Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
followed, however, and Lee repeated his instructions. Longstreet was
still unwilling. A large portion of the Federal force on the Manassas
road now marched northward to join Pope, and Lee, for the last time,
bade Longstreet attack towards Groveton. “I suggested,” says the
latter, “that the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance
before night on a forced reconnaissance, get our troops into the most
favourable positions, and have all things ready for battle the next
morning. To this General Lee reluctantly gave consent, and orders were
given for an advance to be pursued under cover of night, until the main
position could be carefully examined. It so happened that an order to
advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the
encounter was something of a surprise on both sides.[26] Hood, with his
two Texan brigades, led the Confederates, and King’s division, now
commanded by Hatch, met him on the slopes of Stuart’s Hill. Although
the Federals, since 1 a.m. the same morning, had marched to Manassas
and back again, the fight was spirited. Hood, however, was strongly
supported, and the Texans pushed forward
a mile and a half in front of the position they had held since noon.
Longstreet had now full leisure to make his reconnaissance. The ground
to which the enemy had retreated was very strong. He believed it
strongly manned, and an hour after midnight Hood’s brigades were
ordered to withdraw.
The firing, even of the skirmishers, had long since died away on the
opposite flank. The battle was over, and the Valley army had been once
more victorious. But when Jackson’s staff gathered round him in the
bivouac, “their triumph,” says Dabney, “bore a solemn hue.” Their great
task had been accomplished, and Pope’s army, harassed, starving, and
bewildered, had been brought to bay. But their energies were worn down.
The incessant marching, by day and night, the suspense of the past
week, the fierce strife of the day that had just closed, pressed
heavily on the whole force. Many of the bravest were gone. Trimble,
that stout soldier, was severely wounded, Field and Forno had fallen,
and in Gregg’s brigade alone 40 officers were dead or wounded. Doctor
McGuire, fresh from the ghastly spectacle of the silent battle-field,
said, “General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern
fighting.” “No,” replied Jackson, very quietly, “it has been won by
nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence.” And in this
attitude of acknowledgment general and soldiers were as one. When the
pickets had been posted, and night had fallen on the forest, officers
and men, gathered together round their chaplains, made such
preparations for the morrow’s battle as did the host of King Harry on
the eve of Agincourt.
NOTE
Students of war will note with interest the tactical details of the
passage of the Rappahannock by the Army of Northern Virginia.
_August 21._—FEDERALS.
In position behind the river from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.
_Tête de pont_ covering the railway bridge, occupied by a brigade.
CONFEDERATES.
Longstreet to Kelly’s Ford.
Jackson to Beverley Ford.
Stuart to above Beverley Ford.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.
_August 22._—FEDERALS.
In position from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.
Bayard’s cavalry brigade on right flank.
Buford’s cavalry brigade at Rappahannock Station.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson to Sulphur Springs. Early crosses the river.
Longstreet to Beverley Ford and railway.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.
_August 23._—FEDERALS.
Pope abandons _tête de pont_ and burns railway bridge.
Sigel moves against Early, but his advance is repulsed.
Army to a position about Warrenton, with detachments along the river,
and a strong force at Kelly’s Ford.
CONFEDERATES.
Early moves north to Great Run, and is reinforced by Lawton.
Stuart to Catlett’s Station.
Longstreet demonstrates against railway bridge.
_August 24._—FEDERAL.
Buford’s and Bayard’s cavalry to Waterloo.
Army to Waterloo and Sulphur Springs.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson in the evening retires to Jefferson, and is relieved after dark
opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo by Longstreet.
Anderson relieves Longstreet on the railway.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire all along the line.
_August 25._—FEDERALS.
Pope extends his left down the river to Kelly’s Ford, determining to
receive attack at Warrenton should the Confederates cross.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson moves north and crosses the river at Hinson’s Mills.
Longstreet demonstrates at Waterloo, and Anderson at the Sulphur
Springs.
_August 26._—FEDERALS.
A reconnaissance in force, owing to bad staff arrangements, comes to
nothing. At nightfall the whole army is ordered to concentrate at
Warrenton.
CONFEDERATES.
2 a.m. Stuart follows Jackson.
Late in the afternoon, Longstreet, having been relieved by Anderson,
marches to Hinson’s Mills.
Jackson captures Manassas Junction.
Skirmishing all day along the Rappahannock.
_August 27._—FEDERALS.
7 a.m. Hooker’s division from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station.
8.30 a.m. Army ordered to concentrate at Gainesville, Buckland Mills,
and Greenwich. Porter and Banks at Warrenton Junction.
3 p.m. Action at Bristoe Station.
6.30 p.m. Pope arrives at Bristoe Station.
Army ordered to march to Manassaa Junction at dawn.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson at Manassas Junction.
Longstreet to White Plains.
[1] The _Times,_ September 4, 1862.
[2] Letter to the author.
[3] June 9, 1863.
