Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
And yet the Army of the Potomac had lost more than all the efforts of
the Government could replace. The Army of Virginia, on the other hand,
had acquired a superiority of spirit which was ample compensation for
the sacrifice which had been made. It is hardly too much to say that
Lee’s force had gained from the victory an increase of strength
equivalent to a whole army corps of 80,000 men, while that of his
opponent had been proportionately diminished. Why, then, was there no
pursuit?
It has been asserted that Lee was so crippled by his losses at
Chancellorsville that he was unable to resume operations against Hooker
for a whole month. This explanation of his inactivity can hardly be
accepted.
Illustration: The Battlefields of Chancellorsville, Salem Church and
Fredericksburg, May 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 1862. For larger view
click on image.
On June 16 and 18, 1815, at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, the Anglo-Dutch
army, little larger than that of Northern Virginia, lost 17,000 men;
and yet on the 19th Wellington was marching in pursuit of the French;
nor did he halt until he arrived within sight of Paris. And on August
28, 29, and 30, 1862, at Groveton and the Second Manassas, Stonewall
Jackson lost 4,000 officers and men, one-fifth of his force, but he was
not left in rear when Lee invaded Maryland. Moreover, after he had
defeated Sedgwick, on the same night that Hooker was recrossing the
Rappahannock, Lee was planning a final attack on the Federal
intrenchments, and his disappointment was bitter when he learned that
his enemy had escaped. If his men were capable of further efforts on
the night of May 5, they were capable of them the next day; and it was
neither the ravages of battle nor the disorganisation of the army that
held the Confederates fast, but the deficiency of supplies, the damage
done to the railways by Stoneman’s horsemen, the weakness of the
cavalry, and, principally, the hesitation of the Government. After the
victory of Chancellorsville, strong hopes of peace were entertained in
the South. Before Hooker advanced, a large section of the Northern
Democrats, despairing of ultimate success, had once more raised the cry
that immediate separation was better, than a hopeless contest,
involving such awful sacrifices, and it needed all Lincoln’s strength
to stem the tide of disaffection.
The existence of this despondent feeling was well known to the Southern
statesmen; and to such an extent did they count upon its growth and
increase that they had overlooked altogether the importance of
improving a victory, should the army be successful; so now, when the
chance had come, they were neither ready to forward such an enterprise,
nor could they make up their minds to depart from their passive
attitude. But to postpone all idea of counterstroke until some
indefinite period is as fatal in strategy as in tactics. By no means an
uncommon policy, it has been responsible for the loss of a thousand
opportunities.
Had not politics intervened, a vigorous pursuit—not necessarily
involving an immediate attack, but drawing Hooker, as Pope had been
drawn in the preceding August, into an unfavourable situation, before
his army had had time to recover—would have probably been initiated. It
may be questioned, however, whether General Lee, even when Longstreet
and his divisions joined him, would have been so strong as he had been
at the end of April. None felt more deeply than the Commander-in-Chief
that the absence of Jackson was an irreparable misfortune. “Give him my
affectionate regards,” he said to an aide-de-camp who was riding to the
hospital; “tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as
soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right.”
“Any victory,” he wrote privately, “would be dear at such a price. I
know not how to replace him.”
His words were prophetic. Exactly two months after Chancellorsville the
armies met once more in the clash of battle. During the first two days,
on the rolling plain round Gettysburg, a village of Pennsylvania, four
Federal army corps were beaten in succession, but ere the sun set on
the third Lee had to admit defeat.
And yet his soldiers had displayed the same fiery courage and stubborn
persistence which had carried them victorious through the Wilderness.
But his “right arm” had not yet been replaced. “If,” he said after the
war, with unaccustomed emphasis, “I had had Jackson at
Gettysburg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory there
would have resulted in the establishment of Southern independence.”
It was not to be. Chancellorsville, where 130,000 men were defeated by
60,000, is up to a certain point as much the tactical masterpiece of
the nineteenth century as was Leuthen of the eighteenth. But, splendid
triumph as it was, the battle bore no abiding fruits, and the reason
seems very clear. The voice that would have urged pursuit was silent.
Jackson’s fall left Lee alone, bereft of his alter ego; with none, save
Stuart, to whom he could entrust the execution of those daring and
delicate manœuvres his inferior numbers rendered necessary; with none
on whose resource and energy he could implicitly rely. Who shall say
how far his own resolution had been animated and confirmed at other
crises by the prompting and presence of the kindred spirit? “They
supplemented each other,” said Davis, “and together, with any fair
opportunity, they were absolutely invincible.”
Many a fierce battle still lay before the Army of Northern Virginia;
marvellous was the skill and audacity with which Lee manœuvred his
ragged regiments in the face of overwhelming odds; fierce and
unyielding were the soldiers, but with Stonewall Jackson’s death the
impulse of victory died away.
