Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
sources would induce him to throw off his customary caution. Moreover,
only a fortnight previously the Federal army had been heavily
defeated.[13]
Sept. 10 Lee had resolved to woo fortune while she was in the
mood. The movement against Harper’s Ferry once determined, it was
essential that it should be carried out with the utmost speed, and
Jackson marched with even more than ordinary haste, but without
omitting his usual precautions. Before starting he asked for a map of
the Pennsylvania frontier, and made many inquiries as to roads and
localities to the north of Frederick, whereas his route lay in the
opposite direction. “The cavalry, which preceded the column,” says
Colonel Douglas, “had instructions to let no civilian go to the front,
and we entered each village we passed before the inhabitants knew of
our coming. In Middletown two very pretty girls, with ribbons of red,
white, and blue floating from their hair, and small Union flags in
their hands, rushed out of a house as we passed, came to the kerbstone,
and with much laughter waved their flags defiantly in the face of the
general. He bowed, raised his hat, and turning with his quiet smile to
the staff, said, ‘We evidently have no friends in this town.’
Sept. 11 “Having crossed South Mountain at Turner’s Gap, the command
encamped for the night within a mile of Boonsboro’ (fourteen miles from
Frederick). Here General Jackson must determine whether he would go to
Williamsport or turn towards Shepherdstown. I at once rode into the
village with a cavalryman to make some inquiries, but we ran into a
Federal squadron, who without ceremony proceeded to make war upon us.
We retraced our steps, and although we did not stand upon the order of
our going, a squad of them escorted us out of the town with great
rapidity. Reaching the top of the hill, we discovered, just over it,
General Jackson, walking slowly towards us, leading his horse. There
was but one thing to do. Fortunately the chase had become less
vigorous, and with a cry of command to unseen troops, we turned and
charged the enemy. They, suspecting trouble, turned and fled, while the
general quickly galloped to the rear. As I returned to camp I picked up
the gloves which he had dropped in mounting, and took them to him.
Although he had sent a regiment of infantry to the front as soon as he
went back, the only
allusion he made to the incident was to express the opinion that I had
a very fast horse.
“The next morning, having learned that the Federal troops still
occupied Martinsburg, General Jackson took the direct road to
Williamsport. He then forded the Potomac, the troops singing, the bands
playing ‘Carry me back to ole Virginny!’ We marched on Martinsburg.
Sept. 12 “General A. P. Hill took the direct turnpike, while Jackson,
with the rest of his command, followed a side road, so as to approach
Martinsburg from the west, and encamped four miles from the town. His
object was to drive General White, who occupied Martinsburg, towards
Harper’s Ferry, and thus ‘corral’ all the Federal troops in that
military pen. As the Comte de Paris puts it, he ‘organised a grand
hunting match through the lower Valley, driving all the Federal
detachments before him and forcing them to crowd into the blind alley
of Harper’s Ferry.’
“The next morning the Confederates entered Martinsburg. Here the
general was welcomed with enthusiasm, and a great crowd hastened to the
hotel to greet him. At first he shut himself up in a room to write
dispatches, but the demonstration became so persistent that he ordered
the door to be opened. The crowd, chiefly ladies, rushed in and
embarrassed the general with every possible outburst of affection, to
which he could only reply, ‘Thank you, you are very kind.’ He gave them
his autograph in books and on scraps of paper, cut a button from his
coat for a little girl, and then submitted patiently to an attack by
the others, who soon stripped the coat of nearly all the remaining
buttons. But when they looked beseechingly at his hair, which was thin,
he drew the line, and managed to close the interview. These
blandishments did not delay his movements, however, for in the
afternoon he was off again, and his troops bivouacked on the banks of
the Opequon.”[14]
Sept. 13 On the 13th Jackson passed through Halltown and halted a mile
north of that village,[15] throwing out pickets to hold the roads which
lead south and west from Harper’s Ferry. Meanwhile, McLaws and Walker
had taken possession of the heights to the north and east, and the
intrenched camp of the Federals, which, in addition to the garrison,
now held the troops who had fled from Martinsburg, was surrounded on
every side. The Federal officer in command had left but one brigade and
two batteries to hold the Maryland Heights, the long ridge, 1,000 feet
high, on the north shore of the Potomac, which looks down on the
streets of the little town. This detachment, although strongly posted,
and covered by breastworks and abattis, was driven off by General
McLaws; while the Loudoun Heights, a portion of the Blue Ridge, east of
the Shenandoah, and almost equally commanding, were occupied without
opposition by General Walker. Harper’s Ferry was now completely
surrounded. Lee’s plans had been admirably laid and precisely executed,
and the surrender of the place was merely a question of hours.
