Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
general who feels instinctively that his command is slipping from him,
and who sees in victory the only hope of retaining it, seldom listens
to the voice of prudence.
August 29 So on the morning of the 29th Jackson had to do with an enemy
who had resolved to overwhelm him by weight of numbers. Nor could he
expect immediate help. The Federal cavalry still stood between Stuart
and Thoroughfare Gap, and not only was Jackson unaware that Longstreet
had broken through, but he was unaware whether he could break through.
In any case, it would be several hours before he could receive support,
and for that space of time his three divisions, worn with long marching
and the fierce fight of the previous evening, would have to hold their
own unaided. The outlook, to all appearance, was anything but bright.
But on the opposite hills, where the Federals were now forming in line
of battle, the Valley soldiers had already given proof of their
stubborn qualities on the defensive. The sight of their baptismal
battle-field and the memories of Bull Run must have gone far to nerve
the hearts of the Stonewall regiments, and in preparing once more to
justify their proud title the troops were aided by their leader’s quick
eye for a position. While it was still dark the divisions which had
been engaged at Groveton took ground to their left, and passing north
of the hamlet, deployed on the right of A. P. Hill. The long,
flat-topped ridge, covered with scattered copses and rough undergrowth,
which stands north of the
Warrenton–Centreville road, commands the approaches from the south and
east, and some five hundred yards below the crest ran the unfinished
railroad.
Behind the deep cuttings and high embankments the Confederate
fighting-line was strongly placed. The left, lightly thrown back,
rested on a rocky spur near Bull Run, commanding Sudley Springs Ford
and the road to Aldie Gap. The front extended for a mile and
three-quarters south-west. Early, with two brigades and a battery,
occupied a wooded knoll where the unfinished railroad crosses the
highroad, protecting the right rear, and stretching a hand to
Longstreet.
The infantry and artillery were thus disposed:—
_Infantry_
Left.—A. P. Hill’s Division. First and Second line: Three brigades.
(Field, Thomas, Gregg.) Third line: Three brigades. (Branch,
Pender, Archer.)
Centre.—Two brigades of Ewell’s Division (now commanded by
Lawton). (Trimble’s and Lawton’s.)
Right.—Taliaferro’s Division (now commanded by Stark). First
and Second line: Two brigades. Third line: Two brigades.
Force detached on the right: Two brigades of Ewell’s Division
(Early and Forno), and one battery.
_Artillery_
16 guns behind the left, 24 guns behind the right centre: On the
ridge, five hundred yards in rear of the fighting-line.
The flanks were secured by Stuart. A portion of the cavalry was placed
at Haymarket to communicate as soon as possible with Longstreet. A
regiment was pushed out towards Manassas, and on the left bank of Bull
Run Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade watched the approaches from Centreville and
the north. Jackson’s strength, deducting the losses of the previous
day, and the numerous stragglers left behind during his forced marches,
can hardly have exceeded 18,000 muskets, supported by 40 guns, all that
there was room for, and some 2,500 cavalry. These numbers, however,
were ample for the defence of the position which had been selected.
Excluding the detached force on the extreme
right, the line occupied was three thousand yards in length, and to
every yard of this line there were more than five muskets, so that half
the force could be retained in third line or reserve. The position was
thus strongly held and strong by nature. The embankments formed stout
parapets, the cuttings deep ditches.
Before the right and the right centre the green pastures, shorn for
thirteen hundred yards of all obstacles save a few solitary cottages,
sloped almost imperceptibly to the brook which is called Young’s
Branch. The left centre and left, however, were shut in by a belt of
timber, from four hundred to six hundred yards in width, which we may
call the Groveton wood. This belt closed in upon, and at one point
crossed, the railroad, and, as regards the field of fire, it was the
weakest point. In another respect, however, it was the strongest, for
the defenders were screened by the trees from the enemy’s artillery.
The rocky hill on the left, facing north-east, was a point of vantage,
for an open corn-field lay between it and Bull Run. Within the
position, behind the copses and undulations, there was ample cover for
all troops not employed on the fighting-line; and from the ridge in
rear the general could view the field from commanding ground.
5.15 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m., while the Confederates were still
taking up their positions, the Federal columns were seen moving down
the heights near the Henry House. Jackson had ridden round his lines,
and ordering Early to throw forward two regiments east of the turnpike,
had then moved to the great battery forming in rear of his right
centre. His orders had already been issued. The troops were merely to
hold their ground, no general counterstroke was intended, and the
divisional commanders were to confine themselves to repulsing the
attack. The time for a strong offensive return had not yet come.
