Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Federals recoiled. Taliaferro and Early, reforming their brigades,
again advanced upon the right; and Jackson, his front once more
established, turned his attention to the counterstroke he had already
initiated.
Ewell was ordered to attack the Federal left. Branch, leading the Light
Division, was sent forward to support the Stonewall Brigade, and Lane
to charge down the highroad. Thomas was to give aid to Early. Archer
and Pender, following Branch, were to outflank the enemy’s right, and
Field and Stafford were to follow as third line.
Ewell was unable to advance at once, for the Confederate batteries on
Slaughter Mountain swept the whole field, and it was some time before
they could be induced to cease fire. But on the left the mass of fresh
troops, directed on the critical point, exerted a decisive influence.
The Federal regiments, broken and exhausted, were driven back into the
wood and across the wheat-field by the charge of the Stonewall Brigade.
Still they were not yet done with. Before Hill’s troops could come into
action, Jackson’s old regiments, as they advanced into the open, were
attacked in front and threatened on the flank. The 4th and 27th
Virginia were immediately thrown back to meet the more pressing danger,
forming to the left within
the wood; but assailed in the confusion of rapid movement, they gave
way and scattered through the thickets. But the rift in the line was
rapidly closed up. Jackson, riding in front of the Light Division, and
urging the men to hold their fire and use their bayonets, rallied the
27th and led them to the front; while Branch’s regiments, opening their
ranks for the fugitives to pass through, and pressing forward with
unbroken line, drove back the Northern skirmishers, and moving into the
wheatfield engaged their main body in the opposite wood.
Lane, meanwhile, was advancing astride the road; Archer and Pender, in
accordance with Jackson’s orders, were sweeping round through the
forest, and Field and Stafford were in rear of Branch. A fresh brigade
had come up to sustain the defeated Federals; but gallantly as they
fought, the Northerners could make no head against overwhelming
numbers. Outflanked to both right and left, for Early and Ewell were
now moving forward, they began to yield. Jackson rode forward to the
wheat-field, and just at this moment Banks made a despairing effort to
extricate his infantry. Two squadrons, hitherto concealed by the woods,
appeared suddenly on the road, and, deploying into two lines, charged
full against the Confederate centre. The skirmishers were ridden down;
but the troops in rear stood firm, and several companies, running to a
fence along the highway, poured a devastating fire into the mass of
horsemen. Out of 174 officers and men only 71 rode back.[14]
6.30 p.m. This brilliant but useless exploit brought no respite to the
Federals. Archer and Pender had turned their right; Ewell was pressing
forward against their left, scaling the ridge on which their batteries
had been posted; Early and Lane were pressing back their centre, and
their guns had already limbered up. Jackson, galloping to the front,
was received with the cheers of his victorious troops. In every quarter
of the field the enemy was in full retreat, and as darkness began to
fall the whole Confederate line crossed Cedar Run and swept up the
slopes beyond. Every yard of ground bore witness to the severity of the
fighting. The slaughter had been very heavy. Within ninety minutes
3,000 men had fallen. The woods were a shambles, and among the corn the
dead lay thick. Scores of prisoners surrendered themselves, and
hundreds of discarded muskets bore witness to the demoralisation of the
Northerners. Nevertheless, the pursuit was slow. The impetuosity of the
Confederates, eager to complete their triumph, was checked with a firm
hand. The infantry were ordered to reform before they entered the dense
forest which lay between them and Culpeper. The guns, unable to cross
Cedar Run except by the road, were brought over in a single column, and
two fresh brigades, Field’s and Stafford’s, which had not yet fired a
shot, were brought forward as advanced guard. Although Jackson had been
careful to bring guides who knew the woodland tracks, there was need
for prudence. The light was failing; the cavalry could find no space to
act; and, above all, the whereabouts of Pope’s main body was still
uncertain. The Federals had fought with fine courage. Their resolute
attack, pressed home with extraordinary dash, had rolled up the
choicest of the Valley regiments. And yet it was evident that only a
small portion of the Northern army had been engaged. The stirring
incidents of the battle had been crowded into a short space of time. It
was five o’clock when the Federals left their covert. An hour and a
half later they had abandoned the field. Their precipitate retreat, the
absence of a strong rear-guard, were sure tokens that every regiment
had been employed in the attack, and it was soon discovered by the
Confederate soldiers that these regiments were old opponents of the
Valley army. The men who had surprised and outflanked Jackson’s old
division were the same men that had been surprised at Front Royal and
outflanked at Winchester. But Banks’ army corps formed only a third
part of Pope’s army. Sigel and McDowell were still to be accounted for.
It was possible, however, that no more formidable enemies than the
troops already defeated would be found between Cedar Run and Culpeper,
and Jackson, intent
upon securing that strategic point before morning,[15] pushed steadily
forward. Of the seven miles that intervened between the battle-field
and the Court House only one-and-a-half had been passed, when the
scouts brought information that the enemy was in position a few hundred
yards to the front. A battery was immediately sent forward to develop
the situation. The moon was full, and on the far side of the glade
where the advanced guard, acting under Jackson’s orders, had halted and
deployed, a strong line of fire marked the hostile front. Once more the
woodland avenues reverberated to the crash of musketry, and when the
guns opened a portion of the Federal line was seen flying in disorder.
