Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
assailed by overwhelming numbers, were routed with the loss of nearly
half their muster. Jackson’s attack
through the Groveton wood was equally successful, but on the ridge in
rear were posted the regulars under Sykes; and, further east, on Buck
Hill, had assembled the remnants of four divisions.
Outflanked by the capture of the hill upon their left, and fiercely
assailed in front, Sykes’s well-disciplined regiments, formed in lines
of columns and covered by a rear-guard of skirmishers, retired steadily
under the tremendous fire, preserving their formation, and falling back
slowly across Young’s Branch. Then Jackson, reforming his troops along
the Sudley road, and swinging round to the left, moved swiftly against
Buck Hill. Here, in addition to the infantry, were posted three Union
batteries, and the artillery made a desperate endeavour to stay the
counterstroke.
But nothing could withstand the vehement charge of the Valley soldiers.
“They came on,” says the correspondent of a Northern journal, “like
demons emerging from the earth.” The crests of the ridges blazed with
musketry, and Hill’s infantry, advancing in the very teeth of the
canister, captured six guns at the bayonet’s point. Once more Jackson
reformed his lines; and, as twilight came down upon the battle-field,
from position after position, in the direction of the Stone Bridge, the
division of Stevens, Ricketts, Kearney, and Hooker, were gradually
pushed back.
On the Henry Hill, the key of the Federal position, a fierce conflict
was meanwhile raging. From the high ground to the south Longstreet had
driven back several brigades which, in support of the artillery, Sigel
and McDowell had massed upon Bald Hill. But this position had not been
occupied without a protracted struggle. Longstreet’s first line,
advancing with over-impetuosity, had outstripped the second; and before
it could be supported was compelled to give ground under the enemy’s
fire, one of the brigades losing 62 officers and 560 men. Anderson and
Kemper were then brought up; the flank of the defenders was turned; a
counterstroke was beaten back, ridge after ridge was mastered, the edge
of every wood was stormed; and as the sun set
behind the mountains Bald Hill was carried. During this fierce action
the division of D. R. Jones, leaving the Chinn House to the left, had
advanced against the Henry Hill.
6 p.m. On the very ground which Jackson had held in his first battle
the best troops of the Federal army were rapidly assembling. Here were
Sykes’ regulars and Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians; where the woods permitted
batteries had been established; and Porter’s Fifth Army Corps, who at
Gaines’ Mill and Malvern Hill had proved such stubborn fighters,
opposed a strong front once more to their persistent foes.
Despite the rapid fire of the artillery the Southerners swept forward
with unabated vigour. But as the attack was pressed the resistance of
the Federals grew more stubborn, and before long the Confederate
formation lost its strength. The lines in rear had been called up. The
assistance of the strong centre had been required to rout the defenders
of Bald Hill; and although Anderson and Wilcox pressed forward on his
left, Jones had not sufficient strength to storm the enemy’s last
position. Moreover, the Confederate artillery had been unable to follow
the infantry over the broken ground; the cavalry, confronted by
Buford’s squadrons and embarrassed by the woods, could lend no active
aid, and the Federals, defeated as they were, had not yet lost all
heart. Whatever their guns could do, in so close a country, to relieve
the infantry had been accomplished; and the infantry, though
continually outflanked, held together with unflinching courage.
Stragglers there were, and stragglers in such large numbers that
Bayard’s cavalry brigade had been ordered to the rear to drive them
back; but the majority of the men, hardened by months of discipline and
constant battle, remained staunch to the colours. The conviction that
the battle was lost was no longer a signal for “the thinking bayonets”
to make certain of their individual safety; and the regulars, for the
second time on the same field, provided a strong nucleus of resistance.
Thrown into the woods along the Sudley–Manassas road, five battalions
of the United States army held the extreme left, the most critical
point of the Federal line, until
the second brigade relieved them. To their right Meade and his
Pennsylvanians held fast against Anderson and Wilcox; and although six
guns fell into the hands of the Confederate infantry, and four of
Longstreet’s batteries, which had accompanied the cavalry, were now
raking their left, Pope’s soldiers, as twilight descended upon the
field, redeemed as far as soldiers could the errors of their general.
Stuart, on the right flank of the Confederate line, charged down the
opposing cavalry[3] and crossed Bull Run at Lewis’ Ford; but the dark
masses on the Henry Hill, increased every moment by troops ascending
from the valley, still held fast, with no hope indeed of victory, but
with a stern determination to maintain their ground. Had the hill been
lost, nothing could have saved Pope’s army. The crest commanded the
crossings of Bull Run. The Stone Bridge, the main point of passage, was
not more than a mile northward, within the range of artillery, and
Jackson was already in possession of the Matthew Hill, not fourteen
hundred yards from the road by which the troops must pass in their
retreat.
7.30 p.m. The night, however, put an end to the battle. Even the Valley
soldiers were constrained to halt. It was impossible in the obscurity
to distinguish friend from foe. The Confederate lines presented a
broken front, here pushed forward, and here drawn back; divisions,
brigades, and regiments had intermingled; and the thick woods,
intervening at frequent intervals, rendered combination impracticable.
