Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
“5. Brigadier-General Jones will, with one of his brigades and a
battery of artillery, make a demonstration against the enemy’s right;
the remaining part of his division will constitute the reserve and move
along the turnpike.
“By order of Major-General Jackson,
“WM. L. JACKSON,
_“Acting Assistant Adjutant-General’_[19]
Jackson, it appears, was at first inclined to send a flag of truce, for
the purpose of giving the civilian population time to get away, should
the garrison refuse to surrender; but during the morning heavy firing
was heard to the northward, and McLaws reported that he had been
obliged to detach troops to guard his rear against McClellan. The
batteries were therefore ordered to open fire on the Federal works
without further delay.
According to General Walker, Jackson, although he was aware that
McClellan had occupied Frederick, not over twenty miles distant, could
not bring himself to believe that his old classmate had overcome his
prudential instincts, and attributed the sounds of battle to a cavalry
engagement. It is certain that he never for a single moment anticipated
a resolute attempt to force the passages of the South Mountain, for, in
reply to McLaws, he merely instructed him to ask General P. H. Hill to
protect his rear, and to communicate with Lee at Hagerstown. Had he
entertained the slightest suspicion that McClellan was advancing with
his whole force against the passages of the South Mountain, he would
hardly have suggested that Hill would be asked to defend Crampton’s as
well as Turner’s Gap.
Illustration: Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. For larger view click on image.
With full confidence, therefore, that he would have time to enforce the
surrender of Harper’s Ferry and to join Lee on the further bank of the
Potomac, the progress of
his attack was cautious and methodical. “The position in front of me,”
he wrote to McLaws, “is a strong one, and I desire to remain quiet, and
let you and Walker draw attention from Furnace Hill (west of Bolivar
Heights), so that I may have an opportunity of getting possession of
the hill without much loss.” It was not, then, till the artillery had
been long in action, and the fire of the enemy’s guns had been in some
degree subdued, that the infantry was permitted to advance. Although
the Federal batteries opened vigorously on the lines of skirmishers,
the casualties were exceedingly few. The troops found cover in woods
and broken ground, and before nightfall Hill had driven in the enemy’s
pickets, and had secured a knoll on their left flank which afforded an
admirable position for artillery. Lawton, in the centre, occupied a
ridge over which ran the Charlestown turnpike, brought his guns into
action, and formed his regiments for battle in the woods. Jones’
division held the Shepherdstown road on Lawton’s left, seized Furnace
Hill, and pushed two batteries forward.
No attempt was made during this Sunday evening to storm the Bolivar
Heights; and yet, although the Confederate infantry had been hardly
engaged, the enemy had been terribly shaken. From every point of the
compass, from the lofty crests which looked down upon the town, from
the woods towards Charlestown, from the hill to westward, a ceaseless
hail of shells had swept the narrow neck to which the garrison was
confined. Several guns had been dismounted. More than one regiment of
raw troops had dispersed in panic, and had been with difficulty
rallied. The roads were furrowed with iron splinters. Many buildings
had been demolished, and although the losses among the infantry,
covered by their parapets, had been insignificant, the batteries had
come almost to their last round.
During the night Jackson made preparations for an early assault. Two of
A. P. Hill’s brigades, working their way along the bank of the
Shenandoah, over ground which the Federal commander had considered
impassable, established themselves to the left rear of the Bolivar
Heights. Guns were brought up to the knoll which Hill
had seized during the afternoon; and ten pieces, which Jackson had
ordered to be taken across the Shenandoah by Keyes’ Ford, were placed
in a position whence they could enfilade the enemy’s works at effective
range. Lawton and Jones pushed forward their lines until they could
hear voices in the intrenchments; and a girdle of bayonets, closely
supported by many batteries, encircled the hapless Federals. The
assault was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment, and the advance was
to be made as soon as Hill’s guns ceased fire.
Sept. 15 All night long the Confederates slept upon their arms, waiting
for the dawn. When day broke, a soft silver mist, rising from the broad
Potomac, threw its protecting folds over Harper’s Ferry. But the
Southern gunners knew the direction of their targets; the clouds were
rent by the passage of screaming shells, and as the sun, rising over
the Loudoun Heights, dispersed the vapour, the whole of Jackson’s
artillery became engaged. The Federal batteries, worked with stubborn
courage, and showing a bold front to every fresh opponent, maintained
the contest for an hour; but, even if ammunition had not failed them,
they could not have long withstood the terrible fire which took them in
front, in flank, and in reverse.[20] Then, perceiving that the enemy’s
guns were silenced, Hill ordered his batteries to cease fire, and threw
forward his brigades against the ridge. Staunch to the last, the
Federal artillerymen ran their pieces forward, and opened on the
Confederate infantry. Once more the long line of Jackson’s guns crashed
out in answer, and two batteries, galloping up to within four hundred
yards of the ridge, poured in a destructive fire over the heads of
their own troops. Hill’s brigades, when the artillery duel recommenced,
had halted at the foot of the slope. Beyond, over the bare fields, the
way was obstructed by felled timber, the lopped branches of which were
closely interlaced, and above the abattis rose the line of breastworks.
