Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
south-west, where the great Groveton valley, backed by the wooded
mountains, lay green and beautiful, rose the dull booming of cannon,
swelling to a continuous roar; and as the weary soldiers, climbing the
slopes near Centreville, looked eagerly in the direction of the sound,
the rolling smoke of a fierce battle was distinctly visible above the
woods which bordered the Warrenton-Alexandria highway.
Across Bull Run, in the neighbourhood of Groveton, and still further
westward, where the cleft in the blue hills marked Thoroughfare Gap,
was seen the flash of distant guns. McDowell, marching northwards
through Gainesville, had evidently come into collision with the enemy.
Jackson was run to earth at last; and it was now clear that while Pope
had been moving northwards on Centreville, the Confederates had been
moving westward, and that they were once more within reach of Lee. But
by what means, Pope might well have asked, had a whole army corps, with
its batteries and waggons, passed through the cordon which he had
planned to throw around it, and passed through as if gifted with the
secret of invisibility?
The explanation was simple. While his enemies were watching the
midnight glare above Manassas, Jackson was moving north by three roads;
and before morning broke A. P. Hill was near Centreville, Ewell had
crossed Bull Run by Blackburn’s Ford, and Taliaferro was north of Bald
Hill, with a brigade at Groveton, while Stuart’s squadrons formed a
screen to front and flank. Then, as the Federals slowly converged on
Manassas, Hill and Ewell, marching unobserved along the north bank of
Bull Run, crossed the Stone Bridge; Taliaferro joined them, and before
Pope had found that his enemy had left the Junction, the Confederates
were in bivouac north of Groveton, hidden in the woods, and recovering
from the fatigue of their long night march.[19]
Jackson’s arrangements for deceiving his enemy, for concealing his line
of retreat, and for drawing Pope northward on Centreville, had been
carefully thought out. The march from Manassas was no hasty movement to
the rear. Taliaferro, as soon as darkness fell, had moved by New Market
on Bald Hill. At 1 a.m. Ewell followed Hill to Blackburn’s Ford; but
instead of continuing the march on Centrevile, had crossed Bull Run,
and moving up stream, had joined Taliaferro by way of the Stone Bridge.
Hill, leaving Centreville at 10 a.m.,
marched to the same rendezvous. Thus, while the attention of the enemy
was attracted to Centreville, Jackson’s divisions were concentrated in
the woods beyond Bull Bun, some five or six miles west. The position in
which his troops were resting had been skilfully selected. South of
Sudley Springs, and north of the Warrenton turnpike, it was within
twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, and a line of retreat, in case of
emergency, as well as a line by which Lee could join him, should
Thoroughfare Gap be blocked, ran to Aldie Gap, the northern pass of the
Bull Run Mountains. Established on his enemy’s flank, he could avoid
the full shock of his force should Lee be delayed, or he could strike
effectively himself; and it was to retain the power of striking that he
had not moved further northward, and secured his front by camping
beyond Catharpen Run. It was essential that he should be prepared for
offensive action. The object with which he had marched upon Manassas
had only been half accomplished. Pope had been compelled to abandon the
strong line of the Rappahannock, but he had not yet been defeated; and
if he were not defeated, he would combine with McClellan, and advance
in a few days in overwhelming force. Lee looked for a battle with Pope
before he could be reinforced, and to achieve this end it was necessary
that the Federal commander should be prevented from retreating further;
that Jackson should hold him by the throat until Lee should come up to
administer the _coup de grâce._
It was with this purpose in his mind that Jackson had taken post near
Groveton, and he was now awaiting the information that should tell him
the time had come to strike. But, as already related, the march of the
Federals on Manassas was slow and toilsome. It was not till the morning
was well on that the brigade of Taliaferro’s division near Groveton,
commanded by Colonel Bradley Johnson, was warned by the cavalry that
the enemy was moving through Gainesville in great strength. A skirmish
took place a mile or two north of that village, and Johnson, finding
himself menaced by far superior numbers, fell back
to the wood near the Douglass House. He was not followed. The Union
generals, Sigel and Reynolds, who had been ordered to Manassas to “bag”
Jackson, had received no word of his departure from the Junction; and
believing that Johnson’s small force was composed only of cavalry, they
resumed the march which had been temporarily interrupted.
The situation, however, was no clearer to the Confederates. The enemy
had disappeared in the great woods south-west of Groveton, and heavy
columns were still reported coming up from Gainesville. During the
afternoon, however, the cavalry captured a Federal courier, carrying
McDowell’s orders for the movement of the left and centre, which had
been placed under his command, to Manassas Junction,[20] and this
important document was immediately forwarded to Jackson.
