Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Loudoun Heights, if practicable by Friday morning (September 12), . . .
He will as far as practicable co-operate with General McLaws and
General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.
“General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army,
pursuing the road taken by the main body.
“General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the
commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the
main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army and bring up
all stragglers.
“The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after
accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join
the main body at Boonsboro’ or Hagerstown.”
The second paragraph was afterwards modified by General Lee so as to
place Longstreet at Hagerstown.
[1] Wellington’s losses in the battles of these three years were
33,000. The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days
and 10,000 in the campaign against Pope. It is not to be understood,
however, that the Duke’s strategy was less skilful or less audacious
than Lee’s and Jackson’s. During these three years his army, largely
composed of Portuguese and Spaniards, was incapable of offensive
tactics against his veteran enemies, and he was biding his time. It
was the inefficiency of his allies and the miserable support he
received from the English Government that prevented him, until 1813,
from adopting a bolder policy.
[2] In Mrs. Jackson’s Memoirs of her husband a letter is quoted from
her brother-in-law, giving the substance of a conversation with
General Jackson on the conduct of the war. This letter I have not felt
justified in quoting. In the first place, it lacks corroboration; in
the second place, it contains a very incomplete statement of a large
strategical question; in the third place, the opinions put in
Jackson’s mouth are not only contradictory, but altogether at variance
with his practice; and lastly, it attributes certain ideas to the
general—raising “the black flag.” &c.—which his confidential aid
officers declare that he never for a moment entertained.
[3] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, pp. 590, 591.
[4] “1,000 pairs of shoes were obtained in Fredericktown, 250 pairs in
Williamsport, and about 400 pairs in this city (Hagerstown). They will
not be sufficient to cover the bare feet of the army.” Lee to Davis,
September 12, 1862. O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 605.
[5] Calculated on the basis of the Field Returns dated July 20, 1862,
with the addition of Jackson’s and Ewell’s divisions, and subtracting
the losses (10,000) of the campaign against Pope.
[6] The Army of Northern Virginia was thus organised during the
Maryland campaign:—
Longstreet’s McLaws’ Division
R. H. Anderson’s Division
D. R. Jones’ Division
J. G. Walker’s Division
Evans’ Brigade
Washington Artillery
S. D. Lee’s Artillery battalion = 35,600 Jackson’s Ewell’s (Lawton)
Division
The Light (A. P. Hill) Division
Jackson’s own (J. R. Jones) Division = 16,800
D. H. Hill’s Division = 7,000
Pendleton’s Reserve Artillery, 4 battalions = 1,000
Stuart Hampton’s Brigade
Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade
Robertson’s Brigade
3 H.A. Batteries, Captain Pelham = 4,000
Total ——— 64,400
No allowance has been made for straggling. It is doubtful if more than
55,000 men entered Maryland.
[7] “Stonewall Jackson in Maryland.” Colonel H. K. Douglas. _Battles
and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 621.
[8] “The minister,” says Colonel Douglas, “was credited with much
loyalty and courage, because he had prayed for the President of the
United States in the very presence of Stonewall Jackson. Well, the
general didn’t hear the prayer, and if he had he would doubtless have
felt like replying as General Ewell did, when asked at Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, if he would permit the usual prayer for President
Lincoln—‘Certainly; I’m sure he needs it.’”
[9] On the night of September 2. Lee’s Report, O.R., vol. xix, part i,
p. 139.
[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 662.
[11] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 302.
[12] Anderson was placed under McLaws’ command.
[13] “Are you acquainted with McClellan?” said Lee to General Walker
on September 8, 1862. “He is an able general but a very cautious one.
His enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in
a very demoralised and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for
offensive operations—or he will not think it so—for three or four
weeks.”—_Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 605 and 606.
[14] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 622, 623. Major Hotchkiss
relates that the ladies of Martinsburg made such desperate assaults on
the mane and tail of the general’s charger that he had at last to post
a sentry over the stable.
[15] On September 10 he marched fourteen miles, on September 11
twenty, on September 12 sixteen, and on September 13 twelve, arriving
at Halltown at 11 a.m.
[16] General Longstreet, in his _From Manassas to Appomattox,_
declares that the lost order was sent by General Jackson to General D.
H. Hill, “but was not delivered. The order,” he adds, “that was sent
to General Hill from general headquarters was carefully preserved.”
General Hill, however, in _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 570
(note), says: “It was proper that I should receive that order through
Jackson, and not through me. I have now before me (1888) the order
received from Jackson. My adjutant-general swore affidavit, twenty
years ago, that no order was received at our office from General Lee.”
Jackson was so careful that no one should learn the contents of the
order that the copy he furnished to Hill was written by his own hand.
The copy found by the Federals was wrapped round three cigars, and was
signed by Lee’s adjutant-general.
[17] For the lost order, see Note at end of chapter.
[18] Report of Signal Officer, O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 958.