Nor had matters progressed less favourably elsewhere. In exact
accordance with the anticipations of Lee and Jackson, McClellan, up
till noon on the 13th, had received no inkling whatever of the
dangerous manœuvres which Stuart so effectively concealed, and his
march was very slow. On the 12th, after a brisk skirmish with the
Confederate cavalry, his advanced guard had occupied Frederick, and
discovered that the enemy had marched off in two columns, one towards
Hagerstown, the other towards Harper’s Ferry, but he was uncertain
whether Lee intended to recross the Potomac or to move northwards into
Pennsylvania. On the morning of the 13th, although General Hooker,
commanding the First Army Corps, took the liberty of reporting that, in
his opinion, “the rebels had no more intention of going to Pennsylvania
than they had
of going to heaven,” the Federal Commander-in-Chief was still
undecided, and on the Boonsboro’ road only his cavalry was pushed
forward. In four days McClellan had marched no more than
five-and-twenty miles; he had been unable to open communication with
Harper’s Ferry, and he had moved with even more than his usual caution.
But at noon on the 13th he was suddenly put into possession of the most
ample information. A copy of Lee’s order for the investment of Harper’s
Ferry, in which the exact position of each separate division of the
Confederate army was laid down, was picked up in the streets of
Frederick, and chance had presented McClellan with an opportunity
unique in history.[16] He was within twenty miles of Harper’s Ferry.
The Confederates were more than that distance apart. The intrenched
camp still held out, for the sound of McLaws’ battle on the Maryland
Heights was distinctly heard during the afternoon, and a resolute
advance would have either compelled the Confederates to raise the
siege, or have placed the Federal army between their widely separated
wings.
But, happily for the South, McClellan was not the man for the
opportunity. He still hesitated, and during the afternoon of the 13th
only one division was pushed forward. In front of him was the South
Mountain, the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge north of
the Potomac, and the two passes, Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps, were
held by Stuart. No Confederate infantry, as Lee’s order indicated, with
the exception, perhaps, of a rear-guard, were nearer the passes than
the Maryland Heights and Boonsboro’.[17] The roads were good and the
weather fine, and a night march of twelve miles would have placed the
Federal advanced guards at the foot of the mountains, ready to force
the Gaps at earliest dawn. McClellan, however, although his men had
made no unusual exertions during the past few days, preferred to wait
till daylight.
Nevertheless, on the night of the 13th disaster threatened the
Confederates. Harper’s Ferry had not yet fallen, and, in addition to
the cavalry, D. H. Hill’s division was alone available to defend the
passes. Lee, however, still relying on McClellan’s irresolution,
determined to hold South Mountain, thus gaining time for the reduction
of Harper’s Ferry, and Longstreet was ordered back from Hagerstown,
thirteen miles west of Boonsboro’, to Hill’s assistance.
Sept. 14 On the same night Jackson, at Halltown, opened communications
with McLaws and Walker, and on the next morning (Sunday) he made the
necessary arrangements to ensure combination in the attack. The Federal
lines, although commanded by the Maryland and Loudoun Heights to the
north and east, opposed a strong front to the south and west. The
Bolivar Heights, an open plateau, a mile and a quarter in length, which
has the Potomac on the one flank and the Shenandoah on the other, was
defended by several batteries and partially intrenched. Moreover, it
was so far from the summits occupied by McLaws and Walker that their
guns, although directed against the enemy’s rear, could hardly render
effective aid; only the extremities of the plateau were thoroughly
exposed to fire from the heights.
In order to facilitate communication across the two great rivers
Jackson ordered a series of signal stations to be established, and
while his own batteries were taking up their ground to assail the
Bolivar Heights he issued his instructions to his colleagues. At ten
o’clock the flags on the Loudoun Heights signalled that Walker had six
rifled guns in position. He was ordered to wait until McLaws,
who was employed in cutting roads through the woods, should have done
the same, and the following message explained the method of attack:—
“General McLaws,—If you can, establish batteries to drive the enemy
from the hill west of Bolivar and on which Barbour’s House is, and from
any other position where he may be damaged by your artillery. Let me
know when you are ready to open your batteries, and give me any
suggestions by which you can operate against the enemy. Cut the
telegraph line down the Potomac if it is not already done. Keep a good
look-out against a Federal advance from below. Similar instructions
will be sent to General Walker. I do not desire any of the batteries to
open until all are ready on both sides of the river, except you should
find it necessary, of which you must judge for yourself. I will let you
know when to open all the batteries.
“T. J. JACKSON,
_“Major-General Commanding.”_[18]
About half-past two in the afternoon McLaws reported that his guns were
up, and a message “to fire at such positions of the enemy as will be
most effective,” followed the formal orders for the co-operation of the
whole force.
“Headquarters, Valley District,
Sept. 14, 1862.
“1. To-day Major-General McLaws will attack so as to sweep with his
artillery the ground occupied by the enemy, take his batteries in
reverse, and otherwise operate against him as circumstances may
justify.
“2. Brigadier-General Walker will take in reverse the battery on the
turnpike, and sweep with his artillery the ground occupied by the
enemy, and silence the batteries on the island of the Shenandoah should
he find a battery (_sic_) there.
“3. Major-General A. P. Hill will move along the left bank of the
Shenandoah, and thus turn the enemy’s left flank and enter Harper’s
Ferry.
“4. Brigadier-General Lawton will move along the turnpike for the
purpose of supporting General Hill, and otherwise operating against the
enemy to the left of General Hill.