Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
lesson more difficult than drill. The military code, in all its rigour,
could not be at once applied to a body of high-spirited and
inexperienced civilians. Undue severity might have produced the very
worst results. The observance, therefore, of those regulations which
were not in themselves essential to efficiency or health was not
insisted on. Lapses in military etiquette were suffered to pass
unnoticed; no attempt was made to draw a hard and fast line between
officers and men; and many things which in a regular army would be
considered grossly irregular were tacitly permitted. Jackson was well
aware that volunteers of the type he commanded needed most delicate and
tactful handling. The chief use of minute regulations and exacting
routine is the creation of the instinct of obedience. Time was wanting
to instil such instinct into the Confederate troops; and the
intelligence and patriotism of the men, largely of high class and good
position, who filled the ranks, might be relied upon to prevent serious
misconduct. Had they been burdened with the constant acknowledgment of
superior authority which becomes a second nature to the regular
soldier, disgust and discontent might have taken the place of high
spirit and good-will. But at the same time wilful misbehaviour was
severely checked. Neglect of duty and insubordination were crimes which
Jackson never forgave, and deliberate disobedience was in his eyes as
unmanly an offence as cowardice. He knew when to be firm as well as
when to relax, and it was not only in the administration of discipline
that he showed his tact. He was the most patient of instructors. So
long as those under him were trying to do their best, no one could have
been kinder or more forbearing; and he constantly urged his officers to
come to his tent when they required explanation as to the details of
their duty.
Besides discipline and instruction, Jackson had the entire
administration of his command upon his hands. Ammunition was
exceedingly scarce, and he had to provide for the manufacture of
ball-cartridges. Transport there was none, but the great waggons of the
Valley farmers supplied the deficiency. The equipment of the artillery
left much to be desired, and ammunition carts (or caissons) were
constructed by fixing roughly made chests on the running gear of
waggons. The supply and medical services were non-existent, and
everything had to be organised _de novo._ Thus the officer in command
at Harper’s Ferry had his hands full; and in addition to his
administrative labours there was the enemy to be watched, information
to be obtained, and measures of defence to be considered. A glance at
the map will show the responsibilities of Jackson’s position.
The Virginia of the Confederacy was cut in two by the Blue Ridge, a
chain of mountains three hundred and thirty miles in length, which,
rising in North Carolina, passes
under different names through Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and
Vermont, and sinks to the level on the Canadian frontier.
The Blue Ridge varies in height from 2,000 to 6,000 feet. Densely
wooded, it is traversed in Virginia only by the Gaps, through which ran
three railways and several roads. These Gaps were of great strategic
importance, for if they were once secured, a Northern army, moving up
the Valley of the Shenandoah, would find a covered line of approach
towards the Virginia and Tennessee railway, which connected Richmond
with the Mississippi. Nor was this the only advantage it would gain.
From Lexington at its head, to Harper’s Ferry, where it strikes the
Potomac, throughout its whole length of one hundred and forty miles,
the Valley was rich in agricultural produce. Its average width, for it
is bounded on the west by the eastern ranges of the Alleghenies, is not
more than four-and-twenty miles; but there are few districts of the
earth’s surface, of equal extent, more favoured by Nature or more
highly cultivated. It was the granary of Virginia; and not Richmond
only, but the frontier garrisons, depended largely for subsistence on
the farms of the Shenandoah.
Moreover, if the Valley were occupied by the Federals, North-western
Virginia would be cut off from the Confederacy; and Jackson’s native
mountains, inhabited by a brave and hardy race, would be lost as a
recruiting ground.
In order, then, to secure the loyalty of the mountaineers, to supply
the armies, and to protect the railways, the retention of the Valley
was of the utmost importance to the Confederacy. The key of the
communication with the North-west was Winchester, the chief town of the
lower Valley, twenty-six miles, in an air-line, south-west of Harper’s
Ferry. From Winchester two highways lead westward, by Romney and
Moorefield; four lead east and south-east, crossing the Blue Ridge by
Snicker’s, Ashby’s, Manassas, and Chester’s Gaps; and the first object
of the Confederate force at Harper’s Ferry was to cover this nucleus of
roads.
During the month of May the garrison of the frontier
post was undisturbed by the enemy. Lincoln’s first call had been for
75,000 volunteers. On May 3 he asked for an additional 40,000; these
when trained, with 18,000 seamen and a detachment of regulars, would
place at his disposal 150,000 men. The greater part of this force had
assembled at Washington; but a contingent of 10,000 or 12,000 men under
General Patterson, a regular officer of many years’ service, was
collecting in Pennsylvania, and an outpost of 3,000 men was established
at Chambersburg, forty-five miles north of Harper’s Ferry.
