Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been
rejected. The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in
view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the
expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however,
brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived the
duties of a detached force. He was already prejudiced in favour of a
movement against Suffolk. Before he left for his new command, he had
suggested to Lee that one army corps only should remain on the
Rappahannock, while the other operated south of Richmond; and soon
after his arrival he urged upon his superior that, in case Hooker
moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the North Anna.
In short, to his mind the operations of the main body should be made
subservient to those of the detached force; Lee, with 30,000 men,
holding Hooker’s 130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his victory
and could march north to join him. Such strategy was not likely to find
favour at headquarters. It was abundantly evident, in the first place,
that the Army of Northern Virginia must be the principal objective of
the Federals; and, in the second place, that the defeat of the force of
Suffolk, if it were practicable, would have no effect whatever upon
Hooker’s action, except insomuch that his knowledge of Longstreet’s
absence might quicken his resolution to advance. Had Suffolk been a
point vital to the North the question would have assumed a different
shape. As it was, the town merely covered a tract of conquered
territory, the Norfolk dockyard, and the mouth of the James River. The
Confederates would gain little by its capture; the Federals would
hardly feel its loss. It was most improbable that a single man of
Hooker’s army would be detached to defend a point of such comparative
insignificance, and it was quite possible that Longstreet would be
unable to get back in time to meet him, even on the North Anna. General
Lee, however, anxious as ever to defer to the opinions of the man on
the spot, as well as to meet the wishes of the Government, yielded to
Longstreet’s insistence that a fine opportunity for an effective blow
presented itself, and in the first week of April the latter marched
against Suffolk.
April 17 His movement was swift and sudden. But, as Lee had
anticipated, the Federal position was strongly fortified, with the
flanks secure, and Longstreet had no mind to bring matters to a speedy
conclusion. “He could reduce the place,” he wrote on April 17, “in two
or three days, but the expenditure of ammunition would be very large;
or he could take it by assault, but at a cost of 3,000 men.”
The Secretary of War agreed with him that the sacrifice would be too
great, and so, at a time when Hooker was becoming active on the
Rappahannock, Lee’s lieutenant was quietly investing Suffolk, one
hundred and twenty miles away.
From that moment the Commander-in-Chief abandoned all hope that his
missing divisions would be with him when Hooker moved. Bitterly indeed
was he to suffer for his selection of a commander for his detached
force. The loss of 3,000 men at Suffolk, had the works been stormed,
and Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock, would have
been more than repaid. The addition of 12,000 fine soldiers, flushed
with success, and led by two of the most brilliant fighting generals in
the Confederate armies, would have made the victory of Chancellorsville
a decisive triumph. Better still had Longstreet adhered to his original
orders. But both he and Mr. Seddon forgot, as
Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand principle of
concentration at the decisive point.
Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, was also
oblivious of the first axiom of war. As soon as the weather improved he
determined to move against Richmond. His task, however, was no simple
one. On the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks’ Ford to Port
Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon line of
fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a numerous artillery,
against which it was difficult to find position for the Federal guns,
and occupied by the victors of Fredericksburg. A frontal attack gave
even less promise of success than in Burnside’s disastrous battle. But
behind Lee’s earthworks were his lines of supply; the Richmond Railway,
running due south, with the road to Bowling Green alongside; and
second, the plank road, which, running at first due west, led past
Chancellorsville, a large brick mansion, standing in a dense forest, to
Orange Court House and the depôts on the Virginia Central Railroad.
At these roads and railways Hooker determined to strike, expecting that
Lee would at once fall back, and give the Army of the Potomac the
opportunity of delivering a heavy blow.[6] To effect his object he
divided his 130,000 men into three distinct bodies. The cavalry, which,
with the exception of one small brigade, had moved under General
Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by way of Rappahannock
Station, and either capturing or passing Culpeper and Gordonsville, to
cut the Confederate communications, and should Lee retreat, to hold him
fast.[7] General Sedgwick, with two army corps, the First and Sixth,
forming the left wing of the army, was to cross the river below
Fredericksburg, make a brisk demonstration of attack, and if the enemy
fell back follow him rapidly down the Bowling Green and Telegraph
roads. Then, while Lee’s attention was thus attracted, the right wing,
composed of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with Pleasonton’s
brigade of cavalry, under Hooker’s own command, would move up the
Rappahannock to Kelly’s Ford, push forward to the Rapidan, cross at
Ely’s and Germanna fords, and march upon Chancellorsville. The Third
Corps was to remain concentrated on the Stafford Heights, ready to
reinforce either wing as circumstances might require. The Second Corps
was to leave one division on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two
divisions on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks’ Ford.
