Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
portion of the Army of the Potomac had not been involved in Pope’s
defeat. It was possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship than
had yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might deprive the
Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive victory. Yet, although
the opportunity of meeting the enemy with a prospect of success might
never offer, an inroad into Northern territory promised good results.
1. Maryland, still strong in sympathy with the South, might be induced
by the presence of a Southern army to rise against the Union.
2. The Federal army would be drawn off westward from its present
position; and so long as it was detained on the northern frontier of
Virginia nothing could be attempted against Richmond, while time would
be secured for improving the defences of the Confederate capital.
3. The Shenandoah Valley would be most effectively protected, and its
produce transported without risk of interruption both to Lee’s army and
to Richmond.
To obtain such advantages as these was worth an effort, and Lee, after
careful consideration, determined to cross the
Potomac. The movement was made with the same speed which had
characterised the operations against Pope. It was of the utmost
importance that the passage of the river should be accomplished before
the enemy had time to discover the design and to bar the way. Stuart’s
cavalry formed the screen. On the morning after the battle of
Chantilly, Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade followed the retreating Federals in
the direction of Alexandria. Hampton’s brigade was pushed forward to
Dranesville by way of Hunter’s Mill. Robertson’s brigade made a strong
demonstration towards Washington, and Munford, with the 2nd Virginia,
cleared out a Federal detachment which occupied Leesburg. Behind the
cavalry the army marched unmolested and unobserved.[6]
Sept. 6 D. H. Hill’s division was pushed forward as advanced guard;
Jackson’s troops, who had been granted a day’s rest, brought up the
rear, and on the morning of the 6th reached White’s Ford on the
Potomac. Through the silver reaches of the great river the long columns
of men and waggons, preceded by Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, splashed and
stumbled, and passing through the groves of oaks which overhung the
water, wound steadily northward over the green fields of Maryland.
Sept. 7 The next day Frederick was occupied by Jackson, who was once
more in advance; the cavalry at Urbanna watched the roads to
Washington, and every city in the North was roused by the tidings that
the grey jackets had crossed the border. But although the army had
entered Maryland without the slightest difficulty, the troops were not
received with the enthusiasm they had anticipated. The women, indeed,
emulating their Virginia sisters, gave a warm welcome to the heroes of
so many victories. But the men, whether terrorised by the stern rule of
the Federal Government, or mistrusting the power of the Confederates to
secure them from further punishment, showed little disposition to join
the ranks. It is possible that the appearance of the Southern soldiery
was not without effect. Lee’s troops, after five months’ hard marching
and hard fighting, were no delectable objects. With torn and brimless
hats, strands of rope for belts, and raw-hide moccasins of their own
manufacture in lieu of boots; covered with vermin, and carrying their
whole kit in Federal haversacks, the ragged scarecrows who swarmed
through the streets of Frederick presented a pitiful contrast to the
trim battalions which had hitherto held the Potomac. Their conduct
indeed was exemplary. They had been warned that pillage and
depredations would be severely dealt with, and all requisitions, even
of fence-rails, were paid for on the spot. Still recruits were few. The
warworn aspect and indifferent equipment of the “dirty darlings,” as
more than one fair Marylander spoke of Jackson’s finest soldiers,
failed to inspire confidence, and it was soon evident that the western
counties of Maryland had small sympathy with the South.
There were certainly exceptions to the general absence of cordiality.
The troops fared well during their sojourn in Frederick. Supplies were
plentiful; food and clothing were gratuitously distributed, and Jackson
was presented with a fine but unbroken charger. The gift was timely,
for “Little Sorrel,” the companion of so many marches, was lost for
some days after the passage of the Potomac; but the Confederacy was
near paying a heavy price for
the “good grey mare.” When Jackson first mounted her a band struck up
close by, and as she reared the girth broke, throwing her rider to the
ground. Fortunately, though stunned and severely bruised, the general
was only temporarily disabled, and, if he appeared but little in public
during his stay in Frederick, his inaccessibility was not due to broken
bones. “Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and for a time Jeb Stuart,”
writes a staff officer, “had their headquarters near one another in
Best’s Grove. Hither in crowds came the good people of Frederick,
especially the ladies, as to a fair. General Jackson, still suffering
from his hurt, kept to his tent, busying himself with maps and official
papers, and declined to see visitors. Once, however, when he had been
called to General Lee’s tent, two young girls waylaid him, paralysed
him with smiles and questions, and then jumped into their carriage and
drove off rapidly, leaving him there, cap in hand, bowing, blushing,
speechless. But once safe in his tent, he was seen no more that
day.”[7] The next evening (Sunday) he went with his staff to service in
the town, and slept soundly, as he admitted to his wife, through the
sermon of a minister of the German Reformed Church.[8]
But it was not for long that the Confederates were permitted to repose
in Frederick. The enemy had made no further reply to the passage of the
Potomac beyond concentrating to the west of Washington. McClellan, who
had superseded Pope, was powerless, owing to the inefficiency of his
cavalry, to penetrate the cordon of Stuart’s pickets, and to ascertain,
even approximately, the dispositions of the invading force. He was
still in doubt if the whole or only part of Lee’s army had crossed
into Maryland; and whether his adversary intended to attack Washington
by the left bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade
Pennsylvania, were questions which he had no means of determining. This
uncertainty compelled him to move cautiously, and on September 9 his
advanced guard was still twenty miles east of Frederick.
