Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Jackson. He was dismounted, with but few persons round him. He said to
me, ‘Colonel Lee, I wish you to take a ride with me,’ and we rode to
the left of our lines with but one courier, I think. We soon reached a
considerable hill and dismounted. General Jackson then said, ‘Let us go
up this hill, and be careful not to expose yourself, for the Federal
sharpshooters are not far off.’ The hill bore evidence of fierce fight
the day before.[24] A battery of artillery had been on it, and there
were wrecked caissons, broken wheels, dead bodies, and dead horses
around. General Jackson said: ‘Colonel, I wish you to take your glasses
and carefully examine the Federal line of battle.’ I did so, and saw a
remarkably strong line of battle, with more troops than I knew General
Lee had. After locating the
different batteries, unlimbered and ready for action, and noting the
strong skirmish line, in front of the dense masses of infantry, I said
to him, ‘General, that is a very strong position, and there is a large
force there.’ He said, ‘Yes. I wish you to take fifty pieces of
artillery and crush that force, which is the Federal right. Can you do
it?’ I can scarcely describe my feelings as I again took my glasses,
and made an even more careful examination. I at once saw such an
attempt must fail. More than fifty guns were unlimbered and ready for
action, strongly supported by dense lines of infantry and strong
skirmish lines, advantageously posted. The ground was unfavourable for
the location of artillery on the Confederate side, for, to be
effective, the guns would have to move up close to the Federal lines,
and that, too, under fire of both infantry and artillery. I could not
bring myself to say all that I felt and knew. I said, ‘Yes, General;
where will I get the fifty guns?’ He said, ‘How many have you?’ I
replied, ‘About twelve out of the thirty I carried into the action the
day before.’ (My losses had been very great in men, horses, and
carriages.) He said, ‘I can furnish you some, and General Lee says he
can furnish some.’ I replied, ‘Shall I go for the guns?’ ‘No, not yet,’
he replied. ‘Colonel Lee, can you crush the Federal right with fifty
guns?’ I said, ‘General, I can try. I can do it if anyone can.’ He
replied, ‘That is not what I asked you, sir. If I give you fifty guns,
can you crush the Federal right?’ I evaded the question again and
again, but he pressed it home. Finally I said, ‘General, you seem to be
more intent upon my giving you my technical opinion as an artillery
officer, than upon my going after the guns and making the attempt.’
‘Yes, sir,’ he replied, ‘and I want your positive opinion, yes or no.’
I felt that a great crisis was upon me, and I could not evade it. I
again took my glasses and made another examination. I waited a good
while, with Jackson watching me intently.
“I said, ‘General, it cannot be done with fifty guns and the troops you
have near here.’ In an instant he said, ‘Let us ride back, Colonel.’ I
felt that I had
positively shown a lack of nerve, and with considerable emotion begged
that I might be allowed to make the attempt, saying, ‘General, you
forced me to say what I did unwillingly. If you give the fifty guns to
any other artillery officer, I am ruined for life. I promise you I will
fight the guns to the last extremity, if you will only let me command
them.’ Jackson was quiet, seemed sorry for me, and said, ‘It is all
right, Colonel. Everybody knows you are a brave officer and would fight
the guns well,’ or words to that effect. We soon reached the spot from
which we started. He said, ‘Colonel, go to General Lee, and tell him
what has occurred since you reported to me. Describe our ride to the
hill, your examination of the Federal position, and my conversation
about your crushing the Federal right with fifty guns, and my forcing
you to give your opinion.’
“With feelings such as I never had before, nor ever expect to have
again, I returned to General Lee, and gave a detailed account of my
visit to General Jackson, closing with the account of my being forced
to give my opinion as to the possibility of success. I saw a shade come
over General Lee’s face, and he said, ‘Colonel, go and join your
command.’
“For many years I never fully understood my mission that day, or why I
was sent to General Jackson. When Jackson’s report was published of the
battle, I saw that he stated, that on the afternoon of September 17,
General Lee had ordered him to move to the left with a view of turning
the Federal right, but that he found the enemy’s numerous artillery so
judiciously posted in their front, and so near the river, as to render
such an attempt too hazardous to undertake. I afterwards saw General J.
E. B. Stuart’s report, in which he says that it was determined, the
enemy not attacking, to turn the enemy’s right on the 18th. It appears
General Lee ordered General Jackson, on the evening of the 17th, to
turn the enemy’s right, and Jackson said that it could not be done. It
also appears from Stuart’s report, and from the incident I relate, that
General Lee reiterated the order on the 18th,
and told Jackson to take fifty guns, and crush the Federal right.
Jackson having reported against such attempt on the 17th, no doubt said
that if an artillerist, in whom General Lee had confidence, would say
the Federal right could be crushed with fifty guns, he would make the
attempt.
“I now have the satisfaction of knowing that the opinion which I was
forced to give on September 18 had already been given by Jackson on the
evening of September 17, and that the same opinion was reiterated by
him on September 18, and confirmed by General J. E. B. Stuart on the
same day. I still believe that Jackson, Stuart, and myself were right,
and that the attempt to turn the Federal right either on the 17th or on
the 18th would have been unwise.
