Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
were Stuart’s precautions, so intelligent the Maryland soldiers who
acted as his guides, and so rapid his movements, that although constant
reports were received by the Federal generals as to the progress and
direction of his column, the information came always too late to serve
any practical purpose, and his pursuers were never in time to bar his
march. General Pleasanton, with such cavalry as could be spared from
the picket line, marched seventy-eight miles in four-and-twenty hours,
and General Averell’s brigade, quartered on the Upper Potomac, two
hundred miles in four days. The severity of the marches told heavily on
these commands, already worn out by hard work on the outposts; and so
many of the horses broke down that a period of repose was absolutely
necessary to refit them for the field. Until his cavalry should have
recovered it was impossible for McClellan to invade Virginia.
In the second place, neither the Northern Government nor the Northern
people could forget that this was the second time that McClellan had
allowed Stuart to ride at will round the Army of the Potomac. Public
confidence in the general-in-chief was greatly shaken; and a handle was
given to his opponents in the ranks of the abolitionists, who, because
he was a Democrat, and had much influence with the army, were already
clamouring for his removal.
Oct. 26 The respite which Stuart had gained for Virginia was not,
however, of long duration. On October 26, McClellan, having ascertained
by means of a strong reconnaissance in force that the Confederate army
was still in the vicinity of Winchester, commenced the passage of the
Potomac. The principal point of crossing was near Berlin, and so soon
as it became evident that the Federal line of operations lay east of
the Blue Ridge, Lee ordered Longstreet to Culpeper Court House.
Jackson, taking post on the road between Berryville and Charlestown,
was to remain in the Valley.
On November 7 the situation was as follows:—
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
First Corps
Second Corps
Third Corps
Fifth Corps
Ninth Corps
Eleventh Corps
Cavalry Division
Line of Supply
Twelfth Corps Warrenton.
Rectortown.
Between Manassas Junction and Warrenton.
White Plains.
Waterloo.
New Baltimore.
Rappahannock Station and Sperryville.
Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Railways.
Harper’s Ferry and Sharpsburg.
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
First Corps
Second Corps
Cavalry Division
Lines of Supply Culpeper Court House.
Headquarters, Millwood.
Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s Brigades
on the Rappahannock.
Munford’s Brigade with Jackson.
Staunton—Strasburg.
Staunton—Culpeper Court House.
Richmond—Gordonsville.
Nov. 7 On this date the six corps of the Army of the Potomac which were
assembled between the Bull Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge numbered
125,000 officers and men present for duty, together with 320 guns.
The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia give the following
strength:—
Guns First Army Corps
Second Army Corps
Cavalry Division
Reserve Artillery 31,939
31,794
7,176
900
———
71,809 112
123
4
36
——
275 (54 short-range smooth-bores)
(53 short-range smooth-bores)
(20 short-range smooth-bores)
The Confederates were not only heavily outnumbered by the force
immediately before them, but along the Potomac, from Washington
westward, was a second hostile army, not indeed so large as that
commanded by
McClellan, but larger by several thousands than that commanded by Lee.
The Northern capital held a garrison of 80,000; at Harper’s Ferry were
10,000; in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg over 4,000; along the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 8,000. Thus the total strength of the
Federals exceeded 225,000 men. Yet in face of this enormous host, and
with Richmond only weakly garrisoned behind him, Lee had actually
separated his two wings by an interval of sixty miles. He was evidently
playing his old game, dividing his army with a view to a junction on
the field of battle.
Lincoln, in a letter of advice with which he had favoured McClellan a
few days previously, had urged the importance of making Lee’s line of
supply the first objective of the invading army. “An advance east of
the Blue Ridge,” he said, “would at once menace the enemy’s line of
communications, and compel him to keep his forces together; and if Lee,
disregarding this menace, were to cut in between the Army of the
Potomac and Washington, McClellan would have nothing to do but to
attack him in rear.” He suggested, moreover, that by hard marching it
might be possible for McClellan to reach Richmond first.
The Confederate line of communications, so the President believed, ran
from Richmond to Culpeper Court House, and McClellan’s advanced guards,
on November 7, were within twenty miles of that point. Lee, however,
had altogether failed to respond to Mr. Lincoln’s strategical
pronouncements. Instead of concentrating his forces he had dispersed
them; and instead of fearing for his own communications, he had placed
Jackson in a position to interfere very seriously with those of his
enemy.
Mr. Lincoln’s letter to McClellan shows that the lessons of the war had
not been altogether lost upon him. Generals Banks and Pope, with some
stimulus from Stonewall Jackson, had taught him what an important part
is played by lines of supply. He had mastered the strategical truism
that an enemy’s communications are his weakest point. But there were
other considerations which had not come home to him. He had overlooked
the possibility
that Lee might threaten McClellan’s communications before McClellan
could threaten his; and he had yet to learn that an army operating in
its own country, if proper forethought be exercised, can establish an
alternative line of supply, and provide itself with a double base, thus
gaining a freedom of action of which an invader, bound, unless he has
command of the sea, to a single line, is generally deprived.
