Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
some slight breastworks and abattis constructed along the outskirts of
the woods. These works were at extreme range from the Stafford Heights;
and the field of fire, extending as far as the river, a distance
varying from fifteen hundred to three thousand yards, needed no
clearing. Over such ground a frontal attack, even if made by superior
numbers, had little chance of success.
But notwithstanding its manifest advantages the position found no
favour in the eyes of Jackson. It could be easily turned by the fords
above Falmouth—Banks’, United States, Ely’s, and Germanna. This,
however, was a minor disqualification compared with the restrictions in
the way of offensive action. If the enemy should cross at
Fredericksburg, both his flanks would be protected by the river, while
his numerous batteries, arrayed on the Stafford Heights, and commanding
the length and the breadth of the battle-field, would make
counterstroke difficult and pursuit impossible. To await attack,
moreover, was to allow the enemy to choose his own time and place, and
to surrender the advantages of the initiative. Burnside’s
communications were protected by the Rappahannock, and it was thus
impracticable to manœuvre against his most vulnerable point, to inflict
on him a surprise, to compel him to change front, and, in case he were
defeated, to cut him off from his base and deprive him of his supplies.
The line of the North Anna, in Jackson’s opinion, promised far greater
results. The Federals, advancing from Fredericksburg, would expose
their right flank and their communications for a distance of
six-and-thirty miles; and if they were compelled to retreat, the
destruction of their whole army was within the bounds of possibility.
“I am opposed,” he said to General D. H. Hill, “to fighting on the
Rappahannock. We will whip the enemy, but gain no fruits of victory. I
have advised the line of the North Anna, but have been overruled.”[4]
So the days passed on. The country was white with snow. The temperature
was near zero, and the troops, their blankets as threadbare as their
uniforms, without greatcoats, and in many instances without boots,
shivered beneath the rude shelters of their forest bivouacs.
Fortunately there was plenty of work. Roads were cut through the woods,
and existing tracks improved. The river banks were incessantly
patrolled. Fortifications were constructed at Port Royal and Skinker’s
Neck, and the movements of the Federals, demonstrating now here and now
there, kept the whole army on the alert. Nor were Jackson’s men
deprived of all excitement. He had the satisfaction of reporting to
General Lee that D. H. Hill, with the aid of Stuart’s horse-artillery,
had frustrated two attempts of the Federal gunboats to pass up the
river at Port Royal;
and that the vigilance of Early at Skinker’s Neck had caused the enemy
to abandon the design which he had apparently conceived of crossing at
that point.
Dec. 11 But more vigorous operations were not long postponed. On
December 10, General Burnside, urged by the impatience of the Northern
press, determined to advance, and the next morning, at 3 a.m., the
signal guns of the Confederates gave notice that the enemy was in
motion. One hundred and forty Federal guns, many of large calibre,
placed in epaulments on the Stafford Heights, frowned down upon
Fredericksburg, and before the sun rose the Federal bridge builders
were at work on the opposite shore. The little city, which had been
deserted by the inhabitants, was held by Barksdale’s Mississippi
brigade of McLaws’ division, about 1,600 strong, and the conduct of
this advanced detachment must have done much to inspirit the troops who
watched their prowess from the ridge in rear. A heavy fog hung upon the
water, and not until the bridge was two-thirds completed, and shadowy
figures became visible in the mist, did the Mississippians open fire.
At such close quarters the effect was immediate, and the builders fled.
Twice, at intervals of half an hour, they ventured again upon the
deserted bridge, and twice were they driven back. Strong detachments
were now moved forward by the Federals to cover the working parties,
and artillery began to play upon the town. The Southerners, however,
securely posted in rifle-pits and cellars, were not to be dislodged;
and at ten o’clock Burnside ordered the heavy batteries into action.
Every gun which could be brought to bear on Fredericksburg discharged
fifty rounds of shot and shell. To this bombardment, which lasted
upwards of an hour, Longstreet’s artillery could make no reply. Yet
though the effect on the buildings was appalling, and flames broke out
in many places, the defenders not only suffered little loss, but at the
very height of the cannonade repelled another attempt to complete the
bridge.
After a delay of several hours General Hooker, commanding the advance,
called for volunteers to cross the river in boats. Four regiments came
forward. The pontoons
were manned, and though many lives were lost during the transit, the
gallant Federals pushed quickly across; others followed, and Barksdale,
who had no orders to hold the place against superior strength, withdrew
his men from the river bank. About 4.30 p.m., three bridges being at
last established, the enemy pushed forward, and the Mississippians,
retiring in good order, evacuated Fredericksburg. A mile below, near
the mouth of Hazel Run, the Confederate outposts had been driven in,
and three more bridges had been thrown across. Thus on the night of the
11th the Federals, who were now organised in three Grand Divisions,
each of two army corps, had established their advanced guards on the
right bank of the Rappahannock, and, under cover of the batteries on
the Stafford Heights, could rapidly and safely pass over their great
host of 120,000 men.[5]
Burnside had framed his plan of attack on the assumption that Lee’s
army was dispersed along the Rappahannock. His balloon had reported
large Confederate bivouacs below Skinker’s Neck, and he appears to have
believed that Lee, alarmed by his demonstrations near Port Royal, had
posted half his army in that neighbourhood. Utterly unsuspicious that a
trap had been laid for him, he had resolved to take advantage of this
apparently vicious distribution, and, crossing rapidly at
Fredericksburg, to defeat the Confederate left before the right could
lend support. Port Royal is but eighteen miles from Fredericksburg, and
in prompt action, therefore, lay his only hope of success. Burnside,
however, after the successful establishment, of his six bridges,
evinced the same want of resolution which had won him so unenviable a
reputation at Sharpsburg. The long hours of darkness slipped peacefully
away; no unusual sound broke the silence of the night, and all was
still along the Rappahannock.