During the darkness, which was accompanied by heavy rain, the Federals
quietly withdrew, leaving thousands of
wounded on the field, and morning found them in position on the heights
of Centreville, four miles beyond Bull Run.
Pope, with an audacity which disaster was powerless to tame, reported
to Halleck that, on the whole, the results of the battle were
favourable to the Federal army. “The enemy,” he wrote, “largely
reinforced, assailed our position early to-day. We held our ground
firmly until 6 o’clock p.m., when the enemy, massing very heavy forces
on our left, forced that wing back about half a mile. At dark we held
that position. Under all the circumstances, with horses and men having
been two days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I
thought it best to move back to this place at dark. The movement has
been made in perfect order and without loss. The battle was most
furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very
heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not
be uneasy. We will hold our own here.”
Pope’s actions, however, were invariably at variance with Pope’s words.
At 6 p.m. he had ordered Franklin, who was approaching Bull Run from
Alexandria with 10,000 fresh troops, to occupy with his own command and
whatever other troops he could collect, the fortifications round
Centreville, and hold them “to the last extremity.” Banks, still at
Bristoe Station, was told to destroy all the supplies of which he was
in charge, as well as the railway, and to march on Centreville; while
30 guns and more than 2,000 wounded were left upon the field. Nor were
Pope’s anticipations as to the future to be fulfilled. The position at
Centrevile was strong. The intrenchments constructed by the
Confederates during the winter of 1861 were still standing. Halleck had
forwarded supplies; there was ammunition in abundance, and 20,000
infantry under Franklin and Sumner—for the latter also had come up from
Washington—more than compensated for the casualties of the battle. But
formidable earthworks, against generals who dare manœuvre, are often a
mere trap for the unwary.
August 31 Before daylight Stuart and his troopers were in the saddle;
and, picking up many stragglers as they marched, came within range of
the guns at Centreville. Lee, accompanied by Jackson, having
reconnoitred the position, determined to move once more upon the
Federal rear. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the
attention of the enemy and cover the removal of the wounded; while
Jackson, crossing not by the Stone Bridge, but by Sudley Ford, was
entrusted with the work of forcing Pope from his strong position.
The weather was inclement, the roads were quagmires, and the men were
in no condition to make forced marches. Yet before nightfall Jackson
had pushed ten miles through the mud, halting near Pleasant Valley, on
the Little River turnpike, five miles north-west of Centreville. During
the afternoon Longstreet, throwing a brigade across Bull Run to keep
the enemy on the _qui vive,_ followed the same route. Of these
movements Pope received no warning, and Jackson’s proclivity for flank
manœuvres had evidently made no impression on him, for, in blissful
unconsciousness that his line of retreat was already threatened, he
ordered all waggons to be unloaded at Centreville, and to return to
Fairfax Station for forage and rations.
Sept. 1 But on the morning of September 1, although his whole army,
including Banks, was closely concentrated behind strong intrenchments,
Pope had conceived a suspicion that he would find it difficult to
fulfil his promise to Halleck that “he would hold on.” The previous
night Stuart had been active towards his right and rear, capturing his
reconnoitring parties, and shelling his trains. Before noon suspicion
became certainty. Either stragglers or the country people reported that
Jackson was moving down the Little River turnpike, and Centreville was
at once evacuated, the troops marching to a new position round Fairfax
Court House.
Jackson, meanwhile, covered by the cavalry, was advancing to
Chantilly—a fine old mansion which the Federals had gutted—with the
intention of seizing a position whence he could command the road. The
day was sombre, and a tempest was gathering in the mountains. Late in
the
afternoon, Stuart’s patrols near Ox Hill were driven in by hostile
infantry, the thick woods preventing the scouts from ascertaining the
strength or dispositions of the Federal force. Jackson at once ordered
two brigades of Hill’s to feel the enemy. The remainder of the Light
Division took ground to the right, followed by Lawton; Starke’s
division held the turnpike, and Stuart was sent towards Fairfax Court
House to ascertain whether the Federal main body was retreating or
advancing.
Reno, who had been ordered to protect Pope’s flank, came briskly
forward, and Hill’s advanced guard was soon brought to a standstill.
Three fresh brigades were rapidly deployed; as the enemy pressed the
attack a fourth was sent in, and the Northerners fell back with the
loss of a general and many men. Lawton’s first line became engaged at
the same time, and Reno, now reinforced by Kearney, made a vigorous
effort to hold the Confederates in check. Hays’ brigade of Lawton’s
division, commanded by an inexperienced officer, was caught while
“clubbed” during a change of formation, and driven back in disorder;
and Trimble’s brigade, now reduced to a handful, became involved in the
confusion. But a vigorous charge of the second line restored the
battle. The Federals were beginning to give way. General Kearney,
riding through the murky twilight into the Confederate lines, was shot
by a skirmisher. The hostile lines were within short range, and the
advent of a reserve on either side would have probably ended the