;
and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of
generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to
Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's
objection?
No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often
disturbed by objections.
Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will
never in any case be opposed to itself?
To that we are quite agreed, he replied.
Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point
of view, and see whether you agree with me:--There is a thing which you
term heat, and another thing which you term cold?
Certainly.
But are they the same as fire and snow?
Most assuredly not.
Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?
Yes.
And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is
under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at
the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?
Very true, he replied.
And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or
perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will
not remain as before, fire and cold.
That is true, he said.
And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea
in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea,
exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will
try to make this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called
by the name of odd?
Very true.
But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other
things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because,
although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?--that
is what I mean to ask--whether numbers such as the number three are not
of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not
say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also
be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said
not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate number--each
of them without being oddness is odd, and in the same way two and
four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even,
without being evenness. Do you agree?
Of course.
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:--not only do essential