May 7 It is needless to linger over the closing scene at Gurney’s
Station. For some days there was hope that the patient would recover;
pneumonia, attributed to his fall from the litter as he was borne from
the field, supervened, and he gradually began to sink. On the Thursday
his wife and child arrived from Richmond; but he was then almost too
weak for conversation, and on Sunday morning it was evident that the
end was near.
May 10 As yet he had scarcely realised his condition. If, he said, it
was God’s will, he was ready to go, but he believed that there was
still work for him to do, and that his life would be preserved to do
it. At eleven o’clock Mrs. Jackson knelt by his side, and told him that
he could not live beyond the evening. “You are frightened, my
child,” he replied, “death is not so near; I may yet get well.” She
fell upon the bed, weeping bitterly, and told him again that there was
no hope. After a moment’s pause, he asked her to call Dr. McGuire.
“Doctor,” he said, “Anna tells me I am to die to-day; is it so?” When
he was answered, he remained silent for a moment or two, as if in
intense thought, and then quietly replied, “Very good, very good; it is
all right.”
About noon, when Major Pendleton came into the room, he asked, “Who is
preaching at headquarters to-day?” He was told that Mr. Lacy was, and
that the whole army was praying for him. “Thank God,” he said; “they
are very kind to me.” Already his strength was fast ebbing, and
although his face brightened when his baby was brought to him, his mind
had begun to wander. Now he was on the battle-field, giving orders to
his men; now at home in Lexington; now at prayers in the camp,
Occasionally his senses came back to him, and about half-past one he
was told that he had but two hours to live. Again he answered, feebly
but firmly, “Very good; it is all right. These were almost his last
coherent words. For some time he lay unconscious, and then suddenly he
cried out: “Order A.P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to
the front! Tell Major Hawks “then stopped, leaving the sentence
unfinished. Once more he was silent; but a little while after he said
very quietly and clearly, “Let us cross over the river, and rest under
the shade of the trees,” and the soul of the great captain passed into
the peace of God.
NOTE I
[From General Lee’s letter-book.]
Lexington, Virginia, 25th January, 1866.
MRS. T. J. JACKSON:—
MY DEAR MRS. JACKSON,—Dr. Brown handed me your note of the 9th, when in
Richmond on business connected with Washington College. I have delayed
replying since my return, hoping to have sufficient time to comply with
your request. Last night I received a note from Mrs. Brown, enclosing
one from Dr. Dabney, stating that the immediate return of his
manuscript was necessary. I have not been able to open it; and when I
read it when you were here, it was for the pleasure of the narrative,
with no view of remark or correction; and I took no memoranda of what
seemed to be errors. I have not thought of them since, and do not know
that I can now recall them; and certainly have no desire that my
opinions should be adopted in preference to Dr. Dabney’s. . . . I am,
however, unable at this time to specify the battles to which my remark
particularly refers. The opinion of General Jackson, in reference to
the propriety of attacking the Federal army under General McClellan at
Harrison’s Landing, is not, I think, correctly stated. Upon my arrival
there, the day after General Longstreet and himself, I was disappointed
that no opportunity for striking General McClellan, on the retreat, or
in his then position, had occurred, and went forward with General
Jackson alone, on foot; and after a careful reconnaissance of the whole
line and position, he certainly stated to me, at that time, the
impropriety of attacking. I am misrepresented at the battle of
Chancellorsville in proposing an attack in front, the first evening of
our arrival. On the contrary, I decided against it, and stated to
General Jackson, we must attack on our left as soon as practicable; and
the necessary movement of the troops began immediately. In consequence
of a report received about that time, from General Fitzhugh Lee,
describing the position of the Federal army, and the roads which he
held with his cavalry leading to its rear, General Jackson, after some
inquiry concerning the roads leading to the Furnace, undertook to throw
his command entirely in Hooker’s rear, which he accomplished with equal
skill and boldness; the rest of the army being moved to the left flank
to connect with him as he advanced. I think there is some mistake, too,
of a regiment of infantry being sent by him to the ford on the Rapidan,
as described by Dr. Dabney. The cavalry was ordered to make such a
demonstration. General Stuart had proceeded to that part of the field
to co-operate in General Jackson’s movement, and I always supposed it
was his dismounted cavalry. As well as I now recollect, something is
said by
Dr. Dabney as to General Jackson’s opinion as to the propriety of
delivering battle at Sharpsburg. When he came upon the field, having
preceded his troops, and learned my reasons for offering battle, he
emphatically concurred with me. When I determined to withdraw across
the Potomac, he also concurred; but said then, in view of all the
circumstances, it was better to have fought the battle in Maryland than
to have left it without a struggle. After crossing the Potomac, General
Jackson was charged with the command of the rear, and he designated the
brigades of infantry to support Pendleton’s batteries. I believed
General McClellan had been so crippled at Sharpsburg that he could not
follow the Confederate army into Virginia immediately; but General
Stuart was ordered, after crossing the Potomac, to recross at once at
Williamsport, threaten his right flank, and observe his movements. Near
daylight the next, morning, General Pendleton reported to me the
occurrence at Shepherdstown the previous evening, and stated that he