Nevertheless, the situation of the Confederates had become suddenly
complicated. When the march into Maryland was begun, three towns in the
Valley were held by the Federals. 3,000 infantry and artillery occupied
Winchester. 3,000 cavalry were at Martinsburg; and Harper’s Ferry, in
process of conversion into an intrenched camp, had a garrison of 8,000
men. Lee was well aware of the presence of these forces when he
resolved to cross the Potomac, but he believed that immediately his
advance threatened to separate them from the main army, and to leave
them isolated, they would be ordered to insure their safety by a timely
retreat. Had it depended upon McClellan this would have been done.
Halleck, however, thought otherwise; and the officer commanding at
Harper’s Ferry was ordered to hold his works until McClellan should
open communication with him.
On arrival at Frederick, therefore, the Confederates, contrary to
anticipation, found 14,000 Federals still established in their rear,
and although Winchester had been evacuated,[9] it was clear that
Harper’s Ferry was to be defended. The existence of the intrenched camp
was a serious obstacle to the full development of Lee’s designs. His
line of communication had hitherto run from Rapidan Station to Manassas
Junction, and thence by Leesburg and Point of Rocks to Frederick. This
line was within easy reach of Washington, and liable to be cut at any
moment by the enemy’s cavalry. Arrangements had therefore been already
made to transfer the line to the Valley. There, sheltered by the Blue
Ridge, the convoys of
sick and wounded, of arms, clothing, and ammunition, could move in
security from Staunton to Shepherdstown, and the recruits which were
accumulating at Richmond be sent to join the army in Northern
territory. But so long as Harper’s Ferry was strongly garrisoned this
new line would be liable to constant disturbance, and it was necessary
that the post should either be masked by a superior force, or carried
by a _coup de main._ The first of these alternatives was at once
rejected, for the Confederate numbers were too small to permit any
permanent detachment of a considerable force, and without hesitation
Lee determined to adopt the bolder course. 25,000 men, he considered,
would be no more than sufficient to effect his object. But 25,000 men
were practically half the army, and the plan, when laid before the
generals, was not accepted without remonstrance. Longstreet, indeed,
went so far as to refuse command of the detachment. “I objected,” he
writes, “and urged that our troops were worn with marching and were on
short rations, and that it would be a bad idea to divide our forces
while we were in the enemy’s country, where he could get information,
in six or eight hours, of any movement we might make. The Federal army,
though beaten at the Second Manassas, was not disorganised, and it
would certainly come out to look for us, and we should guard against
being caught in such a condition. Our army consisted of a superior
quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the
enemy’s country. I urged that we should keep it in hand, recruit our
strength, and get up supplies, and then we could do anything we
pleased. General Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s
Ferry scheme was abandoned.”[10]
Jackson, too, would have preferred to fight McClellan first, and
consider the question of communicating afterwards;[11] but he accepted
with alacrity the duty which his colleague had declined. His own
divisions, reinforced by
those of McLaws, R. H. Anderson,[12] and Walker, were detailed for the
expedition; Harper’s Ferry was to be invested on three sides, and the
march was to begin at daybreak on September 10. Meanwhile, the
remainder of the army was to move north-west to Hagerstown,
five-and-twenty miles from Frederick, where it would alarm Lincoln for
the safety of Pennsylvania, and be protected from McClellan by the
parallel ranges of the Catoctin and South Mountains.
Undoubtedly, in ordinary circumstances, General Longstreet would have
been fully justified in protesting against the dispersion of the army
in the presence of the enemy. Hagerstown and Harper’s Ferry are
five-and-twenty miles apart, and the Potomac was between them.
McClellan’s advanced guard, on the other hand, was thirty miles from
Harper’s Ferry, and forty-five from Hagerstown. The Federals were
advancing, slowly and cautiously it is true, but still pushing
westward, and it was certainly possible, should they receive early
intelligence of the Confederate movements, that before Harper’s Ferry
fell a rapid march might enable them to interpose between Lee and
Jackson. But both Lee and Jackson calculated the chances with a surer
grasp of the several factors. Had the general in command of the Federal
army been bold and enterprising, had the Federal cavalry been more
efficient, or Stuart less skilful, they would certainly have hesitated
before running the risk of defeat in detail. But so long as McClellan
controlled the movements of the enemy, rapid and decisive action was
not to be apprehended; and it was exceedingly improbable that the
scanty and unreliable information which he might obtain from civilian