Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
should join him he determined
to postpone further manœuvres, and to rest his army. But he was not
without hope that Pope might assume the initiative and move down from
the heights on which his columns were already forming. Aware of the
sanguine and impatient temper of his adversary, confident in the
_moral_ of his troops, and in the strength of his position, he foresaw
that an opportunity might offer for an overwhelming counterstroke.
Meanwhile, the Confederate divisions, still hidden in the woods, lay
quietly on their arms. Few changes were made in the dispositions of the
previous day. Jackson, despite his losses, had made no demand for
reinforcements; and the only direct support afforded him was a battery
of eighteen guns, drawn from the battalion of Colonel S. D. Lee, and
established on the high ground west of the Douglass House, at right
angles to his line of battle. These guns, pointing north-east,
overlooked the wide tract of undulating meadow which lay in front of
the Stonewall and Lawton’s divisions, and they commanded a field of
fire over a mile long. The left of the battery was not far distant from
the guns on Jackson’s right, and the whole of the open space was thus
exposed to the cross-fire of a formidable artillery.
To the right of the batteries, Stuart’s Hill was strongly occupied by
Longstreet, with Anderson’s division as general reserve; and this wing
of the Confederate army was gradually wheeled up, but always under
cover, until it was almost perpendicular to the line of the unfinished
railroad. The strength of Lee’s army at the battle of Manassas was
hardly more than 50,000 of all arms. Jackson’s command had been reduced
by battle and forced marches to 17,000 men. Longstreet mustered 30,000,
and the cavalry 2,500.
But numbers are of less importance than the confidence of the men in
their ability to conquer,[2] and the spirit of the Confederates had
been raised to the highest pitch. The keen
critics in Longstreet’s ranks, although they had taken no part in the
Manassas raid, or in the battles of August 28 and 29, fully appreciated
the daring strategy which had brought them within two short marches of
Washington. The junction of the two wings, in the very presence of the
enemy, after many days of separation, was a manœuvre after their own
hearts. The passage of Thoroughfare Gap revealed the difficulties which
had attended the operations, and the manner in which the enemy had been
outwitted appealed with peculiar force to their quick intelligence.
Their trust in Lee was higher than ever; and the story of Jackson’s
march, of the capture of Manassas, of the repulse of Pope’s army, if it
increased their contempt for the enemy, inspired them with an
enthusiastic determination to emulate the achievements of their
comrades. The soldiers of the Valley army, who, unaided by a single
bayonet, had withstood the five successive assaults which had been
launched against their position, were supremely indifferent, now
Longstreet was in line, to whatever the enemy might attempt. It was
noticed that notwithstanding the heavy losses they had experienced
Jackson’s troops were never more light-hearted than on the morning of
August 30. Cartridge-boxes had been replenished, rations had been
issued, and for several hours the men had been called on neither to
march nor fight. As they lay in the woods, and the pickets, firing on
the enemy’s patrols, kept up a constant skirmish to the front, the
laugh and jest ran down the ranks, and the unfortunate Pope, who had
only seen “the backs of his enemies,” served as whetstone for their
wit.
By the troops who had revelled in the spoils of Winchester Banks had
been dubbed “Old Jack’s Commissary General.” By universal acclamation,
after the Manassas foray, Pope was promoted to the same distinction;
and had it been possible to penetrate to the Federal headquarters, the
mirth of those ragged privates would hardly have diminished. Pope was
in an excellent humour, conversing affably with his staff, and viewing
with pride the martial aspect of his massed divisions. Nearly his whole
force
was concentrated on the hills around him, and Porter, who had been
called up from the Manassas road, was already marching northwards
through the woods.
10.15 p.m. Banks still was absent at Bristoe Station, in charge of the
trains and stores which had been removed from Warrenton; but, shortly
after ten o’clock, 65,000 men, with eight-and-twenty batteries, were at
Pope’s disposal. He had determined to give battle, although Franklin
and Sumner, who had already reached Alexandria, had not yet joined him;
and he anticipated an easy triumph. He was labouring, however, under an
extraordinary delusion. The retreat of Hood’s brigades the preceding
night, after their reconnaissance, had induced him to believe that
Jackson had been defeated, and he had reported to Halleck at daybreak;
“We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of
the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark,
by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy.
The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We lost not less
than 8,000 men killed and wounded, but from the appearance of the field
the enemy lost at least two to one. The news has just reached me from
the front that the enemy is retreating towards the mountains.”
If, in these days of long-range weapons, Napoleon’s dictum still stands
good, that the general who is ignorant of his enemy’s strength and
dispositions is ignorant of his trade, then of all generals Pope was
surely the most incompetent. At ten o’clock on the morning of August
30, and for many months afterwards, despite his statement that he had
fought “the combined forces of the enemy” on the previous day, he was
still under the impression, so skilfully were the Confederate troops
concealed, that Longstreet had not yet joined Jackson, and that the
latter was gradually falling back on Thoroughfare Gap. His patrols had
reported that the enemy’s cavalry had been withdrawn from the left bank
of Bull Run. A small reconnaissance in force, sent to test Jackson’s
strength, had ascertained that the extreme left was not so far forward
as it had been yesterday; while two of the Federal generals,
reconnoitring beyond the
turnpike, observed only a few skirmishers. On these negative reports
Pope based his decision to seize the ridge which was held by Jackson.
