Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
however, that he would reinforce Pope, and Lee held fast to his idea of
crushing his enemies in detail. Aquia Creek was only thirty-five miles’
march from the Rappahannock, but the disembarkation with horses,
trains, and artillery must needs be a lengthy process, and it might
still be possible, by skilful and swift
manœuvres, to redeem the time which had been already lost. But the
Federal position was very strong.
August 21 Early on the 21st it was ascertained that Pope’s whole army
was massed on the left bank of the Rappahannock, extending from Kelly’s
Ford to Hazel Run, and that a powerful artillery crowned the commanding
bluffs. To turn the line of the river from the south was hardly
practicable. The Federal cavalry was vigilant, and Pope would have
quietly fallen back on Washington. A turning movement from the north
was more promising, and during the day Stuart, supported by Jackson,
made vigorous efforts to find a passage across the river. Covered by a
heavy fire of artillery, the squadrons drove in a regiment and a
battery holding Beverley Ford, and spread their patrols over the
country on the left bank. It was soon evident, however, that the ground
was unsuitable for attack, and Stuart, menaced by a strong force of
infantry, withdrew his troopers across the stream. Nothing further was
attempted. Jackson went into bivouac near St. James’s Church, and
Longstreet closed in upon his right.
August 22 The next morning, in accordance with Lee’s orders to “seek a
more favourable place to cross higher up the river, and thus gain the
enemy’s right,” Jackson, still preceded by Stuart, and concealing his
march as far as possible in the woods, moved towards the fords near
Warrenton Springs. Longstreet, meanwhile, marched towards the bridge at
Rappahannock Station, where the enemy had established a _tête-de-pont,_
and bringing his guns into action at every opportunity, made brisk
demonstrations along the river.
Late in the afternoon, after an attack on his rear-guard at Welford’s
Mill had been repulsed by Trimble, reinforced by Hood, Jackson, under a
lowering sky, reached the ruined bridge at the Sulphur Springs. Only a
few of the enemy’s cavalry had been descried, and he at once made
preparations to effect the passage of the Rappahannock. The 13th
Georgia dashed through the ford, and occupied the cottages of the
little watering-place. Early’s brigade and two batteries crossed by an
old mill-dam, a mile below, and
took post on the ridge beyond. But heavy rain had begun to fall; the
night was closing in; and the river, swollen by the storms in the
mountains, was already rising. The difficulties of the passage
increased every moment, and the main body of the Valley army was
ordered into bivouac on the western bank. It was not, however, the
darkness of the ford or the precarious footing of the mill-dam that
held Jackson back from reinforcing his advanced guard, but the
knowledge that these dangerous roadways would soon be submerged by a
raging torrent. Early was, indeed, in peril, but it was better that one
brigade should take its chance of escape than that one half the column
should be cut off from the remainder.
August 23 Next morning the pioneers were ordered to repair the bridge,
while Longstreet, feinting strongly against the _tête-de-pont,_ gave
Pope occupation. Early’s troops, under cover of the woods, moved
northward to the protection of a creek named Great Run, and although
the Federal cavalry kept close watch upon him, no attack was made till
nightfall. This was easily beaten back; and Jackson, anxious to keep
the attention of the enemy fixed on this point, sent over another
brigade.
August 24 At dawn on the 24th, however, as the Federals were reported
to be advancing in force, the detachment was brought back to the
Confederate bank. The men had been for two days and a night without
food or shelter. It was in vain that Early, after the bridge had been
restored, had requested to be withdrawn. Jackson sent Lawton to
reinforce him with the curt message: “Tell General Early to hold his
position;” and although the generals grumbled at their isolation, Pope
was effectually deluded into the conviction that a serious attack had
been repulsed, and that no further attempt to turn his right was to be
immediately apprehended. The significance of Jackson’s action will be
seen hereafter.
While Jackson was thus mystifying the enemy, both Longstreet and Stuart
had been hard at work. The former, after an artillery contest of
several hours’ duration, had driven the enemy from his _tête-de-pont_
on the railway, and had burnt the bridge. The latter, on the morning of
the
22nd, had moved northward with the whole of the cavalry, except two
regiments, and had ridden round the Federal right. Crossing the
Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Hart’s Mills, he marched eastward
without meeting a single hostile scout, and as evening fell the column
of 1,500 men and two pieces of artillery clattered into Warrenton. The
troopers dismounted in the streets. The horses were fed and watered,
and while the officers amused themselves by registering their names,
embellished with fantastic titles, at the hotel, Stuart’s staff,
questioning the throng of women and old men, elicited important
information. None of the enemy’s cavalry had been seen in the vicinity
for some days, and Pope’s supply trains were parked at Catlett’s
Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railway, ten miles south-east.
After an hour’s rest the force moved on, and passing through Auburn
village was caught by the same storm that had cut off Early. The narrow
roads became running streams, and the creeks which crossed the line of
march soon rose to the horses’ withers. But this was the very condition
of the elements most favourable for the enterprise. The enemy’s
vedettes and patrols, sheltering from the fury of the storm, were
captured, one after another, by the advanced guard, and the two
brigades arrived at Catlett’s Station without the Federals receiving
the least notice of their approach.