The President appears to have thought that, if Lee were cut off from
Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia would be reduced to starvation,
and become absolutely powerless. It never entered his head that the
astute commander of that army had already, in anticipation of the very
movement which McClellan was now making, established a second base at
Staunton, and that his line of supply, in case of necessity, would not
run over the open country between Richmond and Gordonsville, but from
Staunton to Culpeper, behind the ramparts of the Blue Ridge.
Lee, in fact, accepted with equanimity the possibility of the Federals
intervening between himself and Richmond. He had already, in the
campaign against Pope, extricated himself from such a situation by a
bold stroke against his enemy’s communications; and the natural
fastness of the Valley, amply provided with food and forage, afforded
facilities for such a manœuvre which had been altogether absent before
the Second Manassas. Nor was he of Mr. Lincoln’s opinion, that if the
Army of Northern Virginia cut in between Washington and McClellan it
would be a simple operation for the latter to about face and attack the
Confederates in rear. He knew, and Mr. Lincoln, if he had studied
Pope’s campaign, should have known it too, that the operation of
countermarching, if the line of communication has been cut, is not only
apt to produce great confusion and great suffering, but has the very
worst effect on the _moral_ of the troops. But Lee had that practical
experience which Mr. Lincoln lacked, and without which it is but waste
of words to dogmatise on strategy. He was well aware that a large army
is a cumbrous machine, not readily deflected from the original
direction of the line of march;[1] and, more than all, he had that
intimate acquaintance with the soldier in the ranks, that knowledge of
the human factor, without which no military problem, whether of
strategy, tactics, or organisation, can be satisfactorily solved.
McClellan’s task, therefore, so long as he had to depend for his
supplies on a single line of railway, was not quite so simple as Mr.
Lincoln imagined.
Nevertheless, on November 7 Lee decided to unite his army. As soon as
the enemy advanced from Warrenton, Jackson was to ascend the Valley,
and crossing the Blue Ridge at Fisher’s Gap, join hands with
Longstreet, who would retire from Madison Court House to the vicinity
of Gordonsville. The Confederates would then be concentrated on
McClellan’s right flank should he march on Richmond, ready to take
advantage of any opportunity for attack; or, if attack were considered
too hazardous, to threaten his communications, and compel him to fall
back to the Potomac.
The proposed concentration, however, was not immediately carried out.
In the first place, the Federal advance came to a sudden standstill;
and, in the second place, Jackson was unwilling to abandon his post of
vantage behind the Blue Ridge. It need hardly be said that the policy
of manœuvring instead of intrenching, of aiming at the enemy’s flank
and rear instead of barring his advance directly, was in full agreement
with his views of war; and it appears that about this date he had
submitted proposals for a movement against the Federal communications.
It would be interesting indeed to have the details of his design, but
Jackson’s letter-book for this period has unfortunately disappeared,
nor did he communicate his ideas to any of his staff. Letters from
General Lee, however, indicate that the manœuvre proposed was of the
same character as
that which brought Pope in such hot haste from the Rappahannock to Bull
Run, and that it was Jackson’s suggestion which caused the
Commander-in-Chief to reconsider his determination of uniting his army.
“As long as General Jackson,” wrote Lee to the Secretary of War on
November 10, “can operate with safety, and secure his retirement west
of the Massanutton Mountains, I think it advantageous that he should be
in a position to threaten the enemy’s flank and rear, and thus prevent
his advance southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge. General
Jackson has been directed accordingly, and should the enemy descend
into the Valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear, and cut off
his communications. The enemy apparently is so strong in numbers that I
think it preferable to baffle his designs by manœuvring, rather than
resist his advance by main force, To accomplish the latter without too
great a risk and loss would require more than double our present
numbers.”[2]
His letter to Jackson, dated November 9, ran as follows: “The enemy
seems to be massing his troops along the Manassas Railroad in the
vicinity of Piedmont, which gives him great facilities for bringing up
supplies from Alexandria. It has occurred to me that his object may be
to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept your ascent
of the Valley. . . . This would oblige you to cross into the Lost River
Valley, or west of it, unless you could force a passage through the
Blue Ridge; hence my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent such a
movement of the enemy, and operate strongly on his flank and rear
through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly in my opinion
effect the object you propose. A demonstration of crossing into
Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might call him back to the
Potomac. As my object is to retard and baffle his designs, if it can be
accomplished by manœuvring your corps as you propose, it will serve my
purpose as well as if effected in any other way. With this
understanding, you can use your discretion, which I know I can rely
upon, in remaining or advancing up the
Valley. Keep me advised of your movements and intentions; and you must
keep always in view the probability of an attack upon Richmond from
either north or south, when a concentration of force will become