These troops, however, though formidable in numbers, were as
ill-prepared for war as the Confederates, and no immediate movement was
to be anticipated. Not only had the Federal authorities to equip and
organise their levies, but the position of Washington was the cause of
much embarrassment. The District of Columbia—the sixty square miles set
apart for the seat of the Federal Government—lies on the Potomac, fifty
miles south-east of Harper’s Ferry, wedged in between Virginia on the
one side and Maryland on the other.
The loyalty of Maryland to the Union was more than doubtful. As a
slave-holding State, her sympathies were strongly Southern; and it was
only her geographical situation, north of the Potomac, and with no
strong frontier to protect her from invasion, which had held her back
from joining the Confederacy. As only a single line of railway
connected Washington with the North, passing through Baltimore, the
chief city of Maryland, a very hot-bed of secession sentiment, the
attitude of the State was a matter of the utmost anxiety to the Federal
Government. An attempt to send troops through Baltimore to Washington
had provoked a popular commotion and some bloodshed. Stern measures had
been necessary to keep the railway open. Baltimore was placed under
martial law, and strongly garrisoned. But despite these precautions,
for some weeks the feeling in Maryland was so hostile to the Union that
it was not considered safe for the Northern troops to cross her
territory except in large numbers; and the concentration
at Washington of a force sufficient to defend it was thus attended with
much difficulty.
A single railroad, too, the Baltimore and Ohio, connected Washington
with the West. Crossing the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and following
the course of the river, it ran for one hundred and twenty miles within
the confines of Virginia. Thus the district commanded by Jackson
embraced an artery of supply and communication which was of great
importance to the enemy. The natural course would have been to destroy
the line at once; but the susceptibilities of both Maryland and West
Virginia had to be considered. The stoppage of all traffic on their
main trade route would have done much to alienate the people from the
South, and there was still hope that Maryland might throw in her lot
with her seceded sisters.
The line was therefore left intact, and the company was permitted to
maintain the regular service of trains, including the mails. For this
privilege, however, Jackson exacted toll. The Confederate railways were
deficient in rolling stock, and he determined to effect a large
transfer from the Baltimore and Ohio. From Point of Rocks, twelve miles
east of Harper’s Ferry, to Martinsburg, fifteen miles west, the line
was double. “The coal traffic along it,” says General Imboden, “was
immense, for the Washington Government was accumulating supplies of
coal on the seaboard. These coal trains passed Harper’s Ferry at all
hours of the day and night, and thus furnished Jackson with a pretext
for arranging a brilliant capture. A detachment was posted at Point of
Rocks, and the 5th Virginia Infantry at Martinsburg. He then complained
to the President of the Baltimore and Ohio that the night trains,
eastward bound, disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a
change of schedule that would pass all east-bound trains by Harper’s
Ferry between eleven and one o’clock in the daytime. The request was
complied with, and thereafter for several days was heard the constant
roar of passing trains for an hour before and an hour after noon. But
since the ‘empties’ were sent up the road at night, Jackson again
complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as the road had
two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains should pass
during the same hour as those going east. Again he was obliged, and we
then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest railroad in America.
“One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its best, Jackson
instructed the officer commanding at Point of Rocks to take a force of
men across to the Maryland side of the river the next day at eleven
o’clock, and letting all west-bound trains pass till twelve o’clock, to
permit none to go east. He ordered the reverse to be done at
Martinsburg.
“Thus he caught all the trains that were going east or west between
these points, and ran them up to Winchester, thirty-two miles on the
branch line, whence they were removed by horse power to the railway at
Strasbourg, eighteen miles further south.”[5]
May 24 This capture was Jackson’s only exploit whilst in command at
Harper’s Ferry. On May 24 he was relieved by General Joseph E.
Johnston, one of the senior officers of the Confederate army. The
transfer of authority was not, however, at once effected. Johnston
reached Harper’s Ferry in advance of his letter of appointment. Jackson
had not been instructed that he was to hand over his command, and,
strictly conforming to the regulations, he respectfully declined to
vacate his post. Fortunately a communication soon came from General
Lee, commanding the Virginia troops, in which he referred to Johnston
as in command at Harper’s Ferry. Jackson at once recognised this letter
as official evidence that he was superseded, and from that time forth
rendered his superior the most faithful and zealous support. He seems
at first to have expected that he would be sent to North-west Virginia,
and his one ambition at this time was to be selected as the instrument
of saving his native mountains to the South. But the Confederate
Government had other views. At the beginning of June a more compact
organisation was given to the regiments at Harper’s Ferry, and Jackson
was
assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the Army of the
Shenandoah.[6]
Recruited in the Valley of the Shenandoah and the western mountains,
the brigade consisted of the following regiments:—
The 2nd Virginia, Colonel Allen.
The 4th Virginia, Colonel Preston.
The 5th Virginia, Colonel Harper.
The 27th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols.
The 33rd Virginia, Colonel Cummings.
A battery of artillery, raised in Rockbridge County, was attached to
the brigade. Commanded by the Reverend Dr. Pendleton, the rector of