Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
had made a similar report to General Jackson, who was lying near me on
the same field. From his statement, I thought it possible that the
Federal army might be attempting to follow us; and I sent at once to
General Jackson to say that, in that event, I would attack it; that he
must return with his whole command if necessary; that I had sent to
Longstreet to countermarch the rest of the army; and that upon his
joining me, unless I heard from him to the contrary, I should move with
it to his support. General Jackson went back with Hill’s division,
General Pendleton accompanying him, and soon drove the Federals into
Maryland with loss. His report, which I received on my way towards the
river, relieved my anxiety, and the order of the march of the troops
was again resumed. I have endeavoured to be as brief as possible in my
statement, and with the single object of calling Dr. Dabney’s attention
to the points referred to, that he may satisfy himself as to the
correctness of his own statements; and this has been done solely in
compliance with your request. Other points may have attracted my
attention in the perusal of the narrative; but I cannot now recall
them, and do not know that those which have occurred to me are of
importance. I wish I could do anything to give real assistance, for I
am very anxious that his work should be perfect.
With feelings of great esteem and regard, I am,
Very truly yours,
(Signed) R. E. LEE.
The production of this letter is due to the kindness of Dr. Henry A.
White, and of R. E. Lee, Esquire, of Washington, youngest son of
General Lee.
NOTE II
The following details, communicated to the author by one of Lee’s
generals, as to the formations of the Confederate infantry, will be
found interesting:—
“Our brigades were usually formed of four or five regiments, each
regiment composed of ten companies. Troops furnished by the same State
were, as far as possible, brigaded together, in order to stimulate
State pride, and a spirit of healthy emulation.
“The regiment was formed for attack in line two-deep, covered by
skirmishers.
“The number of skirmishers, and the intervals between the men on the
skirmish line, depended altogether on the situation. Sometimes two
companies were extended as skirmishers; sometimes one company;
sometimes a certain number of men from several companies. In rear of
the skirmishers, at a distance ranging from three hundred to one
hundred and fifty paces, came the remainder of the regiment.
“When a regiment or a brigade advanced through a heavily wooded
country, such as the Wilderness, the point of direction was
established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements of
the ‘guide company’ or ‘guide regiment’ as the case might be, the
‘guide’ company or regiment governing both direction and alignment.
“The maintenance of direction under such circumstances was a very
difficult matter. Our officers, however, were greatly assisted by the
rank and file, as many of the latter were accomplished woodsmen, and
accustomed to hunt and shoot in the dense forests of the South. Each
regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and a left ‘general
guide,’ men selected for their special aptitudes, being good judges of
distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in maintaining the
direction.
“Then, again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining the
direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the line would
be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods-road, a ravine or
watercourse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as the guide: (at
Chancellorsville, Jackson’s divisions kept direction by the turnpike,
both wings looking to the centre.) In advancing through thick woods the
skirmish line was almost invariably strengthened, and while the ‘line
of battle,’ covered by the skirmishers, advanced in two-deep line,
bodies in rear usually marched in columns of fours, prepared to come,
by a ‘forward into line,’ to the point where their assistance might be
desired. I never saw the compass used in wood-fighting. In all
movements to attack it was the universal custom for the brigade
commander to assemble both field and company officers to the ‘front and
centre,’ and instruct them particularly as to the purpose of the
movement, the method in which it was to be carried out, the point of
direction, the guide regiment, the position of other brigades, etc.,
etc. Like action was also taken by the regimental commander when a
regiment was alone.
“This precaution, I venture to think, is absolutely indispensable to an
orderly and combined advance over any ground whatever, and, so far as
my knowledge goes, was seldom omitted, except when haste was
imperative, in the Army of Northern Virginia. Practical experience
taught us that no movement should be permitted until every
officer was acquainted with the object in view, and had received his
instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders were
most particular to secure their flanks and to keep contact with other
troops by means of patrols; and, also, that in thick woods it was found
to be of very great advantage if a few trustworthy men were detailed as
orderlies to the regimental commander, for by this means he could most
easily control the advance of his skirmishers and of his line of
battle.
“N. H. HARRIS,
_General, late Army of Northern Virginia.”_
NOTE III
Before the campaign of 1864, the theatre of which embraced the region
between the Rappahannock and Petersburg, including the Wilderness,
corps of sharp-shooters, each 180 strong, were organised in many of the
brigades of Lee’s army. These “light” troops undertook the outpost,
advanced, flank, and rear guard duties. The men were carefully
selected; they were trained judges of distance, skilful and
enterprising on patrol, and first-rate marksmen, and their rifles were
often fitted with telescopic sights. In order to increase their
confidence in each other they were subdivided into groups of fours,
which messed and slept together, and were never separated in action.
