Sophist
which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the
business of the dialectical science?
THEAETETUS: That is what we should say.
STRANGER: Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly
one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms
contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into
a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing
only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which
determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to
the philosopher pure and true?
THEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy?
STRANGER: In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we
look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a
different reason.
THEAETETUS: For what reason?
STRANGER: Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being,
in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered
because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?
THEAETETUS: It seems to be so.
STRANGER: And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason
with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls
of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.
THEAETETUS: Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.
STRANGER: Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered
by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed
to escape until we have had a good look at him.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
STRANGER: Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion
with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and
others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have
universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the
argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude
of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are
reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures
and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we
are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being
and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of
them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if
peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and
yet escape unscathed.
THEAETETUS: We must do so.
STRANGER: The most important of all the genera are those which we were
just now mentioning--being and rest and motion.
THEAETETUS: Yes, by far.
STRANGER: And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion
with one another.
THEAETETUS: Quite incapable.
STRANGER: Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both
of them are?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
STRANGER: That makes up three of them.
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
STRANGER: And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same
with itself.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and
'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of
necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead
of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously
speaking of one of the three first kinds?
THEAETETUS: Very likely we are.
STRANGER: But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the
same.
THEAETETUS: How is that?
STRANGER: Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be
either of them.
THEAETETUS: Why not?
STRANGER: Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either
of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into
the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is
either the same or the other.
THEAETETUS: No; we must not.
STRANGER: But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?
THEAETETUS: Possibly.
STRANGER: But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion
and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.
THEAETETUS: Which surely cannot be.
STRANGER: Then being and the same cannot be one.
THEAETETUS: Scarcely.
STRANGER: Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is
now to be added to the three others.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we
consider being and other to be two names of the same class?
THEAETETUS: Very likely.
STRANGER: But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are
relative as well as absolute?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And the other is always relative to other?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: But this would not be the case unless being and the other
entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well
as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not
other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity
be what it is in relation to some other.
THEAETETUS: That is the true state of the case.
STRANGER: Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected
classes.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ
from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they
partake of the idea of the other.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the
five.
THEAETETUS: How?
STRANGER: First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely
'other' than rest: what else can we say?
THEAETETUS: It is so.
STRANGER: And therefore is not rest.
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
STRANGER: And yet is, because partaking of being.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Again, motion is other than the same?
THEAETETUS: Just so.
STRANGER: And is therefore not the same.
THEAETETUS: It is not.
STRANGER: Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of
the same.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the
same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not
the same,' in the same sense; but we call it the 'same,' in relation to
itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having
communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has
become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as 'not
the same.'
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
STRANGER: And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest,
there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.
THEAETETUS: Quite right,--that is, on the supposition that some classes
mingle with one another, and others not.
STRANGER: That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had
already proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than
the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and
other than rest?
THEAETETUS: That is certain.
STRANGER: Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not
other?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than
the three and not other than the fourth,--for we agreed that there
are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make
enquiry?
THEAETETUS: Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it
appeared to be just now.
STRANGER: Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than
being?
THEAETETUS: Without the least fear.
STRANGER: The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being,
really is and also is not?
THEAETETUS: Nothing can be plainer.
STRANGER: Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of
every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes
each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all
of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again,
inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.
THEAETETUS: So we may assume.
STRANGER: Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of
not-being.
THEAETETUS: So we must infer.
STRANGER: And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many
other things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is
not the other things, which are infinite in number.
THEAETETUS: That is not far from the truth.
STRANGER: And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the
nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if any one
denies our present statement [viz., that being is not, etc.], let him
first argue with our former conclusion [i.e., respecting the communion
of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.
THEAETETUS: Nothing can be fairer.
STRANGER: Let me ask you to consider a further question.
THEAETETUS: What question?
STRANGER: When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of
something opposed to being, but only different.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
STRANGER: When we speak of something as not great, does the expression
seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
STRANGER: The negative particles, ou and me, when prefixed to words,
do not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more
correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: There is another point to be considered, if you do not object.
THEAETETUS: What is it?
STRANGER: The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into
fractions like knowledge.
THEAETETUS: How so?
STRANGER: Knowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts
of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence
there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And is not the case the same with the parts of the other,
which is also one?
THEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how?
STRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the
beautiful?
THEAETETUS: There is.
STRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has not a name?
THEAETETUS: It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the
beautiful, not than something else.
STRANGER: And now tell me another thing.
THEAETETUS: What?
STRANGER: Is the not-beautiful anything but this--an existence parted
off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of
view opposed to an existing something?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being
to being?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the
not-beautiful a less real existence?
THEAETETUS: Not at all.
STRANGER: And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the
great?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same
category with the not-just--the one cannot be said to have any more
existence than the other.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature
of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally
be supposed to exist.
THEAETETUS: Of course.