Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
the Confederates would be compelled to retreat, followed by a superior
army, across two bridgeless rivers.
Nevertheless, the consideration of these contingencies had no effect on
Jackson’s purpose. The odds, he decided, were in his favour; and the
defeat of Pope’s army in detail, with all the consequences that might
follow, was worth risking much to bring about. It was still possible
that Pope might delay his concentration; it was still possible that an
opportunity might present itself; and, as he had done at Winchester in
March, when threatened by a force sevenfold stronger than his own, he
resolved to look for that opportunity before he renounced his
enterprise.
August 9 In speed and caution lay the only chance of success. The start
on the 9th was early. Hill, anxious to redeem his shortcomings, marched
long before daylight, and soon caught up with Ewell and Winder. Half of
the cavalry covered the advance; the remainder, screening the left
flank, scouted west and in the direction of Madison Court House. Two
brigades of infantry, Gregg’s and Lawton’s, were left in rear to guard
the trains, for the Federal horsemen threatened danger, and the army,
disembarrassed of the supply waggons, pressed forward across the
Rapidan. Pushing the Federal cavalry before them, the troops reached
Robertson River. The enemy’s squadrons, already worn out by incessant
reconnaissance and picket duty, were unable to dispute the passage, and
forming a single column, the three divisions crossed the Locustdale
Ford. Climbing the northern bank, the high-road to Culpeper, white with
dust, lay before them, and to their right front, little more than two
miles distant, a long wooded ridge, bearing the ominous name of
Slaughter Mountain, rose boldly from the plain.
Ewell’s division led the march, and shortly before noon, as the troops
swept past the western base of Slaughter Mountain, it was reported that
the Federal cavalry, massed in some strength, had come to a halt a mile
or two north, on the bank of a small stream called Cedar Run.
The Confederate guns opened, and the hostile cavalry fell back; but
from a distant undulation a Federal battery came into action, and the
squadrons, supported by this fire, returned to their old position.
Although Cedar Run was distant seven miles from Culpeper, it was
evident, from the attitude of the cavalry, that the enemy was inclined
to make a stand, and that in all probability Banks’ army corps was in
support.[10] Early’s brigade, forming the advanced
guard which had halted in a wood by the roadside, was now ordered
forward. Deploying to the right of the highway, it drove in the enemy’s
vedettes, and came out on the open ground which overlooks the stream.
Across the shallow valley, covered with the high stalks and broad
leaves of Indian corn, rose a loftier ridge, twelve hundred yards
distant, and from more than one point batteries opened on the
Confederate scouts. The regiments of the advanced guard were
immediately withdrawn to the reverse slope of the ridge, and Jackson
galloped forward to the mound of the guns. His dispositions had been
quickly made. A large force of artillery was ordered to come into
action on either flank of the advanced guard. Ewell’s division was
ordered to the right, taking post on the northern face of Slaughter
Mountain; Winder was ordered to the left, and Hill, as soon as he came
up, was to form the reserve, in rear of Winder. These movements took
time. The Confederate column, 20,000 infantry and fifteen batteries,
must have occupied more than seven miles of road; it would consequently
take over two hours for the whole force to deploy for battle.
2.45 p.m. Before three o’clock, however, the first line was formed. On
the right of the advanced guard, near a clump of cedars, were eight
guns, and on Slaughter Mountain eight more. Along the high-road to the
left six guns of Winder’s division were soon afterwards deployed,
reinforced by four of Hill’s. These twenty-six pieces, nearly the whole
of the long-range ordnance which the Confederates possessed, were
turned on the opposing batteries, and for nearly two hours the
artillery thundered across the valley. The infantry, meanwhile,
awaiting Hill’s arrival, had come into line. Ewell’s brigades,
Trimble’s, and the Louisianians (commanded by Colonel Forno) had halted
in the woods on the extreme right, at the base of the mountain,
threatening the enemy’s flank. Winder had come up on the left, and had
posted the Stonewall Brigade in rear of his guns; Campbell’s
brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Garnett, was stationed in front,
west, and Taliaferro’s brigade east, of the road. The 10,000 men of the
Light Division, however, were still some distance to the rear, and the
position was hardly secure against a counterstroke. The left of the
line extended along a skirt of woodland, which ran at right angles to
the road, overlooking a wheat-field but lately reaped, on the further
side of which, and three hundred yards distant, was dense wood. This
point was the most vulnerable, for there was no support at hand, and a
great tract of forest stretched away westward, where cavalry was
useless, but through which it was quite possible that infantry might
force its way. Jackson ordered Colonel Garnett, commanding the brigade
on this flank, “to look well to his left, and to ask his divisional
commander for reinforcements.” The brigadier sent a staff officer and
an orderly to reconnoitre the forest to the left, and two officers were
dispatched to secure the much-needed support.
But at this juncture General Winder was mortally wounded by a shell;
there was some delay in issuing orders, and before the weak place in
the line could be strengthened the storm broke. The enemy’s batteries,
five in number, although the concentrated fire of the Confederates had
compelled them to change position, had not yet been silenced. No large
force of Federal infantry had as yet appeared; skirmishers only had
pushed forward through the corn; but the presence of so many guns was a
clear indication that a strong force was not far off, and Jackson had
no intention of attacking a position which had not yet been
reconnoitred until his rear division had closed up, and the hostile
artillery had lost its sting.
