Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
frustrating Lee’s invasion of the Northern States, and when that was
accomplished, to push with
the utmost rapidity the work of reorganisation and supply, so that a
new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition
to prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission.”[30]
And in his official report, showing what the result of a Confederate
success might well have been, he says: “One battle lost and almost all
would have been lost. Lee’s army might have marched as it pleased on
Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied
its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted tribute
from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghenies
was there another organised force to avert its march.”[31]
3. The situation in the West was such that even a victory in Maryland
was exceedingly desirable. Confederate movements in Tennessee and
Kentucky had won a measure of success which bade fair to open up a
brilliant opportunity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the
theatres of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length and
breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it was of the utmost
importance that all McClellan’s troops should be retained in the East.
So, when the tidings came of Jackson’s victory at Harper’s Ferry, both
armies braced themselves for the coming battle, the Confederates in the
hope that it would be decisive of the war, the Federals that it would
save the capital. But the Confederates had still a most critical time
before them, and Lee’s daring was never more amply illustrated than
when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam. McClellan’s great
army was streaming through the passes of the South Mountain. At
Rohrersville, six miles east of the Confederate bivouacs, where he had
halted as soon as the cannonade at Harper’s Ferry ceased, Franklin was
still posted with 20,000 men. From their battle-field at Turner’s Gap,
ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the 70,000 which composed the right and
centre; and on the banks of the Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in
position.
Jackson had to get rid of his prisoners, to march seventeen miles, and
to ford the Potomac before he could reach the ground. Walker was twenty
miles distant, beyond the Shenandoah; and McLaws, who would be
compelled by Franklin’s presence near Rohrersville to cross at Harper’s
Ferry and follow Jackson, over five-and-twenty. Would they be up before
McClellan attacked? Lee, relying on McClellan’s caution and Jackson’s
energy, answered the question in the affirmative.
The September day wore on. The country between the South Mountain and
Sharpsburg, resembling in every characteristic the Valley of the
Shenandoah, is open and gently undulating. No leagues of woodland, as
in Eastern Virginia, block the view. The roads run through wide
cornfields and rolling pastures, and scattered copses are the only
relics of the forest. It was not yet noon when the Federal scouts
appeared among the trees which crown the left bank of the Antietam
Creek. “The number increased, and larger and larger grew the field of
blue until it seemed to stretch as far as the eye could see. It was an
awe-inspiring spectacle,” adds Longstreet, “as this grand force settled
down in sight of the Confederates, shattered by battles and scattered
by long and tedious marches.”[32] But when night fell upon the field
the only interchange of hostilities had been a brief engagement of
artillery. McClellan’s advance, owing to the difficulty of passing his
great army through the mountains, and to the scarcity of roads, had
been slow and tedious; in some of the divisions there had been
unnecessary delay; and Lee had so disposed his force that the Federal
commander, unenlightened as to the real strength of his adversary,
believed that he was opposed by 50,000 men.
Sept. 16 Nor was the next morning marked by any increase of activity.
McClellan, although he should have been well aware that a great part of
the Confederate army was still west of the Potomac, made no attack. “It
was discovered,” he reports, “that the enemy had changed the position
of some of his batteries. The masses of
his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights.
It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for
attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring the new
position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, and finding
fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and
supply trains.”[33]
Considering that McClellan had been in possession of the left bank of
the Antietam since the forenoon of the previous day, all these
preliminaries might well have been completed before daylight on the
16th. That a change in the dispositions of a few batteries, a change so
unimportant as to pass unnoticed in the Confederate reports, should
have imposed a delay, when every moment was precious, of many hours,
proves that Lee’s and Jackson’s estimate of their opponent’s character
was absolutely correct. While McClellan was reconnoitring, and the guns
were thundering across the Antietam, Jackson and Walker crossed the
Potomac, and reported to Lee in Sharpsburg.[34] Walker had expected to
find the Commander-in-Chief anxious and careworn. “Anxious no doubt he
was; but there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. On the
contrary, he was calm, dignified, and even cheerful. If he had had a
well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could
not have appeared more composed and confident. On shaking hands with
us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with the result of our
operations at Harper’s Ferry, and with our timely arrival at
Sharpsburg; adding that with our reinforcements he felt confident of
being able to hold his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R.