Yet the woods along the unfinished railroad had not been examined, and
the information from other sources was of a different colour and more
positive. Buford’s cavalry had reported on the evening of the 29th that
a large force had passed through Thoroughfare Gap. Porter declared that
the enemy was in great strength on the Manassas road. Reynolds, who had
been in close contact with Longstreet since the previous afternoon,
reported that Stuart’s Hill was strongly occupied. Ricketts, moreover,
who had fought Longstreet for many hours at Thoroughfare Gap, was
actually present on the field. But Pope, who had made up his mind that
the enemy ought to retreat, and that therefore he must retreat, refused
credence to any report whatever which ran counter to these preconceived
ideas.
12 noon Without making the slightest attempt to verify, by personal
observation, the conclusions at which his subordinates had arrived, at
midday, to the dismay of his best officers, his army being now in
position, he issued orders for his troops to be “immediately thrown
forward in pursuit of the enemy, and to press him vigorously.”
Porter and Reynolds formed the left of the Federal army. These
generals, alive to the necessity of examining the woods, deployed a
strong skirmish line before them as they formed for action. Further
evidence of Pope’s hallucination was at once forthcoming. The moment
Reynolds moved forward against Stuart’s Hill he found his front
overlapped by long lines of infantry, and, riding back, he informed
Pope that in so doing he had had to run the gauntlet of skirmishers who
threatened his rear. Porter, too, pushing his reconnaissance across the
meadows west of Groveton, drew the fire of several batteries. But at
this juncture, unfortunately for the Federals, a Union prisoner,
recaptured from Jackson, declared that he had “heard the rebel officers
say that their army was retiring to unite with Longstreet.” So
positively did the indications before him contradict this statement,
that Porter, on sending the man
to Pope, wrote: “In duty bound I send him, but I regard him as either a
fool or designedly released to give a wrong impression. No faith should
be put in what he says.” If Jackson employed this man to delude his
enemy, the ruse was eminently successful. Porter received the reply:
“General Pope believes that soldier, and directs you to attack;”
Reynolds was dismissed with a message that cavalry would be sent to
verify his report; and McDowell was ordered to put in the divisions of
Hatch and Ricketts on Porter’s right.
During the whole morning the attention of the Confederates had been
directed to the Groveton wood. Beyond the timber rose the hill
north-east, and on this hill three or four Federal batteries had come
into action at an early hour, firing at intervals across the meadows.
The Confederate guns, save when the enemy’s skirmishers approached too
close, hardly deigned to reply, reserving their ammunition for warmer
work. That such work was to come was hardly doubtful. Troops had been
constantly in motion near the hostile batteries, and the thickets below
were evidently full of men.
12.15 p.m. Shortly after noon the enemy’s skirmishers became
aggressive, swarming over the meadows, and into the wood which had seen
such heavy slaughter in the fight of yesterday. As Jackson’s pickets,
extended over a wide front, gave slowly back, his guns opened in
earnest, and shell and shrapnel flew fast over the open space. The
strong force of skirmishers betrayed the presence of a line of battle
not far in rear, and ignoring the fire of the artillery, the
Confederate batteries concentrated on the covert behind which they knew
the enemy’s masses were forming for attack. But, except the pickets,
not a single man of either the Stonewall or Lawton’s division was
permitted to expose himself. A few companies held the railroad, the
remainder were carefully concealed. The storm was not long in breaking.
Jackson had just ridden along his lines, examining with his own eyes
the stir in the Groveton wood, when, in rear of the skirmishers,
advancing over the highroad, appeared the serried ranks of the line
of battle. 20,000 bayonets, on a front which extended from Groveton to
near Bull Run, swept forward against his front; 40,000, formed in dense
masses on the slopes in rear, stood in readiness to support them; and
numerous batteries, coming into action on every rising ground, covered
the advance with a heavy fire.
Pope, standing on a knoll near the Stone House, saw victory within his
grasp. The Confederate guns had been pointed out to his troops as the
objective of the attack. Unsupported, as he believed, save by the
scattered groups of skirmishers who were already retreating to the
railroad, and assailed in front and flank, these batteries, he
expected, would soon be flying to the rear, and the Federal army, in
possession of the high ground, would then sweep down in heavy columns
towards Thoroughfare Gap. Suddenly his hopes fell. Porter’s masses,
stretching far to right and left, had already passed the Dogan House;
Hatch was entering the Groveton wood; Ricketts was moving forward along
Bull Run, and the way seemed clear before them; when loud and clear
above the roar of the artillery rang out the Confederate bugles, and