Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
us.” Without a moment’s hesitation Mr. Lincoln replied: “Sir, I have
the best possible reason for knowing the number to be one million of
men, for whenever one of our generals engages a rebel army he reports
that he has encountered a force twice his strength. Now I know we have
half a million soldiers, so I am bound to believe that the rebels have
twice that number.”
[30] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 627.
[31] O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. 70.
[32] _Ibid.,_ part ii, p. 365.
[33] _Ibid.,_ p. 348.
[34] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, pp. 621, 639.
[35] General orders, Sept. 4; Lee to Davis, Sept. 7; Lee to Davis,
Sept. 13; special orders, Sept. 21; circular order, Sept. 22; Lee to
Davis, Sept. 23; Lee to Secretary of War, Sept. 23; Lee to Pendleton,
Sept. 24; Lee to Davis, Sept. 24; Lee to Davis, Sept. 28; Lee to
Davis, Oct. 2; O.R., vol. xix, part ii. _See also_ Report of D. H.
Hill, O.R., vol. xix, part i, p. l026. Stuart to Secretary of War,
Oct. 13. On Sept. 21, Jackson’s adjutant-general wrote, “We should
have gained a victory and routed them, had it not been for the
straggling. We were twenty-five thousand short by this cause.”
_Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, D.D.,_ p. 217. It is but fair to say that
on September 13 there was a camp of 900 barefooted men at Winchester,
and “a great many more with the army.” Lee to Quarter-Master-General,
O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 614.
[36] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 629.
[37] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 302.
[38] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 643.
[39] About this time he made a successful appearance in a new role. In
September, General Bradley T. Johnson was told off to accompany
Colonel Garnet Wolseley, the Hon. Francis Lawley, Special
Correspondent to the _Times,_ and Mr. Vizetelly, Special Correspondent
of the _Illustrated London News,_ round the Confederate camps. By
order of General Lee,” he says, “I introduced the party to General
Jackson. We were all seated in front of General Jackson’s tent, and he
took up the conversation. He had been to England, and had been greatly
impressed with the architecture of Durham Cathedral and with the
history of the bishopric. The Bishops had been Palatines from the date
of the Conquest, and exercised semi-royal authority over their
bishopric.
”There is a fair history of the Palatinate of Durham in Blackstone
and Coke, but I can hardly think that General Jackson derived his
information from those two fountains of the law. Anyhow, he
cross-examined the Englishmen in detail about the cathedral and the
close and the rights of the bishops, etc. etc. He gave them no
chance to talk, and kept them busy answering questions, for he knew
more about Durham than they did.
”As we rode away, I said: ‘Gentlemen, you have disclosed Jackson in
a new character to me, and I’ve been carefully observing him for a
year and a half. You have made him exhibit _finesse,_ for he did
all the talking to keep you from asking too curious or embarrassing
questions. I never saw anything like it in him before.’ We all
laughed, and agreed that the General had been too much for the
interviewers.” _Memoirs,_ pp. 53–1.
[40] _Memoirs of the Confederate War,_ vol. i
[41] Report of July 31, O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 965.
[42] Report of August 20, O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 966. (Not
engaged at Cedar Run.)
[43] Report of July 20, O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 645. (3½ regiments
had been added.)
[44] Four regiments.
[45] 3,866 sick and straggling since August 28 = 21 p.c.
[46] Over 1,300 stragglers had rejoined.
Chapter XX
FREDERICKSBURG
1862. October While the Army of Northern Virginia was resting in the
Valley, McClellan was preparing for a winter campaign. He was unable,
however, to keep pace with the impatience of the Northern people. Not
only was he determined to postpone all movement until his army was
properly equipped, his ranks recruited, his cavalry remounted, and his
administrative services reorganised, but the military authorities at
Washington were very slow in meeting his demands. Notwithstanding,
then, the orders of the President, the remonstrances of Halleck, and
the clamour of the press, for more than five weeks after the battle of
Sharpsburg he remained inactive on the Potomac. It may be that in the
interests of the army he was perfectly right in resisting the pressure
brought to bear upon him. He was certainly the best judge of the temper
of his troops, and could estimate more exactly than either Lincoln or
Halleck the chances of success if he were to encounter Lee’s veterans
on their native soil. However this may be, his inaction was not in
accordance with the demands of the political situation. The President,
immediately the Confederates retired from Maryland, had taken a step
which changed the character of the war. Hitherto the Northerners had
fought for the restoration of the Union on the basis of the
Constitution, as interpreted by themselves. Now, after eighteen months
of conflict, the Constitution was deliberately violated. For the clause
which forbade all interference with the domestic institutions of the
several States, a declaration that slavery should no longer exist
within the boundaries
of the Republic was substituted, and the armies of the Union were
called upon to fight for the freedom of the negro.
In the condition of political parties this measure was daring. It was
not approved by the Democrats, and many of the soldiers were Democrats;
or by those—and they were not a few—who believed that compromise was
the surest means of restoring peace; or by those—and they were
numerous—who thought the dissolution of the Union a smaller evil than
the continuance of the war. The opposition was very strong, and there
was but one means of reconciling it—vigorous action on the part of the
army, the immediate invasion of Virginia, and a decisive victory. Delay
would expose the framers of the measure to the imputation of having
promised more than they could perform, of wantonly tampering with the
Constitution, and of widening the breach between North and South beyond
all hope of healing.
