Stonewall Jackson
and the
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
by the late
Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B.
AUTHOR OF “THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, A TACTICAL STUDY”
AND “THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG”
with an introduction by
FIELD-MARSHAL THE LATE
RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT WOLSELEY,
K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., &c.
IN TWO VOLUMES—VOLUME I
_WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND PLANS_
_TO MY FATHER_
—::—
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PREFACE
Chapter I. WEST POINT
Chapter II. MEXICO. 1846–47
Chapter III. LEXINGTON. 1851–61
Chapter IV. SECESSION. 1860–61
Chapter V. HARPER’S FERRY
Chapter VI. THE FIRST BATTLE OF MANASSAS OR BULL RUN
Chapter VII. ROMNEY
Chapter VIII. KERNSTOWN
Chapter IX. M’DOWELL
Chapter X. WINCHESTER
Chapter XI. CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC
Chapter XII. REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN
Chapter XIII. THE SEVEN DAYS. GAINES’ MILL
Chapter XIV. THE SEVEN DAYS. FRAYSER’S FARM AND MALVERN HILL
Chapter XV. CEDAR RUN
Chapter XVI. GROVETON AND THE SECOND MANASSAS
Chapter XVII. THE SECOND MANASSAS (_continued_)
Chapter XVIII. HARPER’S FERRY
Chapter XIX. SHARPSBURG
Chapter XX. FREDERICKSBURG
Chapter XXI. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Chapter XXII. WINTER QUARTERS
Chapter XXIII. CHANCELLORSVILLE
Chapter XXIV. CHANCELLORSVILLE (_continued_)
Chapter XXV. THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN
INDEX
ILLUSTRATIONS
PORTRAITS
STONEWALL JACKSON, LT.-GENERAL.
STONEWALL JACKSON AT THE AGE OF 24 (_from a daguerreotype_)
MAPS
THE CITY OF MEXICO.
THE UNITED STATES, 1861.
SITUATION, NIGHT OF JULY 17, 1861.
DISPOSITIONS, MORNING OF JULY 21, 1861.
BULL RUN.
SKETCH OF WEST VIRGINIA IN 1861.
THE VALLEY.
SITUATION, NIGHT OF MARCH 21, 1862.
BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.
SITUATION, APRIL 30, 1862.
BATTLE OF MCDOWELL.
SITUATION, MAY 18, 1862.
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
BATTLES OF CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC.
ENVIRONS OF RICHMOND
BATTLE OF GAINES’ MILL
THE SEVEN DAYS. JUNE 26–JULY 2, 1862
BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL
ENVIRONS OF WARRENTON
BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN
SITUATION ON AUGUST 27 (SUNSET), 1862
SITUATION ON AUGUST 28 (SUNSET), 1862
POSITIONS ON AUGUST 29, 1862
GROVETON AND SECOND MANASSAS
POSITIONS ON AUGUST 30, 1862, IN THE ATTACK ON JACKSON
POSITIONS ON AUGUST 30, 1862
HARPER’S FERRY
SHARPSBURG
POSITIONS DURING THE ATTACKS OF HOOKER AND MANSFIELD AT SHARPSBURG
FREDERICKSBURG
HOOKER’S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
INTRODUCTION
Before the great Republic of the West had completed a century of
independent national existence, its political fabric was subjected to
the strain of a terrible internecine war. That the true cause of
conflict was the antagonism between the spirit of Federalism and the
theory of “States’ Rights” is very clearly explained in the following
pages, and the author exactly expresses the feeling with which most
Englishmen regard the question of Secession, when he implies that had
he been a New Englander he would have fought to the death to preserve
the Union, while had he been born in Virginia he would have done as
much in defence of a right the South believed inalienable. The war thus
brought about dragged on its weary length from the spring of 1861 to
the same season of 1865. During its progress reputations were made that
will live for ever in American history, and many remarkable men came to
the front. Among these not the least prominent was “Stonewall Jackson,”
who to the renown of a great soldier and unselfish patriot added the
brighter fame of a Christian hero; and to those who would know what
manner of man this Stonewall Jackson was, and why he was so universally
revered, so beloved, so trusted by his men, I can cordially recommend
Colonel Henderson’s delightful volumes. From their perusal I have
derived real pleasure and sound instruction. They have taught me much;
they have made me think still more; and I hope they may do the same for
many others in the British Army. They are worth the closest study, for
few military writers have possessed Colonel Henderson’s grasp of
tactical and strategical principles, or his knowledge of the methods
which have controlled their application by the most famous soldiers,
from Hannibal to Von Moltke. Gifted with a rare power of describing not
only great military events but the localities where they occurred, he
places clearly before his readers, in logical sequence, the
circumstances which brought them about. He has accomplished, too, the
difficult task of combining with a brilliant and critical history of a
great war the life-story of a great commander, of a most singular and
remarkable man. The figure, the character, the idiosyncrasies of the
famous Virginian, as well as the lofty motives which influenced him
throughout, are most sympathetically portrayed.
