Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
strategical glance was less comprehensive than that of Lee and Jackson.
In the first place, they knew that if Burnside proposed going into
winter quarters, he would not deliberately place the Rappahannock
between himself and his base, nor halt with the great forest of
Spotsylvania on his flank. In the second place, there could be no
question but that the Northern Government and the Northern people would
impel him forward. The tone of the press was unmistakable; and the very
reason that Burnside had been appointed to command was because
McClellan was so slow to move. In the third place, both Lee and Jackson
saw the need of decisive victory. With them questions of strategic
dispositions, offering chances of such victory, were of more importance
than questions
of supply or internal politics. They knew with what rapidity the
Federal soldiers recovered their _moral_; and they realised but too
keenly the stern determination which inspired the North. They had seen
the hosts of invasion retire in swift succession, stricken and
exhausted, before their victorious bayonets. Thousands of prisoners had
been marched to Richmond; thousands of wounded, abandoned on the
battle-field, had been paroled; guns, waggons and small arms, enough to
equip a great army, had been captured; and general after general had
been reduced to the ignominy that awaits a defeated leader. Frémont and
Shields had disappeared; Banks was no longer in the field; Porter was
waiting trial; McDowell had gone; Pope had gone, and McClellan; and yet
the Army of the Potomac still held its ground, the great fleets still
kept their stations, the capture of Richmond was still the objective of
the Union Government, and not for a single moment had Lincoln wavered
from his purpose.
It will not be asserted that either Lee or Jackson fathomed the source
of this unconquerable tenacity, They had played with effect on the
fears of Lincoln; they had recognised in him the motive power of the
Federal hosts; but they had not yet learned, for the Northern people
themselves had not yet learned it, that they were opposed by an
adversary whose resolution was as unyielding as their own, who loved
the Union even as they loved Virginia, and who ruled the nation with
the same tact and skill that they ruled their soldiers.
In these pages Mr. Lincoln has not been spared. He made mistakes, and
he himself would have been the last to claim infallibility. He had
entered the White House with a rich endowment of common-sense, a high
sense of duty, and an extraordinary knowledge of the American
character; but his ignorance of statesmanship directing arms was great,
and his military errors were numerous. Putting these aside, his tenure
of office during the dark days of ’61 and ’62 had been marked by the
very highest political sagacity; his courage and his patriotism had
sustained the nation in its distress; and in spite of every obstacle he
was gradually
bringing into being a unity of sympathy and of purpose, which in the
early days of the war had seemed an impossible ideal. Not the least
politic of his measures was the edict of emancipation, published after
the battle of Sharpsburg. It was not a measure without flaw. It
contained paragraphs which might fairly be interpreted, and were so
interpreted by the Confederates, as inciting the negroes to rise
against their masters, thus exposing to all the horrors of a servile
insurrection, with its accompaniments of murder and outrage, the farms
and plantations where the women and children of the South lived lonely
and unprotected. But if the edict served only to embitter the
Southerners, to bind the whole country together in a still closer
league of resistance, and to make peace except by conquest impossible,
it was worth the price. The party in the North which fought for the
re-establishment of the Union had carried on the war with but small
success. The tale of reverses had told at last upon recruiting. Men
were unwilling to come forward; and those who were bribed by large
bounties to join the armies were of a different character to the
original volunteer. Enthusiasm in the cause was fast diminishing when
Lincoln, purely on his own initiative, proclaimed emancipation, and,
investing the war with the dignity of a crusade, inspired the soldier
with a new incentive, and appealed to a feeling which had not yet been
stirred. Many Northerners had not thought it worth while to fight for
the re-establishment of the Union on the basis of the Constitution. If
slavery was to be permitted to continue they preferred separation; and
these men were farmers and agriculturists, the class which furnished
the best soldiers, men of American birth, for the most part
abolitionists, and ready to fight for the principle they had so much at
heart. It is true that the effect of the edict was not at once
apparent. It was not received everywhere with acclamation. The army had
small sympathy with the coloured race, and the political opponents of
the President accused him vehemently of unconstitutional action. Their
denunciations, however, missed the mark. The letter of the
Constitution, as Mr. Lincoln clearly saw, had ceased to be
regarded, at least by the great bulk of the people, with superstitious
reverence.
They had learned to think more of great principles than of political
expedients; and if the defence of their hereditary rights had welded
the South into a nation, the assertion of a still nobler principle, the
liberty of man, placed the North on a higher plane, enlisted the
sympathy of Europe, and completed the isolation of the Confederacy.