[19] Report of Signal Officer, O.R., vol xix, part i, p. 659.
[20] The ten guns which had been carried across the Shenandoah were
specially effective. Report of Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson’s chief of
artillery. O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 962.
[21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 625–7.
[22] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 951. General Longstreet (_From
Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 233) suggests that Jackson, after the
capitulation of Harper’s Ferry, should have moved east of South
Mountain against McClellan’s rear. Jackson, however, was acquainted
neither with McClellan’s position nor with Lee’s intentions, and
nothing could have justified such a movement except the direct order
of the Commander-in-Chief.
[23] “The Invasion of Maryland,” General Longstreet, _Battles and
Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 666.
[24] The order for the march had been given the night before (“The
Invasion of Maryland,” General Longstreet, _Battles and Leaders,_ vol.
ii, p. 666), and there seems to have been no good reason, even
admitting the heat and dust, that Longstreet’s command should not have
joined him at noon. The troops marched “at daylight” (5 a.m.), and
took ten hours to march thirteen miles. As it was, only four of the
brigades took part in the action, and did so, owing to their late
arrival, in very disjointed fashion. Not all the Confederate generals
appear to have possessed the same “driving power” as Jackson.
[25] O.R., vol. xix, pp. 294, 295.
[26] “The _moral_ of our men is now restored.” McClellan to Halleck
after South Mountain. O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 294.
[27] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 666, 667.
[28] Before Salamanca, for instance, because Marmont, whose strength
was equal to his own, was about to be reinforced by 4,000 cavalry,
Wellington had determined to retreat. It is true, however, that when
weaker than Masséna, whom he had already worsted, by 8,000 infantry
and 3,800 sabres, but somewhat stronger in artillery, he stood to
receive attack at Fuentes d’Onor. Yet Napier declares that it was a
very audacious resolution. The knowledge and experience of the great
historian told him that to pit 32,000 Infantry against 40,000 was to
trust too much to fortune.
[29] _The Antietam and Fredericksburg._ General Palfrey p. 53.
[30] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 554.
[31] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 65.
[32] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 667.
[33] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 55.
[34] According to Jackson’s staff officers he himself reported shortly
after daylight.
[35] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 675.
Chapter XIX
SHARPSBURG
1862. Sept. 17 It is a curious coincidence that not only were the
number, of the opposing armies at the battle of Sharpsburg almost
identical with those of the French and Germans at the battle of Wörth,
but that there is no small resemblance between the natural features and
surrounding scenery of the two fields. Full in front of the Confederate
position rises the Red Hill, a spur of the South Mountain, wooded, like
the Vosges, to the very crest, and towering high above the fields of
Maryland, as the Hochwald towers above the Rhineland. The Antietam,
however, is a more difficult obstacle than the Sauerbach, the brook
which meanders through the open meadows of the Alsatian valley. A deep
channel of more than sixty feet in width is overshadowed by forest
trees; and the ground on either bank ascends at a sharp gradient to the
crests above. Along the ridge to the west, which parts the Antietam
from the Potomac, and about a mile distant from the former stream, runs
the Hagerstown turnpike, and in front of this road there was a strong
position. Sharpsburg, a village of a few hundred inhabitants, lies on
the reverse slope of the ridge, extending in the direction of the
Potomac, and only the church steeples were visible to the Federals.
Above the hamlet was the Confederate centre. Here, near a limestone
boulder, which stood in a plot which is now included in the soldiers’
cemetery, was Lee’s station during the long hours of September 17, and
from this point he overlooked the whole extent of his line of battle. A
mile northward, on the Hagerstown pike, his loft centre was marked by a
square white building, famous
under the name of the Dunkard Church, and backed by a long dark wood.
To the right, a mile southward, a bold spur, covered with scattered
trees, forces the Antietam westward, and on this spur, overlooking the
stream, he had placed his right.
Illustration: Map of Sharpsburg, Maryland. For larger view click on
image.
Between the Hagerstown pike and the Antietam the open slopes, although
not always uniform, but broken, like those on the French side of the
Sauerbach, by long ravines, afforded an admirable field of fire. The
lanes which cross them are sunk in many places below the surface: in
front of Sharpsburg the fields were divided by low stone walls; and
these natural intrenchments added much to the strength of the position.
Nor were they the only advantages. The belt of oaks beyond the Dunkard
Church, the West Wood, was peculiarly adapted for defence. Parallel
ledges of outcropping limestone, both within the thickets and along the
Hagerstown road, rising as high as a man’s waist, gave good coyer from
shot and shell; the trees were of old growth, and there was little
underwood. To the north-east, however, and about five hundred yards
distant across the fields, lay the East Wood, covering the slopes to
the Antietam, with Poffenberger’s Wood beyond; while further to the
left, the North Wood, extending across the Hagerstown pike, approached
the Confederate flank. The enemy, if he advanced to the attack in this
quarter of the field, would thus find ample protection during his march