Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
necessary.”[3]
Jackson’s plan, however, was not destined to be tried. McClellan had
issued orders for the concentration of his army at Warrenton. His
troops had never been in better condition. They were in good spirits,
well supplied and admirably equipped. Owing to the activity of his
cavalry, coupled with the fact that the Confederate horses were at this
time attacked by a disease which affected both tongue and hoof, his
information was more accurate than usual. He knew that Longstreet was
at Culpeper, and Jackson in the Valley. He saw the possibility of
separating the two wings of the enemy’s forces, and of either defeating
Longstreet or forcing him to fall back to Gordonsville, and he had
determined to make the attempt.
On the night of November 7, however, at the very moment when his army
was concentrating for an advance against Longstreet, McClellan was
ordered to hand over his command to General Burnside. Lincoln had
yielded to the insistence of McClellan’s political opponents, to the
rancour of Stanton, and the jealousy of Halleck. But in sacrificing the
general who had saved the Union at Sharpsburg he sacrificed the lives
of many thousands of his soldiers. A darker day than even the Second
Manassas was in store for the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was not a
general of the first order. But he was the only officer in the United
States who had experience of handling large masses of troops, and he
was improving every day. Stuart had taught him the use of cavalry, and
Lee the value of the initiative. He was by no means deficient in
resolution, as his march with an army of recently defeated men against
Lee in Maryland conclusively proves; and although he had never won a
decisive victory, he possessed, to a degree which was never attained by
any of his successors, the confidence and affection of his troops. But
deplorable
as was the weakness which sanctioned his removal on the eve of a
decisive manœuvre, the blunder which put Burnside in his place was even
more so. The latter appears to have been the _protégé_ of a small
political faction. He had many good qualities. He was a firm friend,
modest, generous, and energetic. But he was so far from being
distinguished for military ability that in the Army of the Potomac it
was very strongly questioned whether he was fit to command an army
corps. His conduct at Sharpsburg, where he had been entrusted with the
attack on the Confederate right, had been the subject of the severest
criticism, and by not a few of his colleagues he was considered
directly responsible for the want of combination which had marred
McClellan’s plan of attack. More than once Mr. Lincoln infringed his
own famous aphorism, “Never swap horses when crossing a stream,” but
when he transferred the destinies of the Army of the Potomac from
McClellan to Burnside he did more—he selected the weakest of his team
of generals to bear the burden.
At the same time that McClellan was superseded, General FitzJohn
Porter, the gallant soldier of Gaines’ Mill and Malvern Hill, probably
the best officer in the Army of the Potomac, was ordered to resign
command of the Fifth Army Corps, and to appear before a court-martial
on charges of incompetency and neglect of duty at the Second Manassas.
The fact that those charges were preferred by Pope, and that Porter had
been allowed to retain his command through the campaign in Maryland,
were hardly calculated to inspire the army with confidence in either
the wisdom or the justice of its rulers; and it was the general opinion
that his intimate friendship with McClellan had more to say to his
trial than his alleged incompetency.
Burnside commenced his career by renouncing the enterprise which
McClellan had contemplated. Longstreet was left unmolested at Culpeper;
and, in order to free the communications from Jackson, the Federal army
was marched eastward along the Rappahannock to Falmouth, a new line of
supply being established between that village
and Aquia Creek, the port on the Potomac, six hours’ sail from
Washington.
Lee had already foreseen that Jackson’s presence in the Valley might
induce the Federals to change their line of operations. Fredericksburg,
on the south side of the Rappahannock, and the terminus of the Richmond
and Potomac Railroad, had consequently been garrisoned by an infantry
regiment and a battery, while three regiments of cavalry patrolled the
river. This force, however, was not posted on the Rappahannock with a
view of retarding the enemy’s advance, but merely for observation. Lee,
at this date, had no intention of concentrating at Fredericksburg. The
Federals, if they acted with resolution, could readily forestall him,
and the line of the North Anna, a small but difficult stream,
thirty-six miles south, offered peculiar advantages to the defence.
Nov. 17 The Federal march was rapid. On November 15 the Army of the
Potomac left Warrenton, and the advanced guard reached Falmouth on the
afternoon of the 17th. General Sumner, in command, observing the
weakness of the Confederate garrison, requested permission from
Burnside to cross the Rappahannock and establish himself on the further
bank. Although two army corps were at hand, and the remainder were
rapidly closing up, Burnside refused, for the bridges had been broken,
and he was unwilling to expose part of his forces on the right bank
with no means of retreat except a difficult and uncertain ford. The
same day, part of Longstreet’s corps and a brigade of cavalry were sent
to Fredericksburg; and on the 19th, Lee, finding that the Federals had
left Warrenton, ordered Longstreet to concentrate his whole force at
Fredericksburg, and summoned Jackson from the Valley to Orange Court
House.
Jackson, meanwhile, had moved to Winchester, probably with the design
of threatening the enemy’s garrisons on the Potomac, and this
unexpected movement had caused much perturbation in the North.
Pennsylvania and Maryland expected nothing less than instant invasion.