The enemy advanced slowly in imposing masses. Shortly after seven
o’clock, hidden to some extent by the woods, four divisions of infantry
deployed in several lines at the foot of the Henry Hill, and their
skirmishers became
engaged with the Confederate pickets. At the same moment three
batteries came into action on a rise north-east of Groveton, opposite
the Confederate centre, and Sigel, supported by Reynolds, prepared to
carry out his instructions, and hold Jackson until the remainder of
Pope’s army should arrive upon the field. At the end of July, Sigel’s
army corps had numbered 13,000 men. Allowing for stragglers and for
casualties on the Rappahannock, where it had been several times
engaged, it must still have mustered 11,000. It was accompanied by ten
batteries, and Reynolds’ division was composed of 8,000 infantry and
four batteries. The attack was thus no stronger than the defence, and
as the Federal artillery positions were restricted by the woods, there
could be little doubt of the result. In other respects, moreover, the
combatants were not evenly matched. Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians were fine
troops, already seasoned in the battles on the Peninsula, and commanded
by such officers as Meade and Seymour. But Sigel, who had been an
officer in the Baden army, had succeeded Frémont, and his corps was
composed of those same Germans whom Ewell had used so hardly at Cross
Keys. Many of them were old soldiers, who had borne arms in Europe; but
the stern discipline and trained officers of conscript armies were
lacking in America, and the Confederate volunteers had little respect
for these foreign levies. Nor were Sigel’s dispositions a brilliant
example of offensive tactics. His three divisions, Schurz’, Schenck’s,
and Steinwehr’s, supported by Milroy’s independent brigade, advanced to
the attack along a wide front. Schurz, with two brigades, moving into
the Groveton wood, assailed the Confederate left, while Milroy and
Schenck advanced over the open meadows which lay in front of the right.
Steinwehr was in reserve, and Reynolds, somewhat to the rear, moved
forward on the extreme left. The line was more than two miles long; the
artillery, hampered by the ground, could render but small assistance;
and at no single point were the troops disposed in sufficient depth to
break through the front of the defence. The attack, too, was piecemeal.
Advancing
through the wood, Schurz’ division was at once met by a sharp
counterstroke, delivered by the left brigade (Gregg’s South Carolina)
of A. P. Hill’s division, which drove the two Federal brigades apart.
Reinforcements were sent in by Milroy, who had been checked on the open
ground by the heavy fire of Jackson’s guns, and the Germans rallied;
but, after some hard fighting, a fresh counterstroke, in which Thomas’
brigade took part, drove them in disorder from the wood; and the South
Carolinians, following to the edge, poured heavy volleys into their
retreating masses. Schenck, meanwhile, deterred by the batteries on
Jackson’s right, had remained inactive; the Federal artillery, such as
had been brought into action, had produced no effect; Reynolds, who had
a difficult march, had not yet come into action; and in order to
support the broken troops Schenck was now ordered to close in upon the
right. But the opportunity had already passed.
10.15 a.m. It was now 10.30 a.m., and Jackson had long since learned
that Lee was near at hand. Longstreet’s advanced guard had passed
through Gainesville, and the main body was closing up. Not only had
time been gained, but two brigades alone had proved sufficient to hold
the enemy at arm’s length, and the rough counterstrokes had
disconcerted the order of attack. A fresh Federal force, however, was
already approaching. The troops from Centreville, comprising the
divisions of Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, 17,000 or 18,000 men, were
hurrying over the Stone Bridge; and a second and more vigorous attack
was now to be withstood. Sigel, too, was still capable of further
effort. Bringing up Steinwehr’s division, and demanding reinforcements
from Reno, he threw his whole force against the Confederate front.
Schenck, however, still exposed to the fire of the massed artillery,
was unable to advance, and Milroy in the centre was hurled back. But
through the wood the attack was vigorously pressed, and the fight raged
fiercely at close quarters along the railway. Between Gregg’s and
Thomas’ brigades a gap of over a hundred yards, as the men closed in
upon the
centre, had gradually opened. Opposite the gap was a deep cutting, and
the Federals, covered by the wood, massed here unobserved in heavy
force. Attack from this quarter was unexpected, and for a moment Hill’s
first line was in jeopardy. Gregg, however, had still a regiment in
second line, and throwing it quickly forward he drove the enemy across
the railroad. Then Hill, bringing up Branch from the third line, sent
this fresh brigade to Gregg’s support, and cleared the front.
The Germans had now been finally disposed of. But although Longstreet
had arrived upon the ground, and was deploying in the woods on
Jackson’s right, thus relieving Early, who at once marched to support
the centre, Jackson’s men had not yet finished with the enemy. Pope had
now taken over command; and besides the troops from Centreville, who
had already reached the field, McDowell and Porter, with 27,000 men,
were coming up from Manassas, and Reynolds had not yet been engaged.
But it is one thing to assemble large numbers on the battle-field,
another to give them the right direction.
In the direction of Gainesville high woods and rolling ridges had
concealed Longstreet’s approach, and the Federal patrols had been
everywhere held in check by Stuart’s squadrons. In ignorance,
therefore, that the whole Confederate army was concentrated before him,
Pope, anticipating an easy victory, determined to sweep Jackson from
the field. But it was first necessary to relieve Sigel. Kearney’s
division had already deployed on the extreme right of the Federal line,
resting on Bull Run. Hooker was on the left of Kearney and a brigade of
Reno’s on the left of Hooker. While Sigel assembled his shattered
forces, these 10,000 fresh troops, led by some of the best officers of
the Army of the Potomac, were ordered to advance against A. P. Hill.
Reynolds, under the impression that he was fighting Jackson, was