Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
8 a.m. A mile north of Catherine Furnace the eminence called Hazel
Grove, clear of timber, looked down the valley of the Lewis Creek, and
as early as 8 a.m. General Birney, commanding the Federal division at
this point, reported the passage of a long column across his front.
The indications, however, were deceptive. At first, it is probable, the
movement seemed merely a prolongation of the Confederate front; but it
soon received a different interpretation. The road at the point where
Jackson’s column was observed turned due south; it was noticed that the
troops were followed by their waggons, and that they were turning their
backs on the Federal lines. Hooker, when he received Birney’s report,
jumped to the conclusion that Lee, finding the direct road to Richmond,
through Bowling Green, threatened by Sedgwick, was retreating on
Gordonsville.
11 a.m. About 11 a.m. a battery was ordered into action on the Hazel
Grove heights.
12.15 p.m. The fire caused some confusion in the Confederate ranks; the
trains were forced on to another road; and shortly after noon, General
Sickles, commanding the Third Army Corps, was permitted by Hooker to
advance upon Catherine Furnace and to develop the situation. Birney’s
division moved forward, and Whipple’s soon followed. This attack, which
threatened to cut the Confederate army in two, was so vigorously
opposed by Anderson’s division astride the plank road and by the 23rd
Georgia at the Furnace, that General Sickles was constrained to call
for reinforcements. Barlow’s brigade, which had hitherto formed the
reserve of the Eleventh Corps, holding the extreme right of the Federal
line, the flank at which Jackson was aiming, was sent to his
assistance. Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade followed. Sickles’ movement,
even before the fresh troops arrived, had met with some success. The
23rd Georgia, driven back to the unfinished railroad and surrounded,
lost 300 officers and men. But word had been sent to Jackson’s column,
and Colonel Brown’s artillery battalion, together with the brigades of
Archer and Thomas, rapidly retracing their steps, checked the advance
in front, while Anderson,
manœuvring his troops with vigour, struck heavily against the flank.
Jackson’s train, thus effectively protected, passed the dangerous point
in safety, and then Archer and Thomas, leaving Anderson to deal with
Sickles, drew off and pursued their march.
These operations, conducted for the most part in blind thickets,
consumed much time, and Jackson was already far in advance. Moving in a
south-westerly direction, he had struck the Brook road, a narrow track
which runs nearly due north, and crosses both the plank road and the
pike at a point about two miles west of the Federal right flank. The
Brock road, which, had Stoneman’s three divisions of cavalry been
present with the Federal army, would have been strongly held, was
absolutely free and unobstructed. Since the previous evening Fitzhugh
Lee’s patrols had remained in close touch with the enemy’s outposts,
and no attempt had been made to drive them in. So with no further
obstacle than the heat the Second Army Corps pressed on. Away to the
right, echoing faintly through the Wilderness, came the sound of cannon
and the roll of musketry; couriers from the rear, galloping at top
speed, reported that the trains had been attacked, that the rear
brigades had turned back to save them, and that the enemy, in heavy
strength, had already filled the gap which divided the Confederate
wings. But, though the army was cut in two, Jackson cast no look behind
him. The battle at the Furnace made no more impression on him than if
it was being waged on the Mississippi. He had his orders to execute;
and above all, he was moving at his best speed towards the enemy’s weak
point. He knew—and none better—that Hooker would not long retain the
initiative; that every man detached from the Federal centre made his
own chances of success the more certain; and trusting implicitly in
Lee’s ability to stave off defeat, he rode northwards with redoubled
assurance of decisive victory. Forward was the cry, and though the heat
was stifling, and the dust, rising from the deep ruts on the unmetalled
road, rose in dense clouds beneath the trees, and men dropped fainting
in the ranks, the great column pushed on without a check.[2]
2 p.m. About 2 p.m., as the rear brigades, Archer and Thomas, after
checking Sickles, were just leaving Welford’s House, some six miles
distant, Jackson himself had reached the plank road, the point where he
intended to turn eastward against the Federal flank. Here he was met by
Fitzhugh Lee, conveying most important and surprising information.
The cavalry regiment had halted when it arrived on the plank road; all
was reported quiet at the front; the patrols were moving northward,
and, attended by a staff officer, the young brigadier had ridden
towards the turnpike. The path they followed led to a wide clearing at
the summit of a hill, from which there was a view eastward as far as
Dowdall’s Tavern. Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the
Federal breastworks, with abattis in front and long lines of stacked
arms in rear; but untenanted by a single company. Two cannon were seen
upon the highroad, the horses grazing quietly near at hand. The
soldiers were scattered in small groups, laughing, cooking, smoking,
sleeping, and playing cards, while others were butchering cattle and
drawing rations. What followed is best told in General Fitzhugh Lee’s
own words.
