Plutarch's Morals
they are signs of progress in virtue, or of some habit which has already
a settled constancy and strength through reason.
Sec. XIII. Now since entire freedom from the passions is a great and divine
thing, and progress in virtue seems, as we say, to consist in a certain
remissness and mildness of the passions, we must observe the passions
both in themselves and in reference to one another to gauge the
difference: in themselves as to whether desire, and fear, and rage are
less strong in us now than formerly, through our quickly extinguishing
their violence and heat by reason; and in reference to one another as to
whether we are animated now by modesty more than by fear, and by
emulation more than by envy, and by love of glory rather than by love of
riches, and generally speaking whether--to use the language of
musicians--it is in the Dorian more than in the Lydian measures that we
err either by excess or deficiency,[288] whether we are plainer in our
manner of living or more luxurious, whether we are slower in action or
quicker, whether we admire men and their discourses more than we should
or despise them. For as it is a good sign in diseases if they turn aside
from vital parts of the body, so in the case of people who are making
progress in virtue, when vice seems to shift to milder passions, it is a
sign it will soon die out. When Phrynis added to the seven chords two
chords more, the Ephors asked him which he preferred to let them cut
off, the upper or lower ones;[289] so we must cut off both above and
below, if we mean to attain, to the mean and to due proportion: for
progress in virtue first diminishes the excess and sharpness of the
passions,
"That sharpness for which madmen are so vehement,"
as Sophocles says.
Sec. XIV. I have already said that it is a very great indication of
progress in virtue to transfer our judgement to action, and not to let
our words remain merely words, but to make deeds of them. A
manifestation of this is in the first place emulation as regards what we
praise, and a zeal to do what we admire, and an unwillingness either to
do or allow what we censure. To illustrate my meaning by an example, it
is probable that all Athenians praised the daring and bravery of
Miltiades; but Themistocles alone said that the trophy of Miltiades
would not let him sleep, but woke him up of a night, and not only
praised and admired him, but manifestly emulated and imitated his
glorious actions. Small, therefore, can we think the progress we have
made, as long as our admiration for those who have done noble things is
barren, and does not of itself incite us to imitate them. For as there
is no strong love without jealousy, so there is no ardent and energetic
praise of virtue, which does not prick and goad one on, and make one not
envious but emulous of what is noble, and desirous to do something
similar. For not only at the discourses of a philosopher ought we, as
Alcibiades said,[290] to be moved in heart and shed tears, but the true
proficient in virtue, comparing his own deeds and actions with those of
the good and perfect man, and grieved at the same time at the knowledge
of his own deficiency, yet rejoicing in hope and desire, and full of
impulses that will not let him rest, is, as Simonides says,
"Like sucking foal running by side of dam,"[291]
being desirous all but to coalesce with the good man. For it is a
special sign of true progress in virtue to love and admire the
disposition of those whose deeds we emulate, and to resemble them with a
goodwill that ever assigns due honour and praise to them. But whoever
is steeped in contentiousness and envy against his betters, let him know
that he may be pricked on by a jealous desire for glory or power, but
that he neither honours nor admires virtue.
Sec. XV. Whenever, then, we begin so much to love good men that we deem
happy, "not only," as Plato[292] says, "the temperate man himself, but
also the man who hears the words that flow from his wise lips," and
even admire and are pleased with his figure and walk and look and smile,
and desire to adapt ourselves to his model and to stick closely to him,
then may we think that we are making genuine progress. Still more will
this be the case, if we admire the good not only in prosperity, but like
lovers who admire even the lispings and paleness of those in their
flower,[293] as the tears and dejection of Panthea in her grief and
affliction won the affections of Araspes,[294] so we fear neither the
exile of Aristides, nor the prison of Anaxagoras, nor the poverty of
Socrates, nor the condemnation of Phocion, but think virtue worthy our
love even under such trials, and join her, ever chanting that line of
Euripides,
"Unto the noble everything is good."[295]
For the enthusiasm that can go so far as not to be discouraged at the
sure prospect of trouble, but admires and emulates what is good even so,
could never be turned away from what is noble by anybody. Such men ever,
whether they have some business to transact, or have taken upon them
some office, or are in some critical conjuncture, put before their eyes
the example of noble men, and consider what Plato would have done on the
occasion, what Epaminondas would have said, how Lycurgus or Agesilaus
would have dealt; that so, adjusting and re-modelling themselves, as it
were, at their mirrors, they may correct any ignoble expression, and
repress any ignoble passion. For as those that have learnt the names of
the Idaean Dactyli[296] make use of them to banish their fear by quietly
repeating them over, so the bearing in mind and remembering good men,
which soon suggests itself forcibly to those who have made some progress
in virtue in all their emotions and difficulties, keeps them upright and
not liable to fall. Let this also then be a sign to you of progress in
virtue.
Sec. XVI. In addition to this, not to be too much disturbed, nor to blush,
nor to try and conceal oneself, or make any change in one's dress, on
the sudden appearance of a man of distinction and virtue, but to feel
confident and go and meet such a one, is the confirmation of a good
conscience. It is reported that Alexander, seeing a messenger running up
to him full of joy and holding out his right hand, said, "My good
friend, what are you going to tell me? Has Homer come to life again?"