Pope himself had arrived upon the scene, but surprised by the sudden
salvo of Jackson’s guns, he was constrained to do what he had never
done in the West—to turn his back upon the enemy, and seek a safer
position. Yet despite the disappearance of the staff the Union
artillery made a vigorous reply. Two batteries, hidden by the timber,
concentrated on the four guns of the advanced guard, and about the same
moment the Confederate cavalry on the extreme right reported that they
had captured prisoners belonging to Sigel’s army corps. “Believing it
imprudent,” says Jackson, “to continue to move forward during the
darkness, I ordered a halt for the night.”
August 10 Further information appears to have come to hand after
midnight; and early the next morning General Stuart, who had arrived on
a tour of inspection, having been placed in charge of the cavalry,
ascertained beyond all question that the greater part of Pope’s army
had come up. The Confederates were ordered to withdraw, and before noon
nearly the whole force had regained their old position on Cedar Run.
They were not followed, save by the Federal cavalry; and for two days
they remained in position, ready to receive attack. The enemy, however,
gave no sign of aggressive intentions.
August 11 On the morning of the 11th a flag of truce was received, and
Pope was permitted to bury the dead which had not already been
interred. The same
night, his wounded, his prisoners, and the captured arms having already
been removed, Jackson returned to his old camps near Gordonsville.
August 12 His position on Cedar Run, tactically strong, was
strategically unsound. The intelligence he had obtained was
substantially correct. With the exception of five regiments of
McDowell’s cavalry, only Banks’ army corps had been engaged at Cedar
Run. But during the evening both Sigel and McDowell had reached the
field, and it was their troops which had checked the Confederate
pursuit. In fact, on the morning of the 10th, Pope, besides 5,000
cavalry, had 22,000 fresh troops in addition to those which had been
defeated, and which he estimated at 5,000 effectives, wherewith to bar
the way to Culpeper. McDowell’s second division, 10,000 strong, on the
march from Fredericksburg, was not more than twenty mites east of
Slaughter Mountain.
In front, therefore, Jackson was confronted by superior numbers. At the
least estimate, 32,000 men were posted beyond Cedar Run, and 10,000
under King were coming up from Fredericksburg. Nor was a preponderance
of numbers the only obstacle with which Jackson had to deal. A direct
attack on Pope was impossible, but a turning movement, by way of James
City, might have found him unprepared, or a swift advance might have
crushed King. But for the execution of either manœuvre a large force of
cavalry was absolutely essential. By this means alone could the march
be concealed and a surprise effected. In view, however, of the superior
strength of the Federal horsemen such a project was unfeasible, and
retreat was manifestly the only alternative. Nevertheless, it was not
till he was assured that no further opportunity would be given him that
Jackson evacuated his position. For two days he remained on Cedar Run,
within two miles of the Federal outposts, defying his enemy to battle.
If an attack on the Federals promised nothing but defeat, it was not so
sure that Pope with 27,000 infantry, of whom a considerable number had
just tasted defeat, would be able to oust Jackson with 22,000 from a
position
which the latter had selected; and it was not till King’s approach gave
the Federals an overwhelming superiority that the Confederates withdrew
behind the Rapidan.
With sublime audacity, as soon as his enemy had disappeared, Pope
claimed the battle of Cedar Run as a Federal success. Carried away by
enthusiasm he ventured to forecast the future. “It is safe to predict,”
he declared in a general order, “that this is only the first of a
series of victories which shall make the Army of Virginia famous in the
land.” That such language, however, was the natural result of intense
relief at Jackson’s retreat may be inferred from his telegrams, which,
unfortunately for his reputation, have been preserved in the archives
of Washington. Nor was his attitude on the 10th and 11th that of a
victorious commander. For two days he never stirred from his position.
He informed Halleck that the enemy was in very superior force, that
Stuart and Longstreet had joined Jackson, and while the Confederates
were withdrawing he was telegraphing that he would certainly be
attacked the next morning.
Halleck’s reply to Pope’s final dispatch, which congratulated the
defeated army corps on a “hard-earned but brilliant success,” must have
astonished Banks and his hapless troops. They might indeed be fairly
considered to have “covered themselves with glory.”[16] 9,000 men, of
which only 7,000 were infantry, had given an enemy of more than double
their strength a hard fight. They had broken some of the best troops in
the Confederate army, under their most famous leader; and if they had
been overwhelmed by numbers, they had at least fought to the last man.
Jackson himself bore witness to the vigour of their onslaught, to their
“temporary triumph,” and to the “impetuous valour” of their cavalry.
The Federal defeat was more honourable than many victories. But that it
was a crushing defeat can hardly be disputed. The two divisions which