[4] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 67. “It may have been fortunate for
the Confederates,” says Longstreet, “that he was not instructed to
fight like Jackson.”
[5] General George H. Gordon. _The Army of Virginia,_ p. 9.
[6] Between August 21 and 25 Pope received the following
reinforcements for the Army of the Potomac, raising his strength to
over 80,000 men:
Third Corps Heintzleman Hooker’s Division Kearney’s
Division 10,000 Fifth Corps Porter Morell’s Division Sykes’
Division 10,000 Pennsylvania Reserves. Reynolds 8,000
[7] Letter to the author.
[8] Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000. Lee was well
aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he
had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to
cover Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for
supplies. There was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards
Aquia Creek to join McClellan.
[9] _The Army of Northern Virginia,_ Colonel Allan, p. 200.
[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 533.
[11] The report received at Alexandria from Manassas Junction ran as
follows: “No. 6 train, engine Secretary, was fired into at Bristoe by
a party of cavalry, some 500 strong. They had piled ties on the track,
but the engine threw them off. Secretary is completely riddled by
bullets.”
[12] These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of
General Halleck. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 680. The Federal
Commander-in-Chief expected that the opposition would be slight. He
had evidently no suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee
and Jackson might have carried them.
[13] _The Army of Virginia._ General George H. Gordon.
[14] “Up to the night of August 28 we received,” says Longstreet,
“reports from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his
successful operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all
efforts of the enemy, till we should reach him.” _Battles and
Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 517.
[15] Five messages were sent in between 8.45 a.m. and 11 a.m., but
evidently reached headquarters much later. O.R., vol. xii, part iii,
pp. 654–5.
[16] There is a curious undated report on page 671, O.R., vol. xii,
part iii, from Colonel Duffie, a French officer in the Federal
service, which speaks of a column passing through Thoroughfare Gap;
but, although the compilers of the Records have placed it under the
date August 26, it seems evident, as this officer (_see_ page 670) was
at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th (O.R., vol. xii, part
iii, p. 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and not Jackson’s
troops, and was written on August 28.
[17] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 672. Pope to Porter, p. 675. Pope to
Halleck, p. 684.
[18] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 72.
[19] A. P. Hill had marched fourteen miles, Ewell fifteen, and
Taliaferro, with whom were the trains, from eight to ten.
[20] The order, dated 2 a.m., August 25, was to the following effect:—
“1. Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction,
the right resting on the Manassas railroad.
“2. Reynolds to follow Sigel.
“3. King to follow Reynolds.
“4. Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the
enemy threatened the pass.
King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by
the Warrenton–Alexandria road.”
[21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 507, 508.
[22] Longstreet had been unable to march with the same speed as
Jackson. Leaving Jefferson on the afternoon of August 26, he did not
reach Thoroughfare Gap until “just before night” on August 28. He had
been delayed for an hour at White Plains by the Federal cavalry, and
the trains of the army, such as they were, may also have retarded him.
In two days he covered only thirty miles.
[23] Twenty pieces had been ordered to the front soon after the
infantry moved forward. The dense woods, however, proved impenetrable
to all but three horse-artillery guns, and one of these was unable to
keep up.
[24] Ricketts’ report would have been transmitted through McDowell,
under whose command he was, and as McDowell was not to be found, it
naturally went astray.
[25] “The Federal sharpshooters at this time,” says Colonel McCrady,
of the Light Division, “held possession of the wood, and kept up a
deadly fire of single shots whenever any one of us was exposed. Every
lieutenant who had to change position did so at the risk of his life.
What was my horror, during an interval in the attack, to see General
Jackson himself walking quickly down the railroad cut, examining our
position, and calmly looking into the wood that concealed the enemy!
Strange to say, he was not molested.”—_Southern Historical Society
Papers,_ vol. xiii, p. 27.
[26] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 519.
Chapter XVII
THE SECOND MANASSAS _(continued)_
During the night of August 30 the long line of camp-fires on the
heights above Bull Run, and the frequent skirmishes along the picket
line, told General Lee that his enemy had no intention of falling back
behind the stream. And when morning broke the Federal troops were
observed upon every ridge.
August 30 The Confederate leader, eager as he had been to force the
battle to an issue on the previous afternoon, had now abandoned all
idea of attack. The respite which the enemy had gained might have
altogether changed the situation. It was possible that the Federals had
been largely reinforced. Pope and McClellan had been given time, and
the hours of the night might have been utilised to bring up the
remainder of the Army of the Potomac. Lee resolved, therefore, to await
events. The Federal position was strong; their masses were well
concentrated; there was ample space, on the ridges beyond Young’s
Branch, for the deployment of their numerous artillery, and it would be
difficult to outflank them. Moreover, a contingent of fresh troops from
Richmond, the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker, together
with Hampton’s brigade of cavalry, and part of the reserve artillery,
20,350 men in all, had crossed the Rappahannock.[1] Until this force