These corps did excellent service during the campaign of 1864.
[1] Letter to the author. A letter of General Lee to Mrs. Jackson,
which contains a reference to this council of war, appears as a Note
at the end of the chapter.
[2] There were three halts during the march of fourteen miles. Letter
from Major Hotchkiss.
[3] Melzi Chancellor’s house; otherwise Dowdall’s Tavern.
[4] Sedgwick had crossed the river on April 29 and 30.
[5] Rodes’ brigades were formed in the following order:
......................................
|| _______ ______ _____ _______ ..........
Iverson O’Neal Doles Colquitt _______ Ramseur ||
[6] Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin, the latest historian of
Chancellorsville, has completely disposed of the legend that these
fifty guns repulsed a desperate attack on Hazel Grove.
[7] In the woods west of the Fairview Heights.
[8] Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 1898.
[9] _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,_ pp. 241–242.
[10] It is but fair, however, to state that Hooker, during the
cannonade which preceded the final assault at Chancellorsville, had
been severely bruised by a fall of masonry.
[11] Hon. Francis Lawley, the _Times,_ June 16, 1863.
[12] Chancellorsville, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Hamlin.
Chapter XXV
THE SOLDIER AND THE MAN[1]
To the mourning of a sore-stricken nation Stonewall Jackson was carried
to his rest. As the hearse passed to the Capitol, and the guns which
had so lately proclaimed the victory of Chancellorsville thundered
forth their requiem to the hero of the fight, the streets of Richmond
were thronged with a silent and weeping multitude. In the Hall of
Representatives, surrounded by a guard of infantry, the body lay in
state; and thither, in their thousands, from the President to the
maimed soldier, from the generals of the Valley army to wondering
children, borne in their mothers’ arms, the people came to look their
last upon the illustrious dead. The open coffin, placed before the
Speaker’s chair, was draped in the Confederate standard; the State
colours were furled along, the galleries; and the expression on the
face, firm and resolute, as if the spirit of battle still lingered in
the lifeless clay, was that of a great conqueror, wise in council,
mighty in the strife. But as the evening drew on the darkened chamber,
hung with deep mourning, and resounding to the clash of arms, lost its
sombre and martial aspect. Garlands of soft spring flowers, the tribute
of the women of Virginia, rose high above the bier, and white pyramids
of lilies, the emblems of purity and meekness, recalled the blameless
life of the Christian soldier.
From Richmond the remains were conveyed to Lexington, and, under the
charge of the cadets, lay for the night in the lecture-room of the
Institute, which Jackson had quitted just two years before. The next
morning he was buried, as he himself had wished, in the little cemetery
above the town.
Many were the mourners that stood around the grave, but they were few
in number compared with those whose hearts were present on those silent
hills. From the cities of the Atlantic coast to the far-off settlements
of Texas the news that Stonewall Jackson had fallen came as a stunning
blow. The people sorrowed for him with no ordinary grief, not as a
great man and a good, who had done his duty and had gone to his reward,
but as the pillar of their hopes and the sheet-anchor of the
Confederate cause. Nor will those familiar with the further history of
the Civil War, from the disaster of Gettysburg to the surrender at
Appomattox, question the truth of this mournful presage. The Army of
Northern Virginia became a different and less manageable instrument
after Chancellorsville. Over and over again it failed to respond to the
conceptions of its leader, and the failure was not due to the soldiers,
but to the generals. Loyal and valiant as they were, of not one of his
lieutenants could Lee say, as he had said of Jackson, “Such an
executive officer the sun never shone on. I have but to show him my
design, and I know that if it can be done it will be done. No need for
me to send or watch him. Straight as the needle to the pole he advances
to the execution of my purpose.”[2]
These words have been quoted as an epitome of Jackson’s military
character. “He was essentially,” says Swinton, “an executive officer,
and in that sphere he was incomparable; but he was devoid of high
mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning a combination,
and of that calm, broad, military intelligence which distinguished
General Lee.”[3] And this verdict, except in the South, has been
generally accepted. Yet it rests on a most unsubstantial basis. Because
Jackson knew so well how to obey it is asserted that he was not well
fitted for independent command. Because he could carry out orders to
the letter it is assumed that he was no master of strategy. Because his
will was of iron, and his purpose, once fixed, never for a moment
wavered, we are asked to believe that
his mental scope was narrow. Because he was silent in council, not
eager in expressing his ideas, and averse to argument, it is implied
that his opinions on matters of great moment were not worth the
hearing. Because he was shy and unassuming; because he betrayed neither
in face nor bearing, save in the heat of battle, any unusual power or
consciousness of power, it is hastily concluded that he was deficient
in the initiative, the breadth, and the penetration which are the
distinguishing characteristics of great generals.
In these pages, however, it has been made clear that Jackson’s quiet