Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
and deployment; and in case of reverse he would find a rallying-point
in the North and Poffenberger’s Woods, of which Hooker was already in
possession. In the space between the woods were several small farms,
surrounded by orchards and stone fences; and on the slope east of the
Dunkard Church stood a few cottages and barns.
Access to the position was not easy. Only a single ford, near
Snaveley’s house, exists across the Antietam, and this was commanded by
the bluff on the Confederate right. The stone bridges, however, for
want of time and means to destroy them, had been left standing. That
nearest the confluence of the Antietam and the Potomac,
at the Antietam Iron-works, by which A. P Hill was expected, was
defended by rifle-pits and enfiladed by artillery. The next, known as
the Burnside Bridge, was completely overlooked by the heights above.
That opposite Lee’s centre could be raked throughout its length; but
the fourth, at Pry’s Mill, by which Hooker and Mansfield had already
crossed, was covered both from view and fire. Roads within the position
were numerous. The Hagerstown turnpike, concealed for some distance on
either side of Sharpsburg by the crest of the ridge, was admirably
adapted for the movement of reserves, and another broad highway ran
through Sharpsburg to the Potomac.
The position, then, in many respects, was well adapted to Lee’s
purpose. The flanks were reasonably secure. The right rested on the
Antietam. The left was more open; but the West Wood formed a strong
_point d’appui,_ and beyond the wood a low ridge, rising above
Nicodemus Run, gave room for several batteries; while the Potomac was
so close that the space available for attack on this flank was much
restricted. The ground could thus be held by a comparatively small
number of men, and a large reserve set free for the counterstroke. The
great drawback was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although
commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, would permit
McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful artillery, and in no
place did the range exceed two thousand yards. In case of retreat,
moreover, the Potomac, two hundred yards from shore to shore, would
have to be crossed by a few deep fords,[1] of which only one was
practicable for waggons. These disadvantages, however, it was
impossible to avoid; and if the counterstroke were decisive, they would
not be felt.
The left of the position was assigned to Jackson, with Hood in third
line. Next in order came D. H. Hill. Longstreet held the centre and the
right, with Walker in reserve behind the flank. Stuart, with Fitzhugh
Lee’s
brigade and his four guns, was between the West Wood and the Potomac.
Munford’s two regiments of cavalry, reinforced by a battery, held the
bridge at the Antietam Iron-works, and kept open the communication with
Harper’s Ferry; and twenty-six rifled pieces of the reserve artillery
were with D. H. Hill. From the Nicodemus Run to the bluff overhanging
the Burnside Bridge is just three miles, and for the occupation of this
front the following troops were at Lee’s disposal:—
Men Guns Jackson:
Jones’ Division
Ewell’s Division (General Lawton) 5,500 16[2] Longstreet:
D. R. Jones’ Division
Hood’s Division (detached to Jackson)
Evan’s Brigade 8,000 50
D. H. Hill’s Division 5,000 26
Walker’s Division 3,500 12
Stuart:
Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigade
Munford’s Brigade 2,500 4 Reserve Artillery 1,000 ———
25,000 26 —— 134
On the far side of the Potomac the Shepherdstown Ford was protected by
the remainder of the reserve artillery, with an infantry escort; but so
small was the force whose retreat was thus secured that nearly every
man was required in the fighting-line. Except the divisions of Hood and
Walker, 5,500 men all told, there was no immediate reserve.
But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had been left at Harper’s
Ferry were rapidly coming up. McLaws and Anderson, who had started
before midnight, were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton’s cavalry
brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dispatched to A. P.
Hill. But could these 13,000 bayonets be up in time—before Hooker and
Mansfield received strong support, or before the Burnside Bridge was
heavily attacked? The question was indeed momentous. If the Federals
were to put forth their whole strength without
delay, bring their numerous artillery into action, and press the battle
at every point, it seemed hardly possible that defeat could be averted.
McClellan, however, who had never yet ventured on a resolute offensive,
was not likely, in Lee’s judgment, to assault so strong a position as
that held by the Confederates with whole-hearted energy, and it was
safe to calculate that his troops would be feebly handled. Yet the odds
were great. Even after the arrival of the absent divisions[3] no more
than 35,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 194 guns would be in line, and
the enemy’s numbers were far superior. McClellan had called in Franklin
from Rohrersville, and his muster roll was imposing.
Men Guns
First Corps—Hooker
Second Corps—Sumner
Fifth Corps—Porter
Sixth Corps—Franklin
Ninth Corps—Burnside
Twelfth Corps—Mansfield
Cavalry—Pleasanton 14,856
18,813
12,930
12,300
13,819
10,126
4,320
———
87,164 40 42 70 36 35 36 16 —— 275
In comparison with the masses arrayed between the Red Hill and the
Antietam, the Confederate army was but a handful.
5 a.m. Notwithstanding McClellan’s caution, the opening of the battle
was not long delayed. Before sunrise the desultory firing of the
pickets had deepened to the roar of battle. Hooker, who had been
ordered to begin the attack, forming his troops behind the North Wood,
directed them on the Dunkard Church, which, standing on rising ground,
appeared the key of the position. Jackson had already thrown back his
two divisions at nearly a right angle to the Confederate front. His
right, which connected with the left of D. H. Hill, and resting on the
western edge of the East Wood extended as far as the Miller House, was
held by Lawton, with two brigades in front and one in second line. West
of the Hagerstown turnpike, and covering the ground as far as the
Nicodemus Farm, was Jones’ division; the Stonewall and Jones’ brigades
in front, Taliaferro’s and Starke’s along the edge of the wood in rear.