“Johnson’s messenger,” says General Taliaferro, “found the Confederate
headquarters established on the shady side of an old-fashioned
worm-fence, in the corner of which General Jackson and his division
commanders were profoundly sleeping after the fatigues of the preceding
night, notwithstanding the intense heat of the August day. There was
not so much as an ambulance at headquarters. The headquarters’ train
was back beyond the Rappahannock, at Jefferson, with remounts, camp
equipage, and all the arrangements for cooking and serving food. All
the property of the general, the staff, and the headquarters’ bureau
was strapped to the pommels and cantels of the saddles, and these
formed the pillows of their weary owners. The captured dispatch roused
Jackson like an electric shock. He was essentially a man of action. He
rarely, if ever, hesitated. He never asked advice. He called no council
to discuss the situation disclosed by this
communication, although his ranking officers were almost at his side.
He asked no conference of opinion. He made no suggestion, but simply,
without a word, except to repeat the language of the message, turned to
me and said: ‘Move your division and attack the enemy;’ and to Ewell,
‘Support the attack.’ The slumbering soldiers sprang from the earth at
the first murmur. They were sleeping almost in ranks; and by the time
the horses of their officers were saddled, the long lines of infantry
were moving to the anticipated battle-field.
“The two divisions, after marching some distance to the north of the
turnpike, were halted and rested, and the prospect of an engagement on
that afternoon seemed to disappear with the lengthening shadows. The
enemy did not come. The Warrenton turnpike, along which it was supposed
he would march, was in view, but it was as free from Federal soldiery
as it had been two days before, when Jackson’s men had streamed along
its highway.”[21]
Jackson, however, was better informed than his subordinate. Troops were
still moving through Gainesville, and, instead of turning off to
Manassas, were marching up the turnpike on which so many eyes were
turned from the neighbouring woods. King’s division, while on the march
to Manassas, had been instructed to countermarch and make for
Centrevile, by Groveton and the Stone Bridge. Ricketts, who had been
ordered by McDowell to hold Thoroughfare Gap, was already engaged with
Longstreet’s advanced guard, and of this Jackson was aware; for Stuart,
in position at Haymarket, three miles north of Gainesville, had been
skirmishing all day with the enemy’s cavalry, and had been in full view
of the conflict at the Gap.[22]
Jackson, however, knew not that one division was all that was before
him. The Federal movements had covered
so wide an extent of country, and had been so well concealed by the
forests, that it was hardly possible for Stuart’s patrols, enterprising
as they were, to obtain accurate information. Unaccustomed to such
disjointed marches as were now in progress across his front, Jackson
believed that King’s column was the flank-guard of McDowell’s army
corps. But, although he had been compelled to leave Hill near the Stone
Bridge, in order to protect his line of retreat on Aldie, he had still
determined to attack. The main idea which absorbed his thoughts is
clear enough. The Federal army, instead of moving direct from Warrenton
on Alexandria, as he had anticipated, had apparently taken the more
circuitous route by Manassas, and if Pope was to be fought in the open
field before he could be reinforced by McClellan, he must be induced to
retrace his steps. To do this, the surest means was a resolute attack
on King’s division, despite the probability that it might be strongly
reinforced; and it is by no means unlikely that Jackson deferred his
attack until near sunset in order that, if confronted by superior
numbers, he might still be able to hold on till nightfall, and obtain
time for Longstreet to come up.
Within the wood due north of the Dogan House, through which ran an
unfinished railroad, Ewell’s and Taliaferro’s divisions, awaiting the
propitious moment for attack, were drawn up in order of battle. Eight
brigades, and three small batteries, which had been brought across
country with great difficulty, were present, and the remainder of the
artillery was not far distant.[23] Taliaferro, on the right, had two
brigades (A. G. Taliaferro’s and the Stonewall) in first line; Starke
was in second line, and Bradley Johnson near Groveton village. Ewell,
on the left, had placed Lawton and Trimble in front, while Early and
Forno formed a general reserve. This force numbered in all about 8,000
men, and even the skirmishers, thrown out well to the front, were
concealed by the undulations of the ground.
The Federal division commanded by General King, although unprovided
with cavalry and quite unsupported, was no unworthy enemy. It was
composed of four brigades of infantry, led by excellent officers, and
accompanied by four batteries. The total strength was 10,000 men. The
absence of horsemen, however, placed the Northerners at a disadvantage
from the outset.
The leading brigade was within a mile of Groveton, a hamlet of a few
houses at the foot of a long descent, and the advanced guard, deployed
as skirmishers, was searching the woods in front. On the road in rear,
with the batteries between the columns, came the three remaining
brigades—Gibbon’s, Doubleday’s, and Patrick’s—in the order named.
The wood in which the Confederates were drawn up was near a mile from
the highway, on a commanding ridge, overlooking a broad expanse of open
ground, which fell gently in successive undulations to the road. The
Federals were marching in absolute unconsciousness that the enemy, whom
the last reports had placed at Manassas, far away to the right, was
close at hand. No flank-guards had been thrown out. General King was at
Gainesville, sick, and a regimental band had just struck up a merry
quickstep. On the open fields to the left, bathed in sunshine, there
was not a sign of life. The whitewashed cottages, surrounded by green
orchards, which stood upon the slopes, were lonely and untenanted, and
on the edge of the distant wood, still and drooping in the heat, was
neither stir nor motion. The troops trudged steadily forward through
the dust; regiment after regiment disappeared in the deep copse which