Sophist
THEAETETUS: We must do so.
STRANGER: I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action
are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of
whom the sentence speaks.
THEAETETUS: I will, to the best of my power.
STRANGER: 'Theaetetus sits'--not a very long sentence.
THEAETETUS: Not very.
STRANGER: Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that
is what you have to tell.
THEAETETUS: Of me; I am the subject.
STRANGER: Or this sentence, again--
THEAETETUS: What sentence?
STRANGER: 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.'
THEAETETUS: That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one
to speak of me, and to apply to me.
STRANGER: We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain
quality.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?
THEAETETUS: The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.
STRANGER: The true says what is true about you?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And the false says what is other than true?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we
were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is
and much that is not.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: The second of the two sentences which related to you was first
of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition.
THEAETETUS: Yes, this was implied in recent admission.
STRANGER: And, in the second place, it related to a subject?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Who must be you, and can be nobody else?
THEAETETUS: Unquestionably.
STRANGER: And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject,
for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and
not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and
truly false discourse.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
STRANGER: And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved
to exist in our minds both as true and false.
THEAETETUS: How so?
STRANGER: You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what
they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.
THEAETETUS: Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.
STRANGER: Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that
what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with
herself?
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is
audible is called speech?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And we know that there exists in speech...
THEAETETUS: What exists?
STRANGER: Affirmation.
THEAETETUS: Yes, we know it.
STRANGER: When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in
the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?
THEAETETUS: There can be no other name.
STRANGER: And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of
sense, would you not call it imagination?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought
is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of
thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion,
the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language,
should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have
been discovered sooner than we expected?--For just now we seemed to be
undertaking a task which would never be accomplished.
THEAETETUS: I perceive.
STRANGER: Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but
now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous
classification.
THEAETETUS: What classification?
STRANGER: We divided image-making into two sorts; the one
likeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place
the Sophist.
THEAETETUS: We did say so.
STRANGER: And our heads began to go round more and more when it was
asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance,
because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as
falsehood.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and
false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of
this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.
THEAETETUS: Quite possible.
STRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the
Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class,
always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the
Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and
reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true
nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
STRANGER: You may remember that all art was originally divided by us
into creative and acquisitive.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive
class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the
like.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear
that we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is
a kind of creation--of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real
things.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.
THEAETETUS: What are they?
STRANGER: One of them is human and the other divine.
THEAETETUS: I do not follow.
STRANGER: Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which
causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as
creative.
THEAETETUS: I remember.
STRANGER: Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants,
at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as
at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or
non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence--not having
existed previously--by the creation of God, or shall we agree with
vulgar opinion about them?
THEAETETUS: What is it?
STRANGER: The opinion that nature brings them into being from some
spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are
created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?
THEAETETUS: I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my
view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them
to God, I defer to your authority.
STRANGER: Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of
those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued
with you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come
of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as
you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me
suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the
work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of
these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and
production, the one human and the other divine.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have
already.
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
STRANGER: I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of
production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.
THEAETETUS: I have done so.
STRANGER: Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments--two of
them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference
to the gods and are divine.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in
the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things
themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of
likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.
THEAETETUS: Tell me the divisions once more.
STRANGER: I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out
of which things are made--fire, water, and the like--are known by us to
be each and all the creation and work of God.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And there are images of them, which are not them, but which
correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful
skill.
THEAETETUS: What are they?
STRANGER: The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by
day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection
which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets
on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the
opposite of our ordinary sight.
THEAETETUS: Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the
work of a divine hand.
STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house
by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a
sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And other products of human creation are also twofold and go
in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is
concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.
THEAETETUS: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that
there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the
lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the
vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.
STRANGER: And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part
was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could
be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real
being.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without
hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art.
THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?
STRANGER: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument,
and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the
instrument.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
STRANGER: When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure
or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the
province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and
will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class
and giving it a suitable name.
THEAETETUS: Let us do as you say--assign a sphere to the one and leave
the other.
STRANGER: There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of
our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.
THEAETETUS: Let me hear.
STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and
some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be
greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
THEAETETUS: There can be no greater.
STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the
imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely
know you and your figure?
THEAETETUS: Naturally.
STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of
virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge