Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
an army of regular soldiers, well led and obedient, their untutored
valour, notwithstanding their superior numbers, had proved of no avail.
They had early become demoralised. Their strongest positions had been
rendered useless by the able manœuvres of their adversaries. Everywhere
they had been out-generalled. They had never been permitted to fight on
the ground which they had prepared, and in almost every single
engagement they had been surprised. Nor had the Government escaped the
infection which had turned the hearts of the troops to water.
September 14 The energy of the pursuit after the fall of Chapultepec
had wrought its full effect, and on September 14 the city of Mexico was
surrendered, without further parley, to a force which, all told,
amounted to less than 7,000 men.[13]
With such portion of his force as had not disbanded Santa Anna
undertook the siege of Puebla; and the guerillas, largely reinforced
from the army, waged a desultory warfare in the mountains. But these
despairing
efforts were without effect upon the occupation of the capital. The
Puebla garrison beat back every attack; and the bands of irregular
horse men were easily dispersed. During these operations Magruder’s
battery remained with headquarters near the capital, and so far as
Jackson was concerned all opportunities for distinction were past.
February 1848 The peace negotiations were protracted from September to
the following February, and in their camps beyond the walls the
American soldiers were fain to content themselves with their ordinary
duties.
It cannot be said that Jackson had failed to take advantage of the
opportunities which fortune had thrown in his way. As eagerly as he had
snatched at the chance of employment in the field artillery he had
welcomed the tactical emergency which had given him sole command of his
section at Chapultepec. It was a small charge; but he had utilised it
to the utmost, and it had filled the cup of his ambition to the brim.
Ambitious he certainly was. “He confessed,” says Dabney, “to an
intimate friend that the order of General Pillow, separating his
section on the day of Chapultepec from his captain, had excited his
abiding gratitude; so much so that while the regular officers were
rather inclined to depreciate the general as an unprofessional soldier,
he loved him because he gave him an opportunity to win distinction.”
His friends asked him, long after the war, if he felt no trepidation
when so many were falling round him. He replied: “No; the only anxiety
of which I was conscious during the engagements was a fear lest I
should not meet danger enough to make my conduct conspicuous.”
His share of the glory was more than ample. Contreras gave him the
brevet rank of captain. For his conduct at Chapultepec he was mentioned
in the Commander-in-Chief’s dispatches, and publicly complimented on
his courage. Shortly after the capture of the city, General Scott held
a levée, and amongst others presented to him was Lieutenant Jackson.
When he heard the name, the general drew himself up to his full height,
and, placing his hands behind him, said with affected sternness, “I
don’t
know that I shall shake hands with Mr. Jackson.” Jackson, blushing like
a girl, was overwhelmed with confusion. General Scott, seeing that he
had called the attention of every one in the room, said, “If you can
forgive yourself for the way in which you slaughtered those poor
Mexicans with your guns, I am not sure that I can,” and then held out
his hand. “No greater compliment,” says General Gibbon, “could have
been paid a young officer, and Jackson apparently did not know he had
done anything remarkable till his general told him so.”[14] Magruder
could find no praise high enough for his industry, his capacity, and
his gallantry, and within eighteen months of his first joining his
regiment he was breveted major. Such promotion was phenomenal even in
the Mexican war, and none of his West Point comrades made so great a
stride in rank. His future in his profession was assured. He had
acquired something more than the spurs of a field officer in his seven
months of service. A subaltern, it has been said, learns but little of
the higher art of war in the course of a campaign. His daily work so
engrosses his attention that he has little leisure to reflect on the
lessons in strategy and tactics which unfold themselves before him.
Without maps, and without that information of the enemy’s numbers and
dispositions which alone renders the manœuvres intelligible, it is
difficult, even where the inclination exists, to discuss or criticise
the problems, tactical and strategical, with which the general has to
deal. But siege and battle, long marches and rough roads, gave the
young American officers an insight into the practical difficulties of
war. It is something to have seen how human nature shows itself under
fire; how easily panics may be generated; how positions that seem
impregnable may be rendered weak; to have witnessed the effect of
surprise, and to have realised the strength of a vigorous attack. It is
something, too, if a man learns his own worth in situations of doubt
and danger; and if he finds, as did Jackson, that battle sharpens his
faculties, and makes his self-control more perfect, his judgment
clearer and more prompt, the gain in self-confidence is of the utmost
value.
Moreover, whether a young soldier learns much or little from his first
campaign depends on his intellectual powers and his previous training.