A moment’s halt, a short consultation, a silent movement forward, and
the astonished sentinels were overpowered. Beyond were the encampments
and the trains, guarded by 1,500 infantry and 500 horsemen. The night
was dark—the darkest, said Stuart, that he had ever known. Without a
guide concerted action seemed impossible. The rain still fell in
torrents, and the raiders, soaked to the skin, could only grope
aimlessly in the gloom. But just at this moment a negro was captured
who recognised Stuart, and who knew where Pope’s baggage and horses
were to be found. He was told to lead the way, and Colonel W. H. F.
Lee, a son of the Commander-in-Chief, was ordered to follow with his
regiment. The guide
led the column towards the headquarter tents. “Then there mingled with
the noise of the rain upon the canvas and the roar of the wind in the
forest the rushing sound of many horsemen, of loud voices, and clashing
sabres.” One of Pope’s staff officers, together with the uniform and
horses of the Federal commander, his treasure chest, and his personal
effects, fell into the hands of the Confederates, and the greater part
of the enemy’s troops, suddenly alarmed in the deep darkness, dispersed
into the woods. Another camp was quickly looted, and the 1st and 5th
Virginia Cavalry were sent across the railway, riding without accident,
notwithstanding the darkness, over a high embankment with deep ditches
on either side. But the Federal guards had now rallied under cover, and
the attack on the railway waggons had to be abandoned. Another party
had taken in hand the main object of the expedition, the destruction of
the railway bridge over Cedar Run. The force which should have defended
it was surprised and scattered. The timbers, however, were by this time
thoroughly saturated, and only a few axes had been discovered. Some
Federal skirmishers maintained a heavy fire from the opposite bank, and
it was impossible to complete the work. The telegraph was more easily
dealt with; and shortly before daylight on the 23rd, carrying with him
300 prisoners, including many officers, Stuart withdrew by the light of
the blazing camp, and after a march of sixty miles in six-and-twenty
hours, reached the Sulphur Springs before evening.
The most important result of this raid was the capture of Pope’s
dispatch book, containing most detailed information as to his strength,
dispositions, and designs; referring to the reinforcements he expected,
and disclosing his belief that the line of the Rappahannock was no
longer tenable. But the enterprise had an indirect effect upon the
enemy’s calculations, which was not without bearing on the campaign.
Pope believed that Stuart’s advance on Catlett’s Station had been made
in connection with Jackson’s attempt to cross at Sulphur Springs; and
the retreat of the cavalry, combined with that of Early, seemed
to indicate that the movement to turn his right had been definitely
abandoned.
The Federal commander was soon to be undeceived. Thrice had General Lee
been baulked. The enemy, who should have been annihilated on August 19,
had gained six days’ respite. On the 20th he had placed himself behind
the Rappahannock. On the 22nd the rising waters forbade Jackson’s
passage at the Sulphur Springs; and now, on the afternoon of the 24th,
the situation was still unchanged. Disregarding Longstreet’s
demonstrations, Pope had marched northward, keeping pace with Jackson,
and his whole force was concentrated on the great road which runs from
the Sulphur Springs through Warrenton and Gainesville to Washington and
Alexandria. He had answered move by countermove. Hitherto, except in
permitting Early to recross the river, he had made no mistake, and he
had gained time. He had marched over thirty miles, and executed
complicated manœuvres, without offering the Confederates an opening.
His position near the Sulphur Springs was as strong as that which he
had left on the lower reaches near the railway bridge. Moreover, the
correspondence in his dispatch book disclosed the fact that a portion
at least of McClellan’s army had landed at Aquia Creek, and was
marching to Bealtown;[6] that a strong force, drawn from the Kanawha
Valley and elsewhere, was assembling at Washington; and that 150,000
men might be concentrated within a few days on the Rappahannock. Lee,
on learning McClellan’s destination, immediately asked that the troops
which had been retained at Richmond should be sent to join him. Mr.
Davis assented, but it was not till the request had been repeated and
time lost that the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws’, two brigades of
infantry, under J. G. Walker, and Hampton’s cavalry
brigade were ordered up. Yet these reinforcements only raised Lee’s
numbers to 75,000 men, and they were from eighty to a hundred miles
distant by an indifferent railroad.
Nor was it possible to await their arrival. Instant action was
imperative. But what action was possible? A defensive attitude could
only result in the Confederate army being forced back by superior
strength; and retreat on Richmond would be difficult, for the Federals
held the interior lines. The offensive seemed out of the question.
Pope’s position was more favourable than before. His army was massed,
and reinforcements were close at hand. His right flank was well
secured. The ford at Sulphur Springs and the Waterloo Bridge were both
in his possession; north of the Springs rose the Bull Run Mountains, a
range covered with thick forest, and crossed by few roads; and his left
was protected by the march of McClellan’s army corps from Aquia Creek.
Even the genius of a Napoleon might well have been baffled by the
difficulties in the way of attack. But there were men in the