Three guns stood upon the turnpike; the remainder of the artillery
(thirteen) guns was with Stuart on the high ground north of Nicodemus
Run. Hood, in third line, stood near the Dunkard Church; and on Hood’s
right were three of Longstreet’s batteries under Colonel Stephen Lee.
The ground which Jackson had been ordered to occupy was not
unfavourable for defence, although the troops had practically no cover
except the rail-fences and the rocky ledges. There was a wide and open
field of fire, and when the Federal skirmishers appeared north of the
Miller House the Confederate batteries, opening with vigour at a range
of eight hundred yards, struck down sixteen men at the first salvo.
This fire, and the stubborn resistance of the pickets, held the enemy
for some time in check; but Hooker deployed six batteries in reply, and
after a cannonade of nearly an hour his infantry advanced. From the
cover of the woods, still veiled by the morning mist, the Federals came
forward in strong force. Across the dry ploughed land in Lawton’s front
the fight grew hot, and on the far side of the turnpike the meadows
round the Nicodemus Farm became the scene of a desperate struggle.
Hooker had sent in two divisions, Meade on the left and Doubleday on
the right, while a third under Ricketts acted in close support of
Meade.[4] The attack was waged with the dash and energy which had
earned for Hooker the sobriquet of Fighting Joe, and the troops he
commanded had already proved their mettle on many murderous fields.
Meade’s Pennsylvanians, together with the Indiana and Wisconsin
regiments, which had wrought such havoc in Jackson’s ranks at
Grovetown, were once more bearing down upon his line. Nor were the
tactics of the leaders ill-calculated to second the valour of the
troops. Hooker’s whole army corps of 12,500 men was manœuvred in close
combination. The second line was so posted as to render quick support.
No portion of the front was without an adequate reserve in rear. The
artillery was used in mass, and the flanks were adequately guarded.
The conflict between soldiers so well matched was not less fierce than
when they had met on other fields. Hooker’s troops had won a large
measure of success at South Mountain three days previously, and their
blood was up. Meade, Gibbon, and Ricketts were there to lead them, and
the battle opened with a resolution which, if it had infected
McClellan, would have carried the Sharpsburg ridge ere set of sun.
Stubborn was the resistance of Jackson’s regiments, unerring the aim of
his seasoned riflemen; but the opposing infantry, constantly
reinforced, pressed irresistibly forward, and the heavy guns beyond the
Antietam, finding an opening between the woods, swept the thin grey
line from end to end. Jones’ division, after fighting for
three-quarters of an hour on the meadows, fell back to the West Wood;
General Jones was carried wounded from the field, and the guns on the
turnpike were abandoned.
6.30 a.m. So tremendous was the fire, that the corn, said Hooker, over
thirty acres was cut as close by the bullets as if it had been reaped
with the sickle, and the dead lay piled in regular ranks along the
whole Confederate front. Never, he added, had been seen a more bloody
or dismal battle-field. To the east of the turnpike Lawton’s division,
strengthened at the critical moment by the brigade in second line, held
Meade in check, and with a sharp counterstroke drove the Pennsylvanians
back upon their guns. But Gibbon, fighting fiercely in the centre by
the Miller House, brought up a battery in close support of his first
line, and pressed heavily on the West Wood until the Confederate
skirmishers, creeping through the maize, shot
down the gunners and the teams;[5] and Starke, who had succeeded Jones,
led the Valley regiments once more into the open field. The battle
swayed backwards and forwards under the clouds of smoke; the crash of
musketry, reverberating in the woods, drowned the roar of the
artillery; and though hundreds were shot down at the shortest range
neither Federal nor Confederate flinched from the dreadful fray. Hooker
sent in a fresh brigade, and Patrick, reinforcing Gibbon with four
regiments, passed swiftly to the front, captured two colours, and made
some headway. But again the Virginians rallied, and Starke, observing
that the enemy’s right had become exposed, led his regiments forward to
the charge. Doubleday’s division, struck fiercely in front and flank,
reeled back in confusion past the Miller House, and although the
gallant Starke fell dead, the Confederates recovered the ground which
they had lost. Jackson’s men had not been left unaided. Colonel Lee’s
guns had themselves to look to, for along the whole course of the
Antietam McClellan’s batteries were now in action, sweeping the
Sharpsburg ridge with a tremendous fire; but Stuart, west of the
Nicodemus Farm, had done much to embarrass Hooker’s operations.
Bringing his artillery into action, for the ground was unsuited to
cavalry, he had distracted the aim of the Federal gunners, and,
assailing their infantry in flank, had compelled Doubleday to detach a
portion of his force against him. Jackson, with supreme confidence in
the ability of his men to hold their ground, had not hesitated to
reinforce Stuart with Early’s brigade, the strongest in his command;
but before Doubleday was beaten back, Early had been recalled.
7.30 a.m. It was now half-past seven. The battle had been in progress