Jackson’s brain, as his steady progress at West Point proves, was of a
capacity beyond the average. He was naturally reflective. If, at the
Military Academy, he had heard little of war; if, during his service in
Mexico, his knowledge was insufficient to enable him to compare General
Scott’s operations with those of the great captains, he had at least
been trained to think. It is difficult to suppose that his experience
was cast away. He was no thoughtless subaltern, but already an earnest
soldier; and in after times, when he came to study for himself the
campaigns of Washington and Napoleon, we may be certain that the
teaching he found there was made doubly impressive when read by the
light of what he had seen himself. Nor is it mere conjecture to assert
that in his first campaign his experience was of peculiar value to a
future general of the Southern Confederacy. Some of the regiments who
fought under Scott and Taylor were volunteers, civilians, like their
successors in the great Civil War, in all but name, enlisted for the
war only, or even for a shorter term, and serving under their own
officers. Several of these regiments had fought well; others had
behaved indifferently; and the problem of how discipline was to be
maintained in battle amongst these unprofessional soldiers obtruded
itself as unpleasantly in Mexico as it had in the wars with England.
Amongst the regular officers, accustomed to the absolute subordination
of the army, the question provoked perplexity and discussion.
So small was the military establishment of the States that in case of
any future war, the army, as in Mexico, would be largely composed of
volunteers; and, despite the high intelligence and warlike enthusiasm
of the citizen battalions, it was evident that they were far less
reliable than the regulars. Even General Grant, partial as he was to
the volunteers, admitted the superiority conferred by drill,
discipline, and highly trained officers. “A better army,” he
wrote, “man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one
commanded by General Taylor in the earlier engagements of the Mexican
war.”[15] These troops were all regulars, and they were those who
carried Scott in triumph from the shores of the Gulf to the palace of
Santa Anna. The volunteers had proved themselves exceedingly liable to
panic. Their superior intelligence had not enabled them to master the
instincts of human nature, and, although they had behaved well in camp
and on the march, in battle their discipline had fallen to pieces.[16]
It could hardly be otherwise. Men without ingrained habits of
obedience, who have not been trained to subordinate their will to
another’s, cannot be expected to render implicit obedience in moments
of danger and excitement; nor can they be expected, under such
circumstances, to follow officers in whom they can have but little
confidence. The ideal of battle is a combined effort, directed by a
trained leader. Unless troops are thoroughly well disciplined such
effort is impossible; the leaders are ignored, and the spasmodic action
of the individual is substituted for the concentrated pressure of the
mass. The cavalry which dissolves into a mob before it strikes the
enemy but seldom attains success; and infantry out of hand is hardly
more effective. In the Mexican campaign the volunteers, although on
many occasions they behaved with admirable courage, continually broke
loose from control under the fire of the enemy. As individuals they
fought well; as organised bodies, capable of manœuvring under fire and
of combined effort, they proved to be comparatively worthless.
So Jackson, observant as he was, gained on Mexican battle-fields some
knowledge of the shortcomings inherent in half-trained troops. And this
was not all. The expedition had demanded the services of nearly every
officer in the army of the United States, and in the toils of the
march, in the close companionship of the camp, in the excitement of
battle, the shrewder spirits probed the characters of their comrades to
the quick. In the history of the Civil War
there are few things more remarkable than the use which was made of the
knowledge thus acquired. The clue to many an enterprise, daring even to
foolhardiness, is to be found in this. A leader so intimately
acquainted with the character of his opponent as to be able to predict
with certainty what he will do under any given circumstances may set
aside with impunity every established rule of war. “All the older
officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion,” says Grant, “I had
also served with and known in Mexico. The acquaintance thus formed was
of immense service to me in the War of the Rebellion—I mean what I
learned of the characters of those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I
do not pretend to say that all my movements, or even many of them, were
made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander
against whom they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was
certainly affected by this knowledge.”[17]
Many of the generals with whom Jackson became intimately connected,
either as friends or enemies, are named in Scott’s dispatches.
Magruder, Hooker, McDowell, and Ambrose Hill belonged to his own
regiment. McClellan, Beauregard, and Gustavus Smith served on the same
staff as Lee. Joseph E. Johnston, twice severely wounded, was
everywhere conspicuous for dashing gallantry. Shields commanded a
brigade with marked ability. Pope was a staff officer. Lieutenant D. H.
Hill received two brevets. Lieutenant Longstreet, struck down whilst
carrying the colours at Chapultepec, was bracketed for conspicuous
conduct with Lieutenant Pickett. Lieutenant Edward Johnson is mentioned
as having specially distinguished himself in the same battle. Captain
Huger, together with Lieutenants Porter and Reno, did good service with
the artillery, and Lieutenant Ewell had two horses killed under him at
Churubusco.
So having proved his mettle and “drunk delight of battle with his
peers,” Jackson spent nine pleasant months in the conquered city. The
peace negotiations were protracted. The United States coveted the
auriferous provinces
of California and New Mexico, a tract as large as a European kingdom,