Dec. 12 It was not till the next morning, December 12, that the army
began to cross, and the movement, made difficult by a dense fog, was by
no means energetic. Four of the six army corps were transferred during
the
day to the southern bank; but beyond a cavalry reconnaissance, which
was checked by Stuart, there was no fighting, and to every man in the
Federal ranks it was perfectly plain that the delay was fatal.
Lee, meanwhile, with ample time at his disposal and full confidence in
the wisdom of his dispositions, calmly awaited the development of his
adversary’s plans. Jackson brought up A. P. Hill and Taliaferro at
noon, and posted them on Longstreet’s right; but it was not till that
hour, when it had at last become certain that the whole Federal army
was crossing, that couriers were dispatched to call in Early and D. H.
Hill. Once more the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated at
exactly the right moment on the field of battle.[6]
Dec. 13 Like its predecessor, December 13 broke dull and calm, and the
mist which shrouded river and plain hid from each other the rival
hosts. Long before daybreak the Federal divisions still beyond the
stream began to cross; and as the morning wore on, and the troops near
Hazel Run moved forward from their bivouacs, the rumbling of artillery
on the frozen roads, the loud words of command, and the sound of
martial music came, muffled by the fog, to the ears of the Confederates
lying expectant on the ridge. Now and again the curtain lifted for a
moment, and the Southern guns assailed the long dark columns of the
foe. Very early had the Confederates taken up their position. The
ravine of Deep Run, covered with tangled brushwood, was the line of
demarcation between Jackson and Longstreet. On the extreme right of the
Second Corps, and half a mile north of the marshy valley of the
Massaponax, where a spur called Prospect Hill juts down from the wooded
ridge, were fourteen guns under Colonel Walker. Supported by two
regiments of Field’s brigade, these pieces were held back for the
present within the forest which here clothed the ridge. Below Prospect
Hill, and running thence along the front of the position, the
embankment of the Richmond and Potomac Railroad formed a tempting
breastwork. It was utilised, however,
only by the skirmishers of the defence. The edge of the forest, One
hundred and fifty to two hundred yards in rear, looked down upon an
open and gentle slope, and along the brow of this natural glacis,
covered by the thick timber, Jackson posted his fighting-line. To this
position it was easy to move up his supports and reserves without
exposing them to the fire of artillery; and if the assailants should
seize the embankment, he relied upon the deadly rifles of his infantry
to bar their further advance up the ascent beyond.
The Light Division supplied both the first and second lines of
Jackson’s army corps. To the left of Walker’s guns, posted in a
shelter-trench within the skirts of the wood, was Archer’s brigade of
seven regiments, including two of Field’s, the left resting on a
coppice that projected beyond the general line of forest. On the
further side of this coppice, but nearer the embankment, lay Lane’s
brigade, an unoccupied space of six hundred yards intervening between
his right and Archer’s left. Between Lane’s right and the edge of the
coppice was an open tract two hundred yards in breadth. Both of these
brigades had a strong skirmish line pushed forward along and beyond the
railroad. Five hundred yards in rear, along a road through the woods
which had been cut by Longstreet’s troops, Gregg’s South Carolina
brigade, in second line, covered the interval between Archer and Lane.
To Lane’s left rear lay Pender’s brigade, supporting twelve guns posted
in the open, on the far side of the embankment, and twenty-one massed
in a field to the north of a small house named Bernard’s Cabin. Four
hundred yards in rear of Lane’s left and Pender’s right was stationed
Thomas’s brigade of four regiments.[7]
It is necessary to notice particularly the shape, size, and position of
the projecting tongue of woodland which
broke the continuity of Hill’s line. A German officer on Stuart’s staff
had the day previous, while riding along the position, remarked its
existence, and suggested the propriety of razing it; but, although
Jackson himself predicted that there would be the scene of the severest
fighting, the ground was so marshy within its depths, and the
undergrowth so dense and tangled, that it was judged impenetrable and
left unoccupied—an error of judgment which cost many lives. General
Lane had also recognised the danger of leaving so wide a gap between
Archer and himself, and had so reported, but without effect, to his
divisional commander.
The coppice was triangular in shape, and extended nearly six hundred
yards beyond the embankment. The base, which faced the Federals, was
five hundred yards long. Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and