It will be observed that this design would place a wide interval
between the two wings of the Federal army, thus giving the
Confederates, although much inferior in numbers, the advantage of the
interior lines.[8] Hooker, however, who knew the Confederate strength
to a man, was confident that Lee, directly he found his position
turned, and Stoneman in his rear, would at once retreat on Richmond.
Yet he was not blind to the possibility that his great adversary,
always daring, might assume the offensive, and attempt to crush the
Federal wings in detail. Still the danger appeared small. Either wing
was practically equal to the whole Confederate force. Sedgwick had
40,000, with the Third Corps, 19,000, and a division of the Second,
5,500, close at hand; Hooker 42,000, with two divisions of the Second
Corps, 11,000, at Banks’ Ford; the Third Corps could reinforce him in
less than four-and-twenty hours; and Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres, riding
at will amongst Lee’s supply depôts, would surely prevent him from
attacking. Still precaution was taken in case the attempt were made.
Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of his force
towards Chancellorsville, was “to carry the works at all hazards, and
establish his force on the Telegraph road.”[9] The right wing, “if not
strongly resisted, was to advance at all hazards, and secure a position
uncovering
Banks’ Ford.”[10] Were the Confederates found in force near
Chancellorsville, it was to select a strong position and await attack
on its own ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, would
assail the enemy in flank and rear.
Such was the plan which, if resolutely carried out, bade fair to crush
Lee’s army between the upper and the nether millstones, and it seems
that the size and condition of his forces led Hooker to anticipate an
easy victory. If the Army of the Potomac was not “the finest on the
planet,” as in an order of the day he boastfully proclaimed it, it
possessed many elements of strength. Hooker was a strict disciplinarian
with a talent for organisation. He had not only done much to improve
the efficiency of his troops, but his vigorous measures had gone far to
restore their confidence. When he succeeded Burnside a large proportion
of the soldiers had lost heart and hope. The generals who had hitherto
commanded them, when compared with Lee and Jackson, were mere pigmies,
and the consciousness that this was the case had affected the entire
army. The Official Records contain much justification of Jackson’s
anxiety that Burnside should be fought on the North Anna, where, if
defeated, he might have been pursued. Although there had been no
pursuit after the battle of Fredericksburg, no harassing marches, no
continued retreat, with lack of supplies, abandoning of wounded, and
constant alarms, the Federal regiments had suffered terribly in
_moral._
“The winter rains set in,” said Hooker, “and all operations were for a
while suspended, the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from
which there was no hope of extrication before spring.
“With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and
despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was
in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the
army at this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its
demoralisation; and these, in their turn, had their effect upon the
friends and relatives of the soldiers at
home. At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the
rate of about two hundred a day. So anxious were parents, wives,
brothers and sisters, to relieve their kindred, that they filled the
express trains with packages of citizens’ clothing to assist them in
escaping from service. At that time, perhaps, a majority of the
officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of
the Government in the conduct of the war. The emancipation proclamation
had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army
had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they would never
have embarked in the war had they anticipated the action of the
Government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever
cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and
out of the camps. I may also state that at the moment I was placed in
command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and
found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers and 81,964
non-commissioned officers and privates. They were scattered all over,
the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown.”[11]
In the face of this remarkable report it is curious to read, in the
pages of a brilliant military historian, that “armies composed of the
citizens of a free country, who have taken up arms from patriotic
motives . . . have constantly exhibited an astonishing endurance, and
possessing a bond of cohesion superior to discipline, have shown their
power to withstand shocks that would dislocate the structure of other
military organisations.”[12] A force which had lost twenty-five per
cent of its strength by desertion, although it had never been pursued
after defeat, would not generally be suspected of peculiar solidity.
Nevertheless, the Northern soldiers must receive their due. Want of
discipline made fearful ravages in the ranks, but, notwithstanding the
defection of so many of their comrades, those that remained faithful
displayed the best characteristics of their
race. The heart of the army was still sound, and only the influence of
a strong and energetic commander was required to restore its vitality.
This influence was supplied by Hooker. The cumbrous organisation of