Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
position had been occupied for defensive purposes alone. There was no
general reserve, no large and intact force which could have moved to
the attack immediately the opportunity offered. “No skill,” says
Longstreet, “could have marshalled our troops for offensive operations
in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over broken
country, so much so that the troops could not be promptly handled in
offensive operations. Jackson’s corps was in mass, and could he have
anticipated the result of my battle, he would have been justified in
pressing Franklin to the river when the battle of the latter was lost.
Otherwise, pursuit would have been as unwise as the attack he had just
driven off. It is well known that after driving off attacking forces,
if immediate pursuit can be made, so that the victors can go along with
the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do so; but the
attack should be immediate. To follow a success by counter-attack
against the enemy in position is problematical.”[10]
Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by reason
of the woods, and with such ease had the
Federal attacks been repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the
extent of his success. Ignorant, too, as he necessarily was, of the
mistrust and want of confidence in its leaders with which the Federal
army was infected, he was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had
in the hearts of his enemies; while, on the other hand, the
inaccessible batteries on the Stafford Heights were an outward and
visible token of unabated strength.
Jackson, however, although the short winter day was already closing in,
considered that the attempt was worth making. About 3 p.m. he had seen
a feeble attack on the Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and Pender,
and about the same time he received information of Longstreet’s
success.
Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the high banks of
the Richmond road, and the approach of his reserves, plainly visible
from the Confederate position, seemed to presage a renewed attack. “I
waited some time,” says Jackson, “to receive it, but he making no
forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The
artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance
of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising
of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make
preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the
infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed
until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled to retire, it would
be under cover of the night.”[11]
Jackson’s decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, or rather by
the reports which Stuart, who had sent out staff officers to keep the
closest watch on the enemy’s movements, had been able to furnish of the
demoralised condition of a great part of Franklin’s force. The cavalry
general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in person,
galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, and a message was
at once sent to Lee, requesting permission for an advance. A single
cannon shot was to be the signal for a general attack, which Stuart,
striking the
enemy in flank, was to initiate with his two brigades and the lighter
guns.
“Returning to our position,” to quote Stuart’s chief of staff, “we
awaited in anxious silence the desired signal; but minute after minute
passed by, and the dark veil of the winter night began to envelop the
valley, when Stuart, believing that the summons agreed upon had been
given, issued the order to advance. Off we went into the gathering
darkness, our sharpshooters driving their opponents easily before them,
and Pelham with his guns, pushing ahead at a trot, giving them a few
shots whenever the position seemed favourable, and then again pressing
forward. This lasted about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy’s
infantry began to be more and more destructive, and other fresh
batteries opened upon us. Still all remained silent upon our main line.
Our situation had become, indeed, a critical one, when a courier from
General Jackson galloped up at full speed, bringing the order for
Stuart to retreat as quickly as he could to his original position.”
Under cover of the night this retrograde movement was effected without
loss; and the cavalry, as they marched back, saw the camp-fires
kindling on the skirts of the forest, and the infantry digging
intrenchments by the fitful glare.
The Second Corps had not come into action. Jackson had issued orders
that every gun, of whatever calibre or range, which was not disabled
should be brought to the front and open fire at sunset; and that as
soon as the enemy showed signs of wavering, the infantry should charge
with fixed bayonets, and sweep the invaders into the river. Hood’s
division, which had been temporarily placed at his disposal, was
instructed to co-operate.[12] It appears, however, that it had not been
easy, in the short space of daylight still available, to remedy the
confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by Meade’s attack
and their own counterstroke. The divisions were to some extent mixed
up. Several regiments had been broken, and the ammunition of both
infantry and artillery needed replenishment.
Moreover, it was difficult in the extreme to bring the batteries
forward through the forest; and, when they eventually arrived, the
strength of the Federal position was at once revealed. Franklin’s line
was defended by a hundred and sixteen field pieces, generally of
superior metal to those of the Confederates, and the guns on the
Stafford Heights, of which at least thirty bore upon Jackson’s front,
were still in action. As the first Confederate battery advanced, this
great array of artillery, which had been for some time comparatively
quiet, reopened with vigour, and, to use Jackson’s words, “so
completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement
should be abandoned.”