5 p.m. About five o’clock, however, General Banks, although his whole
force, including Bayard’s cavalry, did not exceed 9,000 officers and
men,[11] and Ricketts’ division, in support, was four miles distant,
gave orders for a general attack.[12] Two brigades, crossing the rise
which formed the Federal position,
bore down on the Confederate centre, and strove to cross the stream.
Early was hard pressed, but, Taliaferro’s brigade advancing on his
left, he held his own; and on the highroad, raked by a Confederate gun,
the enemy was unable to push forward. But within the wood to the left,
at the very point where Jackson had advised precaution, the line of
defence was broken through. On the edge of the timber commanding the
wheatfield only two Confederate regiments were posted, some 500 men all
told, and the 1st Virginia, on the extreme left, was completely
isolated. The Stonewall Brigade, which should have been placed in
second line behind them, had not yet received its orders; it was more
than a half-mile distant, in rear of Winder’s artillery, and hidden
from the first line by the trees and undergrowth. Beyond the
wheat-field 1,500 Federals, covered by a line of skirmishers, had
formed up in the wood. Emerging from the covert with fixed bayonets and
colours flying, their long line, overlapping the Confederate left,
moved steadily across the three hundred yards of open ground. The
shocks of corn, and some ragged patches of scrub timber, gave cover to
the skirmishers, but in the closed ranks behind the accurate fire of
the Southern riflemen made fearful ravages. Still the enemy pressed
forward; the skirmishers darted from bush to bush; the regiments on the
right swung round, enveloping the Confederate line; and the 1st
Virginia, despite the entreaties of its officers, broke and
scattered.[13] Assailed in front from the field and in flank from the
forest, the men would stand no longer, and flying back through the
woodland, left the way open to the very rear of the position. The 42nd
Virginia, outflanked in turn, was compelled to give ground; and the
Federals, without waiting to reform, swept rapidly through the wood,
and bore down upon the flank of Taliaferro’s brigade and Winder’s
batteries.
And now occurred a scene of terrible confusion. So swift was the
onslaught that the first warning received by the Confederates on the
highroad was a sudden storm
of musketry, the loud cheers of the enemy, and the rush of fugitives
from the forest. Attacked simultaneously in front, flank and rear, with
the guns and limbers entangled among the infantry, Winder’s division
was subjected to an ordeal of which it was without experience. The
batteries, by Jackson’s order, were at once withdrawn, and not a gun
was lost. The infantry, however, did not escape so lightly. The
Federals, emboldened by the flight of the artillery, charged forward
with reckless courage. Every regimental commander in Garnett’s brigade
was either killed or wounded. Taliaferro’s brigade was driven back, and
Early’s left was broken. Some regiments attempted to change front,
others retreated in disorder. Scattered groups, plying butt and
bayonet, endeavoured to stay the rout. Officers rushed into the
_mêlée,_ and called upon those at hand to follow. Men were captured and
recaptured, and, for a few moments, the blue and grey were mingled in
close conflict amid the smoke. But the isolated efforts of the
Confederates were of no avail. The first line was irretrievably broken;
the troops were mingled in a tumultuous mass, through which the shells
tore shrieking; the enemy’s bayonets were surging forward on every
side, and his well-served batteries, firing over the heads of their own
infantry, played heavily on the road. But fortunately for the
Virginians the Federal right wing was unsupported; and although the
Light Division was still at some distance from the field, the Stonewall
Brigade was already advancing. Breaking through the rout to the left of
the highroad, these five staunch regiments, undismayed by the disaster,
opened a heavy fire. The Federals, although still superior in numbers
at the decisive point, had lost all order in their successful charge;
to meet this fresh onset they halted and drew together, and then
Jackson, with wonderful energy, restored the battle.
Sending orders for Ewell and A. P. Hill to attack at once, he galloped
forward, unattended by either staff officer or orderly, and found
himself in the midst of his own men, his soldiers of the Valley, no
longer presenting the stubborn front of Bull Run or Kernstown, but an
ungovernable mob, breaking rapidly to the rear, and on the very
verge of panic. Drawing his sword, for the first time in the war, his
voice pealed high above the din; the troops caught the familiar
accents, instinct with resolution, and the presence of their own
general acted like a spell. “Rally, men,” he shouted, “and follow me!”
Taliaferro, riding up to him, emphatically insisted that the midst of
the _mêlée_ was no place for the leader of an army. He looked a little
surprised, but with his invariable ejaculation of “Good, good,” turned
slowly to the rear. The impulse, however, had already been given to the
Confederate troops. With a wild yell the remnant of the 21st Virginia
rushed forward to the front, and received the pursuers with a sudden
volley. The officers of other regiments, inspired by the example of
their commander, bore the colours forward, and the men, catching the
enthusiasm of the moment, followed in the path of the 21st. The