Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
regiments under W. H. F. Lee to watch Stoneman’s 10,000 sabres. Then,
having obtained the information he required, he moved across the
Federal front, and routing one of Pleasonton’s regiments in a night
affair near Spotsylvania Court House, he had regained touch with his
own army. The results of his manœuvres were of the utmost importance.
Lee was fully informed as to his adversary’s strength; the Confederate
cavalry was in superior strength at the critical point, that is, along
the front of the two armies; and Hooker had no knowledge whatever of
what was going on in the space between Sedgwick and himself. He was
only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confederate position
before Fredericksburg was still strongly occupied.
The want, however, of accurate information gave him no uneasiness. The
most careful arrangements had been made to note and report every
movement of the enemy the next day.
No less than three captive balloons, in charge of skilled
observers, looked down upon the Confederate earthworks.[19] Signal
stations and observatories had been established on each commanding
height; a line of field telegraph had been laid from Falmouth to United
States Ford, and the chief of the staff, General Butterfield, remained
at the former village in communication with General Sedgwick. If the
weather were clear, and the telegraph did not fail, it seemed
impossible that either wing of the Federal army could fail to be fully
and instantly informed of the situation of the other, or that a single
Confederate battalion could change position without both Hooker and
Sedgwick being at once advised.
Moreover, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was so certain that Lee would
retreat that his deficiency in cavalry troubled him not at all. He had
determined to carry out his original design.
May 1 The next morning—May 1—the right wing was to move by the plank
road and uncover Banks’ Ford, thus still further shortening the line of
communication between the two wings; and as the chief of the staff
impressed on Sedgwick, it was “expected to be on the heights west of
Fredericksburg at noon or shortly after, or, if opposed strongly, at
night.” Sedgwick, meanwhile, was “to observe the enemy’s movements with
the utmost vigilance; should he expose a weak point, to attack him in
full force and destroy him; should he show any symptom of falling back,
to pursue him with the utmost vigour.”[20]
But Hooker was to find that mere mechanical precautions are not an
infallible remedy for a dangerous situation. The Confederates had not
only learned long since the importance of concealment, and the
advantage of night marches, but in the early morning of May 1 the river
mists rendered both balloons and observatories useless. Long before the
sun broke through the fog, both McLaws and Jackson had joined Anderson
at Tabernacle
Church, and a strong line of battle had been established at the
junction of the two roads, the pike and the plank, which led east from
Chancellorsville. The position was favourable, running along a low
ridge, partially covered with timber, and with open fields in front.
Beyond those fields, a few hundred paces distant, rose the outskirts of
a great forest, stretching far away over a gently undulating country.
This forest, twenty miles in length from east to west, and fifteen in
breadth from north to south, has given to the region it covers the name
of the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, and in its midst the Federal army
was now involved. Never was ground more unfavourable for the manœuvres
of a large army. The timber was unusually dense. The groves of pines
were immersed in a sea of scrub-oak and luxuriant undergrowth. The soil
was poor. Farms were rare, and the few clearings were seldom more than
a rifle shot in width. The woodland tracks were seldom travelled;
streams with marshy banks and tortuous courses were met at frequent
intervals, and the only _débouchée_ towards Fredericksburg, the pike,
the plank road, an unfinished line of railway a mile south of their
junction, and the river road, about two miles north, were commanded
from the Confederate position.
8 a.m. When Jackson arrived upon the scene, Anderson, with the help of
Lee’s engineers, had strongly intrenched the whole front. A large force
of artillery had already taken post. The flanks of the line were
covered; the right, which extended to near Duerson’s Mill, by Mott’s
Run and the Rappahannock; the left, which rested on the unfinished
railroad not far from Tabernacle Church, by the Massaponax Creek. For
the defence of this position, three miles in length, there were present
45,000 infantry, over 100 guns, and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade of cavalry,
a force ample for the purpose, and giving about nine men to the yard.
On the rolling ground eastward there was excellent cover for the
reserves, and from the breastworks to the front the defiles, for such,
owing to the density of the wood, were the four roads by which the
enemy must approach, might be so effectively swept
as to prevent him from deploying either artillery or infantry.
But Jackson was not disposed to await attack. Only 10,000 men remained
in the Fredericksburg lines to confront Sedgwick, and if that officer
acted vigorously, his guns would soon be heard in rear of the lines at
Tabernacle Church. Work on the intrenchments was at once broken off,
and the whole force was ordered to prepare for an immediate advance on
Chancellorsville.
10.45 a.m. Before eleven o’clock the rear brigades had closed up; and
marching by the pike and the plank road, with a regiment of cavalry in
advance, and Fitzhugh Lee upon the left, the Confederate army plunged
resolutely into the gloomy depths of the great forest. Anderson’s
division led the way, one brigade on the pike, and two on the plank
road; a strong line of skirmishers covered his whole front, and his
five batteries brought up the rear. Next in order came McLaws, together
with the two remaining brigades of Anderson, moving by the pike, while
Jackson’s three divisions were on the plank road. The artillery
followed the infantry.