For he thought that his own exploits required nothing but posthumous
fame.[297] And a young man improving in character instinctively loves
nothing better than to take pride and pleasure in the company of good
and noble men, and to display his house, his table, his wife, his
amusements, his serious pursuits, his spoken or written discourses;
insomuch that he is grieved when he remembers that his father or
guardian died without seeing him in that condition in life, and would
pray for nothing from the gods so much, as that they could come to life
again, and be spectators of his life and actions; as, on the contrary,
those that have neglected their affairs, and come to ruin, cannot look
upon their relatives even in dreams without fear and trembling.
Sec. XVII. Add, if you please, to what I have already said, as no small
indication of progress in virtue, the thinking no wrong-doing small, but
being on your guard and heed against all. For as people who despair of
ever being rich make no account of small expenses, thinking they will
never make much by adding little to little,[298] but when hope is nearer
fruition, then with wealth increases the love of it,[299] so in things
that have respect to virtue, not he that generally assents to such
sayings as "Why trouble about hereafter?" "If things are bad now, they
will some day be better,"[300] but the man who pays heed to everything,
and is vexed and concerned if vice gets pardon, when it lapses into even
the most trifling wrongdoing, plainly shows that he has already
attained to some degree of purity, and deigns not to contract defilement
from anything whatever. For the idea that we have nothing of any
importance to bring disgrace upon, makes people inclined to what is
little and careless.[301] To those who are building a stone wall or
coping it matters not if they lay on any chance wood or common stone, or
some tombstone that has fallen down, as bad workmen do, heaping and
piling up pell-mell every kind of material; but those who have made some
progress in virtue, whose life "has been wrought on a golden base,"[302]
like the foundation of some holy or royal building, undertake nothing
carelessly, but lay and adjust everything by the line and level of
reason, thinking the remark of Polycletus superlatively good, that that
work is most excellent, where the model stands the test of the
nail.[303]
[249] See Erasmus, Adagia, "Eadem pensari trutina."
[250] Euripides, "Iphigenia in Tauris," 569.
[251] See Ovid, "Metamorphoses," xii. 189, sq.
[252] See Erasmus, "Adagia," p. 1103.
[253] Compare Shakspere, "Tempest," A. i. Sc. i. 63,
"And gape at widest to glut him."
[254] Hesiod, "Works and Days," 361, 362. Quoted again
by our author, "On Education," Sec. 13.
[255] "In via ad virtutem qui non progreditur, is non
stat et manet, sed regreditur."--_Wyttenbach._
[256] Adopting the reading of Hercher. See Pausanias, x.
37, where the oracle is somewhat different.
[257] For the town which parleys surrenders.
[258] From Homer, "Iliad," xix. 386.
[259] Compare Aristotle, _Rhetoric_, i. 11. [Greek: kai
arche de tou erotos gignetai aute pasin, otan me monon
parontos chairosin, alla kai apontos memnemenoi erosin.]
[260] The line is a Fragment of Sophocles.
[261] See Hesiod, "Works and Days," 289-292.
[262] The well-known Cynic philosopher.
[263] Bergk. fr. 15. Compare Homer, "Iliad," vi. 339.
[Greek: nike d' epameibetai andras].
[264] We are told by Diogenes Laeertius, v. 37, that
Theophrastus had 2000 hearers sometimes at once.
[265] "Republic," vii. p. 539, B.
[266] Sentences borrowed from some author or other,
such, as we still possess from the hands of Hermogenes
and Aphthonius; compare the collection of bon-mots of
Greek courtesans in Athenaeus.
[267] A reference to AEsop's Fable, [Greek: Leon kai
Halopez]. Cf. Horace, "Epistles," i. i. 73-75.
[268] This passage is alluded to also in "On Love to
one's Offspring." Sec. ii.
[269] Madvig's text.
[270] Thucydides, i. 18.
[271] Homer, "Iliad," ix. 323, 324. Quoted also in "On
Love to One's Offspring," Sec. ii.
[272] The remark about Demosthenes has somehow slipped
out, as Wyttenbach has suggested.
[273] Does this refer to [Greek: Peleiadeo] before
[Greek: Hachileos] in "Iliad," i. 1?
[274] An allusion to some passage in a Play that has not
come down to us.
[275] Compare our Author, _De Audiendis Poetis_, Sec. xi.
[Greek: hosper ho Agesilaos ouk hypemeinen hypo tou
kalou philethenai prosiontos].
[276] Reading with Madvig and Hercher, [Greek: to gar
auton], sq.
[277] Literally _cork-like_, so vain, empty. So Horace,
"levior cortice," "Odes," iii. 9, 22.
[278] Marks of a philosopher among the ancients. Compare
our Author, "How one may discern a flatterer from a
friend," Sec. vii.
[279] "Odyssey," xvi. 187.
[280] AEschylus, "Toxotides," Fragm. 224. Quoted again by
our author, "On Love," Sec. xxi.
[281] "Turpe habitum fuisse in caupona conspici, et hoc
exemplo apparet, et alia sunt indicia. Isocrates Orat.
Areopagitica laudans antiquorum Atheniensium mores, p.
257: [Greek: en kapeleio de phagein e piein oudeis han
oiketes epieikes etolmese]: quem locum citans Athenaeus