But he was not yet at the end of his resources. A strong position,
which cannot be turned, is not always impregnable. If the ground be
favourable, and few obstacles exist, a night attack with the bayonet,
especially if the enemy be exhausted or half-beaten, has many chances
of success; and during the evening Jackson made arrangements for such a
movement. “He asked me,” says Dr. McGuire, “how many yards of bandaging
I had, and when I replied that I did not know the exact number, but
that I had enough for another fight, he seemed a little worried at my
lack of information and showed his annoyance. I repeated rather
shortly, ‘I have enough for another battle,’ meaning to imply that this
was all that it was necessary for him to know. I then asked him: ‘Why
do you want to know how much bandaging I have?’ He said: ‘I want a yard
of bandaging to put on the arm of every soldier in this night’s attack,
so that the men may know each other from the enemy.’ I told him I had
not enough cotton cloth for any such purpose, and that he would have to
take a piece of the shirt tail of each soldier to supply the cloth,
but, unfortunately, half of them had no shirts! The expedient was never
tried. General Lee decided that the attack would be too hazardous.”[13]
That night both armies lay on their arms. Burnside,
notwithstanding that he spent several hours amongst the troops before
Fredericksburg, and found that both officers and men were opposed to
further attack, decided to renew the battle the next day. His
arrangements became known to Lee, an officer or orderly carrying
dispatches having strayed within the Confederate outposts,[14] and the
Southern generals looked forward, on the morning of the 14th, to a
fresh attack, a more crushing repulse, and a general counterstroke.
Such cheerful anticipations, however, so often entertained by generals
holding a strong defensive position, are but seldom realised, and
Fredericksburg was no exception. The Confederates spent the night in
diligent preparation. Supplies of ammunition were brought up and
distributed, the existing defences were repaired, abattis cut and laid,
and fresh earthworks thrown up. Jackson, as usual on the eve of battle,
was still working while others rested. Until near midnight he sat up
writing and dispatching orders; then, throwing himself, booted and
spurred, on his camp bed, he slept for two or three hours, when he
again arose, lighted his candle, and resumed his writing. Before four
o’clock he sent to his medical director to inquire as to the condition
of General Gregg. Dr. McGuire reported that his case was hopeless, and
Jackson requested that he would go over and see that he had everything
he wished. Somewhat against his will, for there were many wounded who
required attention, the medical officer rode off, but scarcely had he
entered the farmhouse where Gregg was lying, than he heard the tramp of
horses, and Jackson himself dismounted on the threshold. The brigadier,
it appears, had lately fallen under the ban of his displeasure; but
from the moment his condition was reported, Jackson forgot everything
but the splendid services he had rendered on so many hard-fought
fields; and in his anxiety that every memory should be effaced which
might embitter his last moments, he had followed Dr. McGuire to his
bedside.
The interview was brief, and the dying soldier was
the happier for it; but the scene in that lonely Virginian homestead,
where, in the dark hours of the chill December morning, the life of a
strong man, of a gallant comrade, of an accomplished gentleman, and of
an unselfish patriot—for Gregg was all these—was slowly ebbing, made a
deeper impression on those who witnessed it than the accumulated
horrors of the battle-field. Sadly and silently the general and his
staff officer rode back through the forest, where the troops were
already stirring round the smouldering camp-fires. Their thoughts were
sombre. The Confederacy, with a relatively slender population, could
ill spare such men as Gregg. And yet Jackson, though yielding to the
depression of the moment, and deploring the awful sacrifices which the
defence of her liberties imposed upon the South, was in no melting
mood. Dr. McGuire, when they reached headquarters, put a question as to
the best means of coping with the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.
“Kill them, sir! kill every man!” was the reply of the stern soldier
who but just now, with words of tender sympathy and Christian hope, had
bade farewell to his dying comrade.
Dec. 14 But on December 14, as on the morrow of Sharpsburg, the
Confederates were doomed to disappointment. “Darkness still prevailed,”
writes Stuart’s chief of the staff, “when we mounted our horses and
again hastened to Prospect Hill, the summit of which we reached just in
time to see the sun rising, and unveiling, as it dispersed the haze,
the long lines of the Federal army, which once more stood in full line
of battle between our own position and the river. I could not withhold
my admiration as I looked down upon the well-disciplined ranks of our
antagonists, astonished that these troops now offering so bold a front
should be the same whom not many hours since I had seen in complete
flight and disorder. The skirmishers of the two armies were not much
more than a hundred yards apart, concealed from each other’s view by
the high grass in which they were lying, and above which, from time to
time, rose a small cloud of blue smoke, telling that a shot had been
fired. As the boom of artillery began
to sound from different parts of the line, and the attack might be
expected every minute, each hastened to his post.”
But though the skirmishing at times grew hotter, and the fire of the
artillery more rapid, long intervals of silence succeeded, until it at