But although Lee and Jackson had not yet penetrated the political
genius of their great antagonist, they rated at its true value the
vigour displayed by his Administration, and they saw that something
more was wanting to wrest their freedom from the North than a mere
passive resistance to the invader’s progress. Soon after the battle of
Fredericksburg, Lee went to Richmond and laid proposals for an
aggressive campaign before the President. “He was assured, however,”
says General Longstreet, “that the war was virtually over, and that we
need not harass our troops by marches and other hardships. Gold had
advanced in New York to two hundred premium, and we were told by those
in the Confederate capital that in thirty or forty days we would be
recognised (by the European Powers) and peace proclaimed. General Lee
did not share this belief.”[16]
Dec. 18 So Jackson, who had hoped to return to Winchester, was doomed
to the inaction of winter quarters on the Rappahannock, for with
Burnside’s repulse operations practically ceased. The Confederate
cavalry, however, did not at once abandon hostilities. On December 18,
Hampton marched his brigade as far as the village of Occoquan, bringing
off 150 prisoners and capturing a convoy.
Dec. 26 And on December 26 Stuart closed his record for 1862 by leading
1,800 troopers far to the Federal rear. After doing much damage in the
district about Occoquan and Dumfries, twenty miles from Burnside’s
headquarters, he marched northward in the direction of Washington, and
penetrated as far as Burke’s Station, fifteen miles from Alexandria.
Sending a telegraphic
message to General Meigs, Quartermaster-General at Washington, to the
effect that the mules furnished to Burnside’s army were of such bad
quality that he was embarrassed in taking the waggons he had captured
into the Confederate lines, and requesting that a better class of
animal might be supplied in future, he returned by long marches through
Warrenton to Culpeper Court House, escaping pursuit, and bringing with
him a large amount of plunder and many prisoners. From the afternoon of
December 26 to nightfall on December 31 he rode one hundred and fifty
miles, losing 28 officers and men in skirmishes with detachments of the
Federal cavalry. He had contrived to throw a great part of the troops
sent to meet him into utter confusion by intercepting their telegrams,
and answering them himself in a manner that scattered his pursuers and
broke down their horses.
Near the end of January, Burnside made a futile attempt to march his
army round Lee’s flank by way of Ely’s and Germanna Fords. The weather,
however, was inclement; the roads were in a fearful condition, and the
troops experienced such difficulty in movement, that the operation,
which goes by the name of the Mud Campaign, was soon abandoned.
1863. Jan. 26 On January 26, Burnside, in consequence of the strong
representations made by his lieutenants to the President, was
superseded. General Hooker, the dashing fighter of the Antietam,
replaced him in command of the Army of the Potomac, and the Federal
troops went into winter quarters about Falmouth, where, on the opposite
shore of the Rappahannock, within full view of the sentries, stood a
row of finger-posts, on which the Confederate soldiers had painted the
taunting legend, “This way to Richmond!”
[1] On November 1 the Army of the Potomac (not including the Third
Corps) was accompanied by 4,818 waggons and ambulances, 8,500
transport horses, and 12,000 mules. O.R., vol. xix, part i, pp. 97–8.
The train of each army corps and of the cavalry covered eight miles of
road, or fifty miles for the whole.
[2] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 711.
[3] O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 705.
[4] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 355. From _Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 299.
[5] The three Grand Divisions were commanded by Sumner, Hooker, and
Franklin.
[6] Lord Wolseley. _North American Review,_ vol. 149, p. 282.
[7] The dispositions were as follows:—
12 guns Lane Archer ------- ---- ------
14 guns 21 guns
------- ------- ----- Thomas Pender ------
------ Gregg
[8] Franklin’s Grand Division consisted of the 42,800 men, and 12,000
of Hooker’s Grand Division had reinforced him.
[9] Of Early’s Division.
[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, pp. 82–3.
[11] _Jackson’s Reports,_ O.R., vol. xxi, p. 634.
[12] _Advance and Retreat,_ Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood, p. 50.
[13] Letter to the author.
[14] _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ p. 316.
[15] “When the flag of truce,” says Major Hotchkiss, “was received by
General Jackson, he asked me for paper and pencil, and began a letter
to be sent in reply; but after writing a few lines he handed the paper
back, and sent a personal message by Captain Smith.”
Captain Smith writes: “The general said to me, before I went out to
meet Colonel Sumner, representing the Federals: ‘If you are asked
who is in command of your right, do not tell them I am, and be
guarded in your remarks.’ It so happened that Colonel Sumner was
the brother-in-law of Colonel Long, an officer on General Lee’s
staff. While we were together, another Federal officer named Junkin
rode up. He was the brother or cousin of Jackson’s first wife, and
I had known him before the war. After some conversation, Junkin
asked me to give his regards to General Jackson, and to deliver a
message from the Reverend Dr. Junkin, the father of his first wife.
I replied, ‘I will do so with pleasure when I meet General
Jackson.’ Junkin smiled and said: ‘It is not worth while for you to
try to deceive us. We know that General Jackson is in front of
us.’”
[16] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. iii, p. 84.
Chapter XXI
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
“In war men are nothing; it is the man who is everything. The general
is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that
conquered Gaul, but Cæsar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made
Rome tremble in her gates, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army