“The incident shows General Lee’s decision and boldness in battle, and
General Jackson’s delicate loyalty to his commanding general, in
convincing him of the inadvisability of a proposed movement, which he
felt it would be hazardous to undertake.”[25]
The Federal left, protected by the Antietam, was practically
inaccessible; and on receiving from the artillery officers’ lips the
confirmation of Jackson’s report, Lee was fain to relinquish all hope
of breaking McClellan’s line. The troops, however, remained in line of
battle; but during the day information came in which made retreat
imperative. The Federals were being reinforced. Humphrey’s division,
hitherto held back at Frederick by orders from Washington, had marched
over South Mountain; Couch’s division, which McClellan had left to
observe Harper’s Ferry, had been called in; and a large force of
militia was assembling on the Pennsylvania border. Before evening,
therefore, Lee determined to evacuate his position, and during the
night the Army of Northern Virginia, with all its trains and artillery,
recrossed the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford.
Such was the respect which the hard fighting of the Confederates had
imposed upon the enemy, that although the rumbling of heavy vehicles,
and the tramp of the long columns, were so distinctly audible in the
Federal lines that they seemed to wakeful ears like the steady flow of
a river, not the slightest attempt was made to interfere. It was not
till the morning of the 19th that a Federal battalion, reconnoitring
towards Sharpsburg, found the ridge and the town deserted; and although
Jackson, who was one of the last, except the cavalry scouts, to cross
the river, did not reach the Virginia shore till eight o’clock, not a
shot was fired at him.
Nor were the trophies gathered by the Federals considerable. Several
hundred badly wounded men were found in Sharpsburg, and a number of
stragglers were picked up, but neither gun nor waggon had been left
upon the field. The retreat, despite many obstacles, was as
successfully as skilfully executed. The night was very dark, and a fine
rain, which had set in towards evening, soon turned the heavy soil into
tenacious mud; the ford was wide and beset with boulders, and the only
approach was a narrow lane. But the energetic quartermaster of the
Valley army, Major Harman, made light of all difficulties, and under
the immediate supervision of Lee and Jackson, the crossing was effected
without loss or misadventure.
Sept. 19 Just before nightfall, however, under cover of a heavy
artillery fire, the Federals pushed a force of infantry across the
ford, drove back the two brigades, which, with thirty pieces of
artillery, formed the Confederate rear-guard, and captured four guns.
Emboldened by this partial success, McClellan ordered Porter to put
three brigades of the Fifth Army Corps across the river the next
morning, and reconnoitre towards Winchester.
The news of the disaster to his rear-guard was long in reaching Lee’s
headquarters. His army had not yet recovered from the confusion and
fatigue of the retreat. The bivouacs of the divisions were several
miles from the river, and were widely scattered. The generals were
ignorant of each other’s dispositions. No arrangements had been
made to support the rear-guard in case of emergency. The greater part
of the cavalry had been sent off to Williamsport, fifteen miles up
stream, with instructions to cross the Potomac and delay the enemy’s
advance by demonstration. The brigadiers had no orders; many of the
superior generals had not told their subordinates where they would be
found; and the commander of the rear-guard, General Pendleton, had not
been informed of the strength of the infantry placed at his disposal.
On the part of the staff, worn out by the toils and anxieties of the
past few days, there appears to have been a general failure; and had
McClellan, calculating on the chances invariably offered by an enforced
retreat, pushed resolutely forward in strong force, success might
possibly have followed.
Sept. 20 Lee, on receiving Pendleton’s report, long after midnight,
sent off orders for Jackson to drive the enemy back. When the messenger
arrived, Jackson had already ridden to the front. He, too, had received
news of the capture of the guns; and ordering A. P. Hill and Early,[26]
who were in camp near Martinsburg, to march at once to Shepherdstown,
he had gone forward to reconnoitre the enemy’s movements. When Lee’s
courier found him he was on the Shepherdstown road, awaiting the
arrival of his divisions, and watching, unattended by a single
aide-de-camp, the advance of Porter’s infantry. He had at once grasped
the situation. The Confederates were in no condition to resist an
attack in force. The army was not concentrated. The cavalry was absent.
No reconnaissance had been made either of lines of march or of
positions. The roads were still blocked by the trains. The men were
exhausted by their late exertions, and depressed by their retreat, and
the straggling was terrible. The only chance of safety lay in driving
back the enemy’s advanced guard across the river before it could be
reinforced; and the chance was seized without an instant’s hesitation.
The Federals advanced leisurely, for the cavalry which
should have led the way had received its orders too late to reach the
rendezvous at the appointed hour, and the infantry, compelled to
reconnoitre for itself, made slow progress. Porter’s leading brigade
was consequently not more than a mile and a half from the river when
the Light Division reported to Jackson. Hill was ordered to form his
troops in two lines, and with Early in close support to move at once to
the attack. The Federals, confronted by a large force, and with no
further object than to ascertain the whereabouts of the Confederate
army, made no attempt to hold their ground. Their left and centre,
composed mainly of regulars, withdrew in good order. The right,