“I rode back and met Jackson. ‘General,’ said I, ‘if you will ride with
me, halting your columns here, out of sight, I will show you the great
advantage of attacking down the old turnpike instead of the plank road,
the enemy’s lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as
you will be in view from the top of the hill.’ Jackson assented. When
we reached the eminence the picture below was still unchanged, and I
watched him closely as he gazed on Howard’s troops. His expression was
one of intense interest. His eyes burnt with a brilliant glow, and his
face was slightly flushed, radiant at the success of his flank
movement. To the remarks made to him while the unconscious line of blue
was pointed out
he made no reply, and yet during the five minutes he was on the hill
his lips were moving. ‘Tell General Rodes,’ he said, suddenly turning
his horse towards the courier, ‘to move across the plank road, and halt
when he gets to the old turnpike. I will join him there.’ One more look
at the Federal lines, and he rode rapidly down the hill.”
4 p.m. The cavalry, supported by the Stonewall Brigade, was immediately
placed a short distance down the plank road, in order to mask the march
of the column. At 4 p.m. Rodes was on the turnpike. Passing down it for
about a mile, in the direction of the enemy’s position, the troops were
ordered to halt and form for battle. Not a shot had been fired. A few
hostile patrols had been observed, but along the line of breastworks,
watched closely by the cavalry, the Federal troops, still in the most
careless security, were preparing their evening meal. Jackson,
meanwhile, seated on a stump near the Brock road, had penned his last
dispatch to General Lee.
“Near 3 p.m. May 2, 1863.
“General,—The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor’s,[3] which is about
two miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to
attack. I trust that an ever-kind Providence will bless us with great
success.
“Respectfully,
T. J. JACKSON, _Lieutenant-General._
“The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well closed.
“T.J.J.
“General B. E. Lee.”
25,000 men were now deploying in the forest within a mile of the
Federal works, overlapping them both to north and south, and not a
single general in the Northern army appears to have suspected their
presence. The day had passed quietly at Chancellorsville. At a very
early hour in
the morning Hooker, anticipating a vigorous attack, had ordered the
First Army Corps, which had hitherto been acting with Sedgwick below
Fredericksburg, to recross the Rappahannock and march to
Chancellorsville. Averell’s division of cavalry, also, which had been
engaged near Orange Court House with W. H. F. Lee’s two regiments, was
instructed about the same time to rejoin the army as soon as possible,
and was now marching by the left bank of the Rapidan to Ely’s Ford.
Anticipating, therefore, that he would soon be strongly reinforced,
Hooker betrayed no uneasiness. Shortly after dawn he had ridden round
his lines. Expecting at that time to be attacked in front only, he had
no fault to find with their location or construction. “As he looked
over the barricades,” says General Howard, “while receiving the cheers
and salutes of the men, he said to me, ‘How strong! how strong!’ When
the news came that a Confederate column was marching westward past
Catherine Furnace, his attention, for the moment, was attracted to his
right. At 10 a.m. he was still uncertain as to the meaning of Jackson’s
movement. As the hours went by, however, and Jackson’s column
disappeared in the forest, he again grew confident; the generals were
informed that Lee was in full retreat towards Gordonsville, and a
little later Sedgwick received the following:
“Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863, 4.10 p.m.
“General Butterfield,—The Major-General Commanding directs that General
Sedgwick cross the river (_sic_) as soon as indications will permit,[4]
capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the
enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains.
Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them.
“J. H. VAN ALEN,
_“Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.”_
“(Copy from Butterfield, at Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 5.50 p.m.).”
At 4 o’clock, therefore, the moment Jackson’s vanguard reached the old
turnpike near Luckett’s Farm, Hooker believed that all danger of a
flank attack had passed away. His left wing was under orders to
advance, as soon as a swamp to the front could be “corduroyed,” and
strike Lee in flank; while to reinforce Sickles, “among the enemy’s
trains,” Williams’ division of the Twelfth Corps was sent forward from
the centre, Howard’s reserve brigade (Barlow’s) from the right, and
Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade from Hazel Grove.
The officers in charge of the Federal right appear to have been as
unsuspicious as their commander. During the morning some slight
preparations were made to defend the turnpike from the westward; a
shallow line of rifle-pits, with a few epaulements for artillery, had
been constructed on a low ridge, commanding open fields, which runs
north from Dowdall’s Tavern, and the wood beyond had been partially
entangled. But this was all, and even when the only reserve of the
Eleventh Army Corps, Barlow’s brigade, was sent to Sickles, it was not
considered necessary to make any change in the disposition of the
troops. The belief that Lee and Jackson were retreating had taken firm
hold of every mind. The pickets on the flank had indeed reported, from
time to time, that infantry was massing in the thickets; and the
Confederate cavalry, keeping just outside effective range, occupied
every road and every clearing. Yet no attempt was made, by a strong
reconnaissance in force, to ascertain what was actually going on within
the forest; and the reports of the scouts were held to be exaggerated.
The neglect was the more marked in that the position of the Eleventh
Army Corps was very weak. Howard had with him twenty regiments of
infantry and six batteries; but his force was completely isolated. His
extreme right, consisting of four German regiments, was posted in the
forest, with two guns facing westward on the pike, and a line of