About a mile towards Chancellorsville the Federal cavalry was found in
some force, and as the patrols gave way, a heavy force of infantry was
discovered in movement along the pike. General McLaws, who had been
placed in charge of the Confederate right, immediately deployed his
four leading brigades, and after the Federal artillery, unlimbering in
an open field, had fired a few rounds, their infantry advanced to the
attack. The fight was spirited but short. The Northern regulars of
Sykes’ division drove in the Confederate skirmishers, but were unable
to make ground against the line of battle. Jackson, meanwhile, who had
been at once informed of the encounter, had ordered the troops on the
plank road to push briskly forward, and the Federals, finding their
right in danger of being enveloped, retired on Chancellorsvile. Another
hostile column was shortly afterwards met on the plank road, also
marching eastward. Again there was a skirmish, and again Jackson,
ordering a brigade to march
rapidly along the unfinished railroad, had recourse to a turning
movement; but before the manœuvre was completed, the Federals began to
yield, and all opposition gradually melted away. The following order
was then sent to McLaws:—
2.30 p.m.
Headquarters, Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia,
May 1, 1863, 2.30 p.m. (received 4 p.m.).
“General,—The Lieutenant-General commanding directs me to say that he
is pressing up the plank road; also, that you will press on up the
turnpike towards Chancellorsville, as the enemy is falling back.
“Keep your skirmishers and flanking parties well out, to guard against
ambuscade.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“J. G. MORRISON,
_Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.”_[21]
There was something mysterious in so easy a victory. The enemy was
evidently in great strength, for, on both roads, heavy columns had been
observed behind the lines of skirmishers. Several batteries had been in
action; cavalry was present; and the Confederate scouts reported that a
third column, of all arms, had marched by the river road toward Banks’
Ford, and had then, like the others, unaccountably withdrawn. The
pursuit, therefore, was slow and circumspect. Wilcox’ brigade, on the
extreme right, moved up the Mine road, in the direction of Duerson’s
Mill; Wright’s brigade, on the extreme left, followed Fitzhugh Lee’s
cavalry on the unfinished railroad; while the main body, well closed
up, still kept to the main highways.
5 p.m. At length, late in the afternoon, Hooker’s tactics became clear.
As Jackson’s advanced guards approached Chancellorsville, the
resistance of the Federal skirmishers, covering the retreat, became
more stubborn. From the low ridge, fringed by heavy timber, on which
the mansion stands, the fire of artillery, raking every avenue of
approach, grew more intense, and it was evident that the foe was
standing fast on the defensive.
The Confederate infantry, pushing forward through the undergrowth, made
but tardy progress; the cavalry patrols found that every road and
bridle-path was strongly held, and it was difficult in the extreme to
discover Hooker’s exact position. Jackson himself, riding to the front
to reconnoitre, nearly fell a victim to the recklessness he almost
invariably displayed when in quest of information. The cavalry had been
checked at Catherine Furnace, and were waiting the approach of the
infantry. Wright’s brigade was close at hand, and swinging round
northwards, drove back the enemy’s skirmishers, until, in its turn, it
was brought up by the fire of artillery. Just at this moment Jackson
galloped up, and begged Stuart to ride forward with him in order to
find a point from which the enemy’s guns might be enfiladed. A
bridle-path, branching off from the main road to the right, led to a
hillock about half a mile distant, and the two generals, accompanied by
their staffs, and followed by a battery of horse-artillery, made for
this point of vantage. “On reaching the spot,” says Stuart’s
adjutant-general, “so dense was the undergrowth, it was found
impossible to find enough clear space to bring more than one gun at a
time into position; the others closed up immediately behind, and the
whole body of us completely blocked up the narrow road. Scarcely had
the smoke of our first shot cleared away, when a couple of masked
batteries suddenly opened on us at short range, and enveloped us in a
storm of shell and canister, which, concentrated on so narrow a space,
did fearful execution among our party, men and horses falling right and
left, the animals kicking and plunging wildly, and everybody eager to
disentangle himself from the confusion, and get out of harm’s way.
Jackson, as soon as he found out his mistake, ordered the guns to
retire; but the confined space so protracted the operation of turning,
that the enemy’s cannon had full time to continue their havoc, covering
the road with dead and wounded. That Jackson and Stuart with their
staff officers escaped was nothing short of miraculous.”[22]
Other attempts at reconnaissance were more successful. Before nightfall
it was ascertained that Hooker was in strong force on the
Chancellorsville ridge, along the plank road, and on a bare plateau to
the southward called Hazel Grove. “Here,” in the words of General Lee,
“he had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all
sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the
midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees
felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abattis. His
artillery swept the few narrow roads, by which the position could be
approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left