H. Anderson, McLaws, and A. P. Hill, which were still behind, and which
did not arrive till next day.”[35]
Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker had brought up were no
considerable addition to Lee’s
strength. Jones’ division consisted of no more than 1,600 muskets,
Lawton’s of less than 3,500. Including officers and artillery,
therefore, the effectives of these divisions numbered about 5,500. A.
P. Hill’s division appears to have mustered 5,000 officers and men, and
we may add 1,000 for men sick or on detached duties. The total should
undoubtedly have been larger. After the battle of Cedar Run, Jackson
had 22,450 effectives in his ranks. His losses in the operations
against Pope, and the transfer of Robertson’s cavalry to Stuart, had
brought his numbers down by 5,787; but on September 16, including 70
killed or wounded at Harper’s Ferry, they should have been not less
than 16,800. In reality they were only 11,500. We have not far to look
for the cause of this reduction. Many of the men had absented
themselves before the army crossed into Maryland; and if those who
remained with the colours had seen little fighting since Pope’s defeat,
they had had no reason to complain of inactivity. The operations which
resulted in the capture of Harper’s Ferry had been arduous in the
extreme. Men who had taken part in the forced marches of the Valley
campaign declared that the march from Frederick to Harper’s Ferry
surpassed all their former experiences. In three-and-a-half days they
had covered over sixty miles, crossing two mountain ranges, and fording
the Potomac. The weather had been intensely hot, and the dust was
terrible. Nor had the investment of Harper’s Ferry been a period of
repose. They had been under arms during the night which preceded the
surrender, awaiting the signal to assault within a few hundred yards of
the enemy’s sentries. As soon as the terms of capitulation were
arranged they had been hurried back to the bivouac, had cooked two
days’ rations, and shortly after midnight had marched to the Potomac,
seventeen miles away. This night march, coming on the top of their
previous exertions, had taxed the strength of many beyond endurance.
The majority were badly shod. Many were not shod at all. They were
ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on the highroad to hospital. There were
stragglers, then, from every company in the command. Even the Stonewall
Brigade, though it had still preserved its five regiments, was reduced
to 300 muskets; and the other brigades of Jackson’s division were but
little stronger. Walker’s division, too, although less hardly used in
the campaign than the Valley troops, had diminished under the strain of
the night march, and mustered no more than 3,500 officers and men at
Sharpsburg. Thus the masses of troops which McClellan conceived were
hidden in rear of D. H. Hill and Longstreet amounted in reality to some
10,000 effective soldiers.
It was fortunate, indeed, that in their exhausted condition there was
no immediate occasion for their services on September 16. The shadows
grew longer, but yet the Federals made no move; even the fire of the
artillery died away, and the men slept quietly in the woods to north
and west of the little town. Meanwhile, in an old house, one of the few
which had any pretensions to comfort in Sharpsburg, the generals met in
council. Staff officers strolled to and fro over the broad brick
pavement; the horses stood lazily under the trees which shaded the
dusty road; and within, Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet pored long and
earnestly over the map of Maryland during the bright September
afternoon. But before the glow of a lovely sunset had faded from the
sky the artillery once more opened on the ridge above, and reports came
in that the Federals were crossing the Antietam near Pry’s Mill. Lee at
once ordered Longstreet to meet this threat with Hood’s division, and
Jackson was ordered into line on the left of Hood. No serious
collision, however, took place during the evening. The Confederates
made no attempt to oppose the passage of the Creek. Hood’s pickets were
driven in, but a speedy reinforcement restored the line, and except
that the batteries on both sides took part the fighting was little more
than an affair of outposts. At eleven o’clock Hood’s brigades were
withdrawn to cook and eat. Jackson’s division filled their place; and
the night, although broken by constant alarms, passed away without
further conflict. The Federal movements had clearly exposed their
intention of attacking, and had even revealed the point which they
would first assail.
McClellan had thrown two army corps, the First under Hooker, and the
Twelfth under Mansfield, across the Antietam; and they were now posted,
facing southward, a mile and a half north of Sharpsburg, concealed by
the wood beyond Jackson’s left.
NOTE
The essential paragraphs of the lost order ran as follows:—
“The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road.
General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and after passing
Middletown, with such portions as he may select, take the route towards
Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by
Friday night (September 12) take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and
intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.
“General Longstreet’s command will pursue the same road as far as
Boonsboro’, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage
trains of the army.
“General McLaws, with his own division and that of General Anderson,
will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown he will take the
route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning (September 12) possess
himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavour to capture the enemy at
Harper’s Ferry and vicinity.
“General Walker with his division . . . will take possession of the