The merchant feared for his strong-box, the farmer for
his herds; plate was once more packed up; railway presidents demanded
further protection for their lines; generals begged for reinforcements,
and, according to the “Times” Correspondent, it was “the universal
belief that Stonewall Jackson was ready to pounce upon Washington from
the Shenandoah, and to capture President, Secretaries, and all.” But
before apprehension increased to panic, before Mr. Lincoln had become
infected by the prevailing uneasiness, the departure of the
Confederates from the Valley brought relief to the affrighted citizens.
On November 22 Jackson bade farewell to Winchester. His headquarters
were not more than a hundred yards from Dr. Graham’s manse, and he
spent his last evening with his old friends. “He was in fine health and
fine spirits,” wrote the minister’s wife to Mrs. Jackson. “The children
begged to be permitted to sit up to see “General Jackson,” and he
really seemed overjoyed to see them, played with them and fondled them,
and they were equally pleased. I have no doubt it was a great
recreation to him. He seemed to be living over last winter again, and
talked a great deal about the hope of getting back to spend this winter
with us, in the old room, which I told him I was keeping for you and
him. He certainly has had adulation enough to spoil him, but it seems
not to affect or harm him at all. He is the same humble, dependent
Christian, desiring to give God all the glory, looking to Him alone for
a blessing, and not thinking of himself.”
So it was with no presage that this was the last time he would look
upon the scenes he loved that Jackson moved southward by the Valley
turnpike. Past Kernstown his columns swept, past Middletown and
Strasburg, and all the well-remembered fields of former triumphs; until
the peaks of the Massanuttons threw their shadows across the highway,
and the mighty bulk of the noble mountains, draped in the gold and
crimson of the autumn, once more re-echoed to the tramp of his
swift-footed veterans. Turning east at New Market, he struck upwards by
the familiar road; and then, descending the narrow pass, he forded the
Shenandoah, and crossing the Luray valley vanished in the forests of
the Blue Ridge. Through the dark pines of Fisher’s Gap he led his
soldiers down to the Virginia plains, and the rivers and the mountains
knew him no more until their dead returned to them.
On the 26th the Second Army Corps was at Madison Court House.
Nov. 27 The next day it was concentrated at Orange Court House,
six-and-thirty miles from Fredericksburg. In eight days, two being
given to rest, the troops had marched one hundred and twenty miles, and
with scarce a straggler, for the stern measures which had been taken to
put discipline on a firmer basis, and to make the regimental officers
do their duty, had already produced a salutary effect.
On Jackson’s arrival at Orange Court House he found the situation
unchanged. Burnside, notwithstanding that heavy snow-storms and sharp
frosts betokened the approach of winter, the season of impassable roads
and swollen rivers, was still encamped near Falmouth. The difficulty of
establishing a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek, and some delay on
the part of the Washington authorities in furnishing him with a pontoon
train, had kept him idle; but he had not relinquished his design of
marching upon Richmond. His quiescence, however, together with the
wishes of the President, had induced General Lee to change his plans.
The Army of Northern Virginia, 78,500 strong, although, in order to
induce the Federals to attack, it was not yet closely concentrated, was
ready to oppose in full force the passage of the Rappahannock, and all
thought of retiring to the North Anna had been abandoned.
Nov. 29 On November 29, therefore, Jackson was ordered forward, and
while the First Army Corps occupied a strong position in rear of
Fredericksburg, with an advanced detachment in the town, the Second was
told off to protect the lower reaches of the Rappahannock. Ewell’s
division, still commanded by Early, was posted at Skinker’s Neck,
twelve miles south-east of Fredericksburg, a spot which afforded many
facilities for crossing; D. H. Hill’s at Port Royal, already menaced by
Federal gunboats, six
miles further down stream; A. P. Hill’s and Taliaferro’s (Jackson’s
own) at Yerby’s House and Guiney’s Station, five and nine miles
respectively from Longstreet’s right; and Stuart, whose division was
now increased to four brigades, watched both front and flanks.
The Rappahannock was undoubtedly a formidable obstacle. Navigable for
small vessels as far as Fredericksburg, the head of the tide water, it
is two hundred yards wide in the neighbourhood of the city, and it
increases in width and depth as it flows seaward. But above Falmouth
there are several easy fords; the river banks, except near
Fredericksburg, are clad with forest, hiding the movements of troops;
and from Falmouth downward, the left bank, under the name of the
Stafford Heights, so completely commands the right that it was
manifestly impossible for the Confederates to prevent the enemy,
furnished with a far superior artillery, from making good the passage
of the stream. A mile west of Fredericksburg, however, extending from
Beck’s Island to the heights beyond the Massaponax Creek, runs a long
low ridge, broken by ravines and partially covered with timber, which
with some slight aid from axe and spade could be rendered an
exceedingly strong position. Longstreet, who occupied this ridge, had
been ordered to intrench himself; gun-pits had been dug on the bare
crest, named Marye’s Hill, which immediately faces Fredericksburg; a
few shelter-trenches had been thrown up, natural defences improved, and