Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
of his line extended from Chancellorsville towards the Rappahannock,
covering the Bark Mill (United States) Ford, which communicated with
the north bank of the river by a pontoon bridge. His right stretched
westward along the Germanna Ford road (the pike) more than two miles. .
. . As the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by
night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front of
Chancellorsville at right angles to the plank road, extending on the
right to the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the
Catherine Furnace.”
As darkness falls upon the Wilderness, and the fire of the outposts,
provoked by every movement of the patrols, gradually dies away, we may
seek the explanation of the Federal movements. On finding that his
enemy, instead of “ingloriously flying,” was advancing to meet him, and
advancing with confident and aggressive vigour, Hooker’s resolution had
failed him. Waiting till his force was concentrated, until the Second
and Third Corps had crossed at United States Ford, and were close to
Chancellorsville, it was not till eleven o’clock on the morning of May
1 that he had marched in three great columns towards Fredericksburg.
His intention was to pass rapidly through the Wilderness, secure the
open ground about Tabernacle Church, and there, with ample space for
deployment, to form for battle, and move against the rear of Marye’s
Hill.[23]
But before his advanced guards got clear of the forest defiles they
found the Confederates across their path, displaying an unmistakable
purpose of pressing the attack. Hooker at once concluded that Lee was
marching against him with nearly his whole force, and of the strength
of that force, owing to the weakness of his cavalry, he was not aware.
The news from the Stafford Heights was disquieting. As soon as the fog
had lifted, about nine o’clock in the morning, the signal officers and
balloonists had descried long columns of troops and trains marching
rapidly towards Chancellorsville.[24] This was duly reported by the
telegraph,[25] and it was correctly inferred to signify that Lee was
concentrating against the Federal right. But at the same time various
movements were observed about Hamilton’s Crossing; columns appeared
marching from the direction of Gurney’s Station; there was much traffic
on the railway, and several deserters from Lee’s army declared, on
being examined, that Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions had arrived from
Richmond.[26] The statements of these men—who we may suspect were not
such traitors as they appeared—were confirmed by the fact that
Sedgwick, who was without cavalry, had noticed no diminution in the
force which held the ridge before him.
It is easy, then, to understand Hooker’s decision to stand on the
defensive. With a prudent foresight which does him much credit, before
he marched in the morning he had ordered the position about
Chancellorsville, covering his lines of retreat to United States and
Ely’s Fords, to be reconnoitred and intrenched, and his front, as Lee
said, was undoubtedly very strong. He would assuredly have done better
had he attacked vigorously when he found the Confederates advancing.
His sudden retrograde movement, especially as following the swift and
successful manœuvres which had turned Lee’s position, could not fail to
have a discouraging effect upon the troops; and
if Sedgwick had been ordered to storm the Fredericksburg lines, the
whole Federal force could have been employed, and the Confederates,
assailed in front and rear simultaneously, must, to say the least, have
been embarrassed. But in abandoning his design of crushing Lee between
his two wings, and in retiring to the stronghold he had prepared,
Hooker did what most ordinary generals would have done, especially one
who had served on the losing side at Fredericksburg. He had there
learned the value of intrenchments. He had seen division after division
shatter itself in vain against a stone wall and a few gun-pits, and it
is little wonder that he had imbibed a profound respect for defensive
tactics. He omitted, however, to take into consideration two simple
facts. First, that few districts contain two such positions as those of
the Confederates at Fredericksburg; and, secondly, that the strength of
a position is measured not by the impregnability of the front, but by
the security of the flanks. The Fredericksburg lines, resting on the
Rappahannock and the Massaponax, had apparently safe flanks, and yet he
himself had completely turned them, rendering the whole series of works
useless without firing a shot. Were Lee and Jackson the men to knock
their heads, like Burnside, against stout breastworks strongly manned?
Would they not rather make a wide sweep, exactly as he himself had
done, and force him to come out of his works? Hooker, however, may have
said that if they marched across his front, he would attack them _en
route,_ as did Napoleon at Austerlitz and Wellington at Salamanca, and
cut their army in two. But here he came face to face with the fatal
defect of the lines he had selected, and also of the disposition he had
made of his cavalry. The country near Chancellorsville was very unlike
the rolling plains of Austerlitz or the bare downs of Salamanca. From
no part of the Federal position did the view extend for more than a few
hundred yards. Wherever the eye turned rose the dark and impenetrable
screen of close-growing trees, interlaced with wild vines and matted
undergrowth, and seamed with rough roads, perfectly passable for
troops, with which his
enemies were far better acquainted than himself. Had Stoneman’s cavalry
been present, the squadrons, posted far out upon the flanks, and
watching every track, might have given ample warning of any turning
movement, exactly as Stuart’s cavalry had given Lee warning of Hooker’s
own movement upon Chancellorsville. As it was, Pleasonton’s brigade was
too weak to make head against Stuart’s regiments; and Hooker could
expect no early information of his enemy’s movements.