In consequence, therefore, of McClellan’s refusal to move forward, the
friction between the Federal Government and their general-in-chief,
which, so long as Lee remained in Maryland, had been allayed, once more
asserted its baneful influence; and the aggressive attitude of the
Confederates did not serve to make matters smoother. Although the
greater part of October was for the Army of Northern Virginia a period
of unusual leisure, the troops were not altogether idle. As soon as the
stragglers had been brought in, and the ranks of the divisions once
more presented a respectable appearance, various enterprises were
undertaken. The Second Army Corps was entrusted with the destruction of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, a duty carried out by Jackson with
characteristic thoroughness. The line from Harper’s Ferry to
Winchester, as well as that from Manassas Junction to Strasburg, were
also torn up; and the spoils of the late campaign were sent south to
Richmond and Staunton. These preparations for defensive warfare were
not, however, so immediately embarrassing to the enemy as the action of
the cavalry. Stuart’s three brigades, after the affair at
Boteler’s Ford, picketed the line of the Potomac from the North
Mountain to the Shenandoah, a distance of forty miles: Hampton’s
brigade at Hedgesville, Fitzhugh Lee’s at Shepherdstown, Munford’s at
Charlestown, and headquarters near Leetown.
On October 8 General Lee, suspecting that McClellan was meditating some
movement, ordered the cavalry to cross the Potomac and reconnoitre.
Oct. 9 Selecting 600 men from each of his brigades, with General
Hampton, Colonels W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones in command, and
accompanied by four horse-artillery guns, Stuart rendezvoused on the
night of the 9th at Darkesville. As the day dawned he crossed the
Potomac at McCoy’s Ford, drove in the Federal pickets, and broke up a
signal station near Fairview.
Oct. 10 Marching due north, he reached Mercersburg at noon, and
Chambersburg, forty-six miles from Darkesville, at 7 p.m. on October
10. Chambersburg, although a Federal supply depôt of some importance,
was without a garrison, and here 275 sick and wounded were paroled, 500
horses requisitioned, the wires cut, and the railroad obstructed; while
the machine shops, several trains of loaded cars, and a large quantity
of small arms, ammunition, and clothing was destroyed.
Oct. 11 At nine the next morning the force marched in the direction of
Gettysburg, moving round the Federal rear. Then, crossing the
mountains, it turned south through Emmittsburg, passed the Monocacy
near Frederick, and after a march of ninety miles since leaving
Chambersburg reached Hyattstown at daylight on the 12th.
Oct.12 Here, on the road which formed McClellan’s line of communication
with Washington, a few waggons were captured, and information came to
hand that 4,000 or 5,000 Federal troops were near Poolesville, guarding
the fords across the Potomac. Moving at a trot through the woods, the
column, leaving Poolesville two or three miles to the left, made for
the mouth of the Monocacy. About a mile and a half from that river an
advanced guard of hostile cavalry, moving eastward, was encountered and
driven in. Colonel Lee’s men were
dismounted, a gun was brought into action, and under cover of this
screen, posted on a high crest, the main body made a dash for White’s
Ford. The point of passage, although guarded by about 100 Federal
riflemen, was quickly seized, and Stuart’s whole force, together with
the captured horses, had completed the crossing before the enemy,
advancing in large force from the Monocacy, was in a position to
interfere.
This brilliantly conducted expedition was as fruitful of results as the
ride round McClellan’s army in the previous June. The information
obtained was most important. Lee, besides being furnished with a
sufficiently full report of the Federal dispositions, learned that no
part of McClellan’s army had been detached to Washington, but that it
was being reinforced from that quarter, and that therefore no over-sea
expedition against Richmond was to be apprehended. Several hundred fine
horses from the farms of Pennsylvania furnished excellent remounts for
the Confederate troopers. Prominent officials were brought in as
hostages for the safety of the Virginia citizens who had been thrown
into Northern prisons. Only a few scouts were captured by the enemy,
and not a man was killed. The distance marched by Stuart, from
Darkesville to White’s Ford, was one hundred and twenty-six miles, of
which the last eighty were covered without a halt. Crossing the Potomac
at McCoy’s Ford about 6 a.m. on October 10, he had recrossed it at
White’s Ford, between 1 and 2 p.m. on October 12; he was thus for
fifty-six hours inside the enemy’s lines, and during the greater part
of his march within thirty miles of McClellan’s headquarters near
Harper’s Ferry.
It is often the case in war that a well-planned and boldly executed
enterprise has a far greater effect than could possibly have been
anticipated. Neither Lee nor Stuart looked for larger results from this
raid than a certain amount of plunder and a good deal of intelligence.
But skill and daring were crowned with a more ample reward than the
attainment of the immediate object.
In the first place, the expedition, although there was little fighting,
was most destructive to the Federal cavalry.
McClellan had done all in his power to arrest the raiders. Directly the
news came in that they had crossed the Potomac, troops were sent in
every direction to cut off their retreat. Yet so eminently judicious