Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
already in collision with Longstreet’s advanced-guard; and McDowell and
Porter, marching along the railway from Manassas, might be expected to
strike the Confederate right rear at any moment. It was then with good
hope of victory that Pope rode along his line and explained the
situation to his generals.
But the fresh attack was made with no better concert than those which
preceded it. Kearney, on the right, near Bull Run, was held at bay by
Jackson’s guns, and Hooker and Reno advanced alone.
1 p.m. As the Federals moved forward the grey skirmishers fell back
through the Groveton wood, and scarcely had they reached the railroad
before the long blue lines came crashing through the undergrowth.
Hill’s riflemen, lying down to load, and rising only to fire, poured in
their deadly volleys at point-blank range. The storm of bullets,
shredding leaves and twigs, stripped the trees of their verdure, and
the long dry grass, ignited by the powder sparks, burst into flames
between the opposing lines. But neither flames nor musketry availed to
stop Hooker’s onset. Bayonets flashed through the smoke, and a gallant
rush placed the stormers on the embankment. The Confederates reeled
back in confusion, and men crowded round the colours to protect them.
But assistance was at hand. A fierce yell and a heavy volley, and the
regiments of the second line surged forward, driving back the
intruders, and closing the breach. Yet the Federal ranks reformed; the
wood rang with cheers, and a fresh brigade advanced to the assault.
Again the parapet was carried; again the Southern bayonets cleared the
front. Hooker’s leading brigade, abandoning the edge of the wood, had
already given ground. Reno’s regiments, suffering fearful slaughter,
with difficulty maintained their place; and Hill, calling once more
upon his reserves, sent in Pender to the counterstroke. Passing by the
right of Thomas, who, with Field, had borne the brunt of the last
attack, Pender crossed the railroad, and charged into the wood. Many of
the men in the fighting-line joined in the onward movement. The
Federals were borne back; the brigades in rear were swept away by the
tide of fugitives; the wood was cleared, and a battery near by was
deserted by the gunners.
Then Pender, received with a heavy artillery fire from the opposite
heights, moved boldly forward across the open. But the counterstroke
had been pushed too far. The line
faltered; hostile infantry appeared on either flank, and as the
Confederates fell back to the railroad, the enemy came forward in
pursuit. Grover’s brigade of Hooker’s division had hitherto been held
in reserve, sheltered by a roll of the land opposite that portion of
the front which was held by Thomas.
3 p.m. It was now directed to attack. “Move slowly forward,” were the
orders which Grover gave to his command, “until the enemy opens fire.
Then advance rapidly, give them one volley, and then the bayonet.” The
five regiments moved steadily through the wood in a single line. When
they reached the edge they saw immediately before them the red earth of
the embankment, at this point ten feet high and lined with riflemen.
There was a crash of fire, a swift rush through the rolling smoke, and
the Federals, crossing the parapet, swept all before them. Hill’s
second line received them with a scattered fire, turned in confusion,
and fled back upon the guns. Then beckoned victory to him who had held
his reserves in hand. Jackson had seen the charge, and Forno’s
Louisianians, with a regiment of Lawton’s, had already been sent
forward with the bayonet.
In close order the counterstroke came on. The thinned ranks of the
Federals could oppose no resolute resistance. Fighting they fell back,
first to the embankment, where for a few moments they held their own,
and then to the wood. But without supports it was impossible to rally.
Johnson’s and Starke’s brigades swept down upon their flank, the
Louisianians, supported by Field and Archer, against their front, and
in twenty minutes, with a loss of one-fourth his numbers, Grover in his
turn was driven beyond the Warrenton turnpike.
Four divisions, Schurz’, Steinwehr’s, Hooker’s, and Reno’s, had been
hurled in succession against Jackson’s front. Their losses had been
enormous. Grover’s brigade had lost 461 out of 2,000, of which one
regiment, 288 strong, accounted for 6 officers and 106 men; three
regiments of Reno’s lost 530; and it is probable that more than 4,000
men had fallen in the wood which lay in front of Hill’s brigades.
The fighting, however, had not been without effect on
the Confederates. The charges to which they had been exposed, impetuous
as they were, were doubtless less trying than a sustained attack,
pressed on by continuous waves of fresh troops, and allowing the
defence no breathing space. Such steady pressure, always increasing in
strength, saps the morale more rapidly than a series of fierce
assaults, delivered at wide intervals of time. But such pressure
implies on the part of the assailant an accumulation of superior force,
and this accumulation the enemy’s generals had not attempted to
provide. In none of the four attacks which had shivered against Hill’s
front had the strength of the assailants been greater than that of his
own division; and to the tremendous weight of such a stroke as had won
the battles of Gaines’ Mill or Cedar Run, to the closely combined
advance of overwhelming numbers, Jackson’s men had not yet been
subjected.