But before the charge was sounded
the Confederate gunners completed the work they had so well begun. At
7.30 a.m. the white flag was hoisted, and with the loss of no more than
100 men Jackson had captured Harper’s Ferry with his artillery alone.
The general was near the church in the wood on the Charlestown road,
and Colonel Douglas was sent forward to ascertain the enemy’s purpose.
“Near the top of the hill,” he writes, “I met General White (commanding
the Federals), and told him my mission. Just then General Hill came up
from the direction of his line, and on his request I conducted them to
General Jackson, whom I found sitting on his horse where I had left
him. He was not, as the Comte de Paris says, leaning against a tree
asleep, but exceedingly wide-awake. . . . The surrender was
unconditional, and then General Jackson turned the matter over to
General A. P. Hill, who allowed General White the same liberal terms
that Grant afterwards gave Lee at Appomattox. The fruits of the
surrender were 12,520 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, 73 pieces of
artillery, and several hundred waggons.
“General Jackson, after a brief dispatch to General Lee announcing the
capitulation, rode up to Bolivar and down into Harper’s Ferry. The
curiosity in the Union army to see him was so great that the soldiers
lined the sides of the road. Many of them uncovered as he passed, and
he invariably returned the salute. One man had an echo of response all
about him when he said aloud: ‘Boys, he’s not much for looks, but if
we’d had him we wouldn’t have been caught in this trap.’”[21]
The completeness of the victory was marred by the escape of the Federal
cavalry. Under cover of the night 1,200 horsemen, crossing the pontoon
bridge, and passing swiftly up the towpath under the Maryland Heights,
had ridden boldly beneath the muzzles of McLaws’ batteries, and, moving
north-west, had struck out for Pennsylvania. Yet the capture of
Harper’s Ferry was a notable exploit, although Jackson seems to have
looked upon it as a mere matter of course.
“Through God’s blessing,” he reported to Lee at eight o’clock,
“Harper’s Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered. As Hill’s
troops have borne the heaviest part of the engagement, he will be left
in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed
of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move off this
evening so soon as they get their rations. To what point shall they
move? I write at this time in order that you may be apprised of the
condition of things. You may expect to hear from me again to-day, after
I get more information respecting the number of prisoners, etc.”[22]
Lee, with D. H. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was already falling back
from the South Mountain to Sharpsburg, a little village on the right
bank of the Antietam Creek; and late in the afternoon Jackson, Walker,
and McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.[23] September 14 had
been an anxious day for the Confederate Commander-in-Chief. During the
morning D. H. Hill, with no more than 5,000 men in his command, had
seen the greater part of McClellan’s army deploy for action in the wide
valley below and to the eastward of Turner’s Gap. Stuart held the woods
below Crampton’s Gap, six miles south, with Robertson’s brigade, now
commanded by the gallant Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had
posted three brigades, for against this important pass, the shortest
route by which the Federals could interpose between Lee and Jackson,
McClellan’s left wing, consisting of 20,000 men under General Franklin,
was steadily advancing.
The positions at both Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps were very strong.
The passes, at their highest points, are at least 600 feet above the
valley, and the slopes steep, rugged, and thickly wooded. The enemy’s
artillery had
little chance. Stone walls, running parallel to the crest, gave much
protection to the Southern infantry, and loose boulders and rocky
scarps increased the difficulties of the ascent. But the numbers
available for defence were very small; and had McClellan marched during
the night he would probably have been master of the passes before
midday. As it was, Crampton’s Gap was not attacked by Franklin until
noon; and although at the same hour the advanced guard of the Federal
right wing had gained much ground, it was not till four in the evening
that a general attack was made on Turner’s Gap. By this time
Longstreet, after a march of thirteen miles, had reached the
battle-field;[24] and despite the determination with which the attack
was pressed, Turner’s Gap was still held when darkness fell.
The defence of Crampton’s Gap had been less successful. Franklin had
forced the pass before five o’clock, and driving McLaws’ three brigades
before him, had firmly established himself astride the summit. The
Confederate losses were larger than those which they had inflicted.
McClellan reports 1,791 casualties on the right, Franklin 533 on the
left. McLaws’ and Munford’s loss was over 800, of whom 400 were
captured. The number of killed and wounded in Hill’s and Longstreet’s
commands is unknown; it probably reached a total of 1,500, and 1,100 of
their men were marched to Frederick as prisoners. Thus the day’s
fighting had cost the South 3,400 men. Moreover, Longstreet’s
ammunition column, together with an escort of 600 men, had been cut up
by the cavalry which had escaped from Harper’s Ferry, and which had
struck the Hagerstown road as it marched northward into Pennsylvania.
Yet, on the whole, Lee had no reason to be chagrined with the result of
his operations. McClellan had acted with unexpected vigour. But neither
in strategy nor in tactics had he displayed improvement on his
Peninsular methods. He should have thrown the bulk of his army against