He thus found himself in the dilemma which a general on the defensive,
if he be weak in cavalry, has almost invariably to face, especially in
a close country. He was ignorant, and must necessarily remain ignorant,
of where the main attack would be made. Lee, on the other hand, by
means of his superior cavalry, could reconnoitre the position at his
leisure, and if he discovered a weak point could suddenly throw the
greater portion of his force against it. Hooker could only hope that no
weak point existed. Remembering that the Confederates were on the pike
and the plank road, there certainly appeared no cause for apprehension.
The Fifth Corps, with its flank on the Rappahannock, held the left,
covering the river and the old Mine roads. Next in succession came the
Second Corps, blocking the pike. In the centre the Twelfth Corps, under
General Slocum, covered Chancellorsville. The Third Corps, under
Sickles, held Hazel Grove, with Berry’s division as general reserve;
and on the extreme right, his breastworks running along the plank road
as far as Talley’s Clearing, was Howard with the Eleventh Corps,
composed principally of German regiments. Strong outposts of infantry
had been thrown out into the woods; the men were still working in the
intrenchments; batteries were disposed so as to sweep every approach
from the south, the south-east, or the south-west, and there were at
least five men to every yard of parapet. The line, however, six miles
from flank to flank, was somewhat extensive, and to make certain, so
far as possible, that sufficient numbers should be forthcoming to
defend the position, at 1.55 on the morning of May 2, Sedgwick was
instructed to send the First Army Corps to Chancellorsville. Before
midnight, moreover, thirty-four guns, principally horse. Artillery,
together with a brigade of infantry, were sent from Falmouth to Banks’
Ford.
Sedgwick, meantime, below Fredericksburg, had contented himself with
engaging the outposts on the opposite ridge. An order to make a brisk
demonstration, which Hooker had dispatched at 11.30 a.m., did not
arrive, the telegraph having broken down, until 5.45 p.m., six hours
later; and it was then too late to effect any diversion in favour of
the main army.
Yet it can hardly be said that Sedgwick had risen to the height of his
responsibilities. He knew that a portion at least of the Confederates
had marched against Hooker, and the balloonists had early reported that
a battle was in progress near Tabernacle Church. But instead of obeying
Napoleon’s maxim and marching to the sound of the cannon, he had made
no effort to send support to his commander. Both he and General
Reynolds[27] considered “that to have attacked before Hooker had
accomplished some success, in view of the strong position and numbers
in their front, might have failed to dislodge the enemy, and have
rendered them unserviceable at the proper time.”[28] That is, they were
not inclined to risk their own commands in order to assist Hooker, of
whose movements they were uncertain. Yet even if they had been
defeated, Hooker would still have had more men than Lee.
[1] Quinine sold in the South for one hundred dollars (Confederate)
the ounce. O.R., vol. xxv, part ii, p. 79.
[2] 3,594 officers and men. Report of December 1. O.R., vol. xxi, p.
1082.
[3] Middle of February.
[4] Pickett, 7,165; Hood, 7,956—15,121 officers and men.
[5] Lee thought Pickett was sufficient. O.R., vol. xxi, p. 623.
[6] Hooker to Lincoln, April 12, O.R., vol.xxv, part ii, p. 199.
[7] The cavalry was to take supplies for six days, food and forage,
depending on the country and on captures for any further quantity that
might be required.
[8] From Franklin’s Crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick’s
bridges were thrown, to Kelly’s Ford is 27 miles; to Ely’s Ford 19
miles, and to Chancellorsville 11 miles.
[9] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 268.
[10] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 274.
[11] _Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War._
[12] _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac._ By William Swinton, p.
267.
[13] “The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns, of the enemy
is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since December.” Lee to
Trimble, March 8, 1862. O.R., vol.xxv, part ii, p. 658.
[14] O.R., vol. xxv, p. 725.
[15] “From the condition of our horses and the amount of our supplies
I am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously as
circumstances might reguire.” Lee to Davis, April 27, O.R., vol.xxv,
p. 752.
[16] On April 20 Lee had asked that the cavalry regiments not needed
in other districts might be sent to the Army of Northern Virginia. The
request was not compiled with until too late. O.R., vol. xxv, pp. 740,
741.
[17] On March 12, before Hooker had even framed his plan of
operations, Lee had received information that the Federals, as soon as
the state of the roads permitted, would cross at United States,
Falmouth, and some point below; the attempt at Falmouth to be a feint.
O.R., vol. xxv, part ii, p. 664.
[18] The troops carried eight days’ supplies: three days’ cooked
rations with bread and groceries in the haversacks; five days’ bread
and groceries in the knapsacks; five days’ “beef on the hoof.” The
total weight carried by each man, including sixty rounds of
ammunition, was 45 pounds. The reserve ammunition was carried
principally by pack mules, and only a small number of waggons crossed
the Rappahannock. Four pontoon bridges were laid by the engineers. One
bridge took three-quarters of an hour to lay; the other three, one and
a half hour to lay, and an hour to take up. Each bridge was from 100
to 140 yards long. O.R., vol. xxv, pp. 215, 216.