There have been few more fitted by natural instincts, by education, by
study, and by self-discipline to become leaders of men than Stonewall
Jackson. From the day he joined that admirable school at West Point he
may be said to have trained himself mentally, morally, and physically,
for the position to which he aspired, and which it would seem he always
believed he would reach. Shy as a lad, reserved as a man, speaking
little but thinking much, he led his own life, devouring the
experiences of great men, as recorded in military history, in order
that when his time came he should be capable of handling his troops as
they did. A man of very simple tastes and habits, but of strong
religious principles, drawn directly from the Bible; a child in purity;
a child in faith; the Almighty always in his thoughts, his stay in
trouble, his guide in every difficulty, Jackson’s individuality was
more striking and more complete than that of all others who played
leading parts in the great tragedy of Secession. The most reckless and
irreligious of the Confederate soldiers were silent in his presence,
and stood awestruck and abashed before this great God-fearing man; and
even in the far-off Northern States the hatred of the formidable
“rebel” was tempered by an irrepressible admiration of his piety, his
sincerity, and his resolution. The passions then naturally excited have
now calmed down, and are remembered no more by a reunited and
chivalrous nation. With that innate love of virtue and real worth which
has always distinguished the American people, there has long been
growing up, even among those who were the fiercest foes of the South, a
feeling of love and reverence for the memory of this great and
true-hearted man of war, who fell in what he firmly believed to be a
sacred cause. The fame of Stonewall Jackson is no longer the exclusive
property of Virginia and the South; it has become the birthright of
every man privileged to call himself an American.
Colonel Henderson has made a special study of the Secession War, and it
would be difficult, in my opinion, to find a man better qualified in
every respect for the task he has undertaken. I may express the hope
that he will soon give us the history of the war from the death of
Stonewall Jackson to the fall of Richmond. Extending as it did over a
period of four years, and marked by achievements which are a lasting
honour to the Anglo-Saxon name, the struggle of the South for
independence is from every point of view one of the most important
events in the second half of the century, and it should not be left
half told. Until the battle where Stonewall Jackson fell, the tide of
success was flowing, and had borne the flag of the new Confederacy
within sight of the gates of Washington. Colonel Henderson deals only
with what I think may be called the period of Southern victories, for
the tide began to ebb when Jackson fell; and those who read his volumes
will, I am convinced, look forward eagerly to his story of the years
which followed, when Grant, with the skill of a practised strategist,
threw a net round the Confederate capital, drawing it gradually
together until he imprisoned its starving garrison, and compelled Lee,
the ablest commander of his day, to surrender at discretion.
But the application of strategical and tactical principles, and the
example of noble lives, are not the only or even the most valuable
lessons of great wars. There are lessons which concern nations rather
than individuals; and there are two to be learnt from the Secession War
which are of peculiar value to both England and the United States,
whose armies are comparatively small and raised by voluntary
enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining at all times (for
it is impossible to predict what tomorrow may have in store for us) a
well-organised standing army in the highest state of efficiency, and
composed of thoroughly-trained and full-grown men. This army to be
large enough for our military requirements, and adapted to the
character, the habits, and the traditions of the people. It is not
necessary that the whole force should be actually serving during peace:
one half of it, provided it is periodically drilled and exercised, can
be formed into a Reserve; the essential thing is that it should be as
perfect a weapon as can be forged.
The second lesson is that to hand over to civilians the administration
and organisation of the army, whether in peace or in war, or to allow
them to interfere in the selection of officers for command or
promotion, is most injurious to efficiency; while, during war, to allow
them, no matter how high their political capacity, to dictate to
commanders in the field any line of conduct, after the army has once
received its commission, is simply to ensure disaster.
The first of these lessons is brought home to us by the opening events
of this unreasonably protracted war. As I have elsewhere said, most
military students will admit that had the United States been able,
early in 1861, to put into the field, in addition to their volunteers,
one Army Corps of regular troops, the war would have ended in a few
months. An enormous expenditure of life and money, as well as a serious
dislocation and loss of trade, would have been thus avoided. Never have
the evil consequences which follow upon the absence of an adequate and
well-organised army been more forcibly exemplified.
But, alas! when this lesson is preached in a country governed
alternately by rival political parties, and when there is no immediate
prospect of national danger, it falls on deaf ears. The demands made by
the soldiers to put the army on a thoroughly efficient footing are
persistently ignored, for the necessary means are almost invariably
required for some other object, more popular at the moment and in a
parliamentary—or party—sense more useful. The most scathing comment on
such a system of administration is furnished in the story told by
Colonel Henderson. The fearful trials to which the United States were
subjected expose the folly and self-deception of which even
well-meaning party leaders are too often capable. Ministers bluster
about fighting and yet refuse to spend enough money on the army to make
it fit for use; and on both sides of the Atlantic the lessons taught by
the Peninsula, the Crimea, and the Secession War are but seldom
remembered.
The pleasing notion that, whenever war comes, money can obtain for the
nation all that it requires is still, it would seem, an article of at
least lip-faith with the politicians of the English-speaking race
throughout the world. Gold will certainly buy a nation powder, pills,
and provisions; but no amount of wealth, even when supported by a
patriotic willingness to enlist, can buy discipline, training, and
skilful leading. Without these there can be no such thing as an
efficient army, and success in the field against serious opposition is
merely the idle dream of those who know not war.