The battle, nevertheless, had been fiercely contested, and the strain
of constant vigilance and close-range fighting had told on the Light
Division. The Federal skirmishers, boldly advancing as Pender’s men
fell back, had once more filled the wood, and their venomous fire
allowed the defenders no leisure for repose.[25] Ammunition had already
given out; many of the men had but two or three cartridges remaining,
and the volunteers who ran the gauntlet to procure fresh supplies were
many of them shot down. Moreover, nine hours’ fighting, much of it at
close range, had piled the corpses thick upon the railroad, and the
ranks of Hill’s brigades were terribly attenuated. The second line had
already been brought up to fill the gaps, and every brigade had been
heavily engaged.
4 p.m. It was about four o’clock, and for a short space the pressure on
the Confederate lines relaxed. The continuous
roar of the artillery dwindled to a fitful cannonade; and along the
edge of the wood, drooping under the heat, where the foliage was white
with the dust of battle, the skirmishers let their rifles cool. But the
Valley soldiers knew that their respite would be short. The Federal
masses were still marching and counter-marching on the opposite hills;
from the forest beyond long columns streamed steadily to the front, and
near the Warrenton turnpike fresh batteries were coming into action.
Pope had ordered Kearney and Reno to make a fresh attack. The former,
one of the most dashing officers in the Federal army, disposed his
division in two lines. Reno, in the same formation, deployed upon
Kearney’s right, and with their flank resting on Bull Run the five
brigades went forward to the charge. The Confederate batteries, posted
on the ridge in rear, swept the open ground along the stream; but,
regardless of their fire, the Federals came rapidly to close quarters,
and seized the railroad.
4.30 p.m. When Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his lines he
felt that the supreme moment had arrived. Would Gregg, on whose front
the division of Reno was bearing down, be able to hold his own? That
gallant soldier, although more than one half of his command lay dead or
wounded, replied, in answer to his chief’s enquiry, that his ammunition
was almost expended, but that he had still the bayonet. Nevertheless,
the pressure was too heavy for his wearied troops. Foot by foot they
were forced back, and, at the same moment, Thomas, Field, and Branch,
still fighting desperately, were compelled to yield their ground. Hill,
anxiously looking for succour, had already called on Early. The enemy,
swarming across the railroad, had penetrated to a point three hundred
yards within the Confederate position. But the grey line was not yet
shattered. The men of the Light Division, though borne backwards by the
rush, still faced towards the foe; and Early’s brigade, supported by
two regiments of Lawton’s division, advanced with levelled bayonets,
drove through the tumult, and opposed a solid line to the crowd of
Federals.
Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious
moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself. Once more order
prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel asserted its supremacy. The
strength of the assailants was already spent. The wave receded more
swiftly than it had risen, and through the copses and across the
railroad the Confederates drove their exhausted foe. General Hill had
instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the original front; but
it was impossible to restrain the troops, and not till they had
advanced several hundred yards was the brigade halted and brought back.
5.15 p.m. The counterstroke was as completely successful as those that
had preceded it. Early’s losses were comparatively slight, those
inflicted on the enemy very heavy, and Hill’s brigades were finally
relieved. Pope abandoned all further efforts to crush Jackson. Five
assaults had failed. 30,000 infantry had charged in vain through the
fatal wood; and of the 8,000 Federal casualties reported on this day,
by far the larger proportion was due to the deadly fire and dashing
counterstrokes of Jackson’s infantry.
While Pope was hurling division after division against the Confederate
left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, observed the conflict from
Stuart’s Hill, the wooded eminence which stands south-west of Groveton.
On this wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both
Federals and Confederates were in force. At least one half of Pope’s
army had gradually assembled on this flank. Here were Reynolds and
McDowell, and on the Manassas road stood two divisions under Porter.
Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on his flank,
Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the exception of
Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare Gap. But although both
Pope and Lee were anxious to engage, neither could bring their
subordinates to the point. Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter
and McDowell, and when at Length he had substituted a definite order it
was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it was based
on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation. The Federal commander
had no knowledge that Longstreet,
with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left. So close lay
the Confederates that under the impression that Stuart’s Hill was still
untenanted, he desired Porter to move across it and envelop Jackson’s
right. Porter, suspecting that the main body of the Southern army was
before him, declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the
true state of affairs. A peremptory reply to attack at once was
received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene.
Nor had Lee been more successful in developing a counterstroke.
Longstreet, with a complacency it is difficult to understand, has
related how he opposed the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Three
times Lee urged him forward. The first time he rode to the front to
reconnoitre, and found that the position, in his own words, was not
inviting. Again Lee insisted that the enemy’s left might be turned.
While the question was under discussion, a heavy force (Porter and
McDowell) was reported advancing from Manassas Junction. No attack