Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
reconnoitring through the woods had become detached for the moment from
his command. As he rode along a winding lane he saw resting in a field
a company of Federal infantry. He still wore the uniform of the United
States army; the enemy suspected nothing, taking him for one of their
own cavalry, and he determined to effect their capture. Riding up to
the fence he bade one of the men remove the bars. This was done with
respectful alacrity, and he then galloped among them, shouting “Throw
down your arms, or you are all dead men!” The stentorian order was at
once obeyed: the raw troops not only dropped their rifles but fell upon
their faces, and the Confederate troopers, coming to their leader’s
aid, marched the whole company as prisoners to the rear.
So firm was the attitude of Jackson’s command that General Patterson
was thoroughly imposed upon. Slowly and cautiously he pushed out right
and left, and it was not till near noon that the Confederates were
finally ordered to retreat. Beyond desultory skirmishing there was no
further fighting. The 5th Virginia fell back on the main body; Stuart
came in with his string of captives, and leaving the cavalry to watch
the enemy, the First Brigade went into camp some two miles south of
Martinsburg. Patterson reported to his Government that he had been
opposed by 3,500 men, exactly ten times Jackson’s actual number.[11]
The losses on either side were inconsiderable, a few men killed and 10
or 15 wounded; and if the Confederates carried off 50 prisoners, the
Federals had the satisfaction of burning some tents which Jackson had
been unable to remove. The engagement, however, had the best effect on
the morale of the Southern troops, and they were not so ignorant as to
overlook the skill and coolness with which they had been manœuvred. It
is possible that their commander appeared in an unexpected light, and
that they had watched his behaviour with some amount of curiosity. They
certainly discovered that a
distaste for show and frippery is no indication of an unwarlike spirit.
In the midst of the action, while he was writing a dispatch, a cannon
ball had torn a tree above his head to splinters. Not a muscle moved,
and he wrote on as if he were seated in his own tent.
July 3 The day after Falling Waters, on Johnston’s recommendation,
Jackson received from General Lee his commission as brigadier-general
in the Confederate army. “My promotion,” he wrote to his wife, “was
beyond what I had anticipated, as I only expected it to be in the
Volunteer forces of the State. One of my greatest desires for
advancement is the gratification it will give my darling, and (the
opportunity) of serving my country more efficiently. I have had all
that I ought to desire in the line of promotion. I should be very
ungrateful if I were not contented, and exceedingly thankful to our
kind Heavenly Father.”
Of Patterson’s further movements it is unnecessary to speak at length.
The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg. Halting seven miles
south-west Jackson was reinforced by Johnston’s whole command; and
here, for four days, the Confederates, drawn up in line of battle,
awaited attack. But the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg; and on the
fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were
bitterly dissatisfied. At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for
further action. His experiences at Falling Waters had given him no
exalted notion of the enemy’s prowess, and he was ready to engage them
single-handed. “I want my brigade,” he said, “to feel that it can
itself whip Patterson’s whole army, and I believe we can do it.” But
Johnston’s self-control was admirable. He was ready to receive attack,
believing that, in his selected position, he could repulse superior
numbers. But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an offensive
movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the remonstrances of the
officers. The stone houses of Martinsburg and its walled inclosures
were proof against assault, and promised at most a bloody victory. His
stock of ammunition was scanty in
the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and
although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of
enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle
south of Martinsburg.
The Federal army at Washington, commanded by General McDowell, amounted
to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of the
Potomac, and Beauregard’s 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas Junction,
were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy had advanced,
moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the southern end
of the Valley, and not on Winchester.
July 11 On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate
detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson’s birthplace; and
although it was still in the heart of the Alleghenies, a few marches,
which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the
control of the Upper Valley.
Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over
80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more than
32,000 all told, looked small indeed. But the three Federal columns
were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the Manassas
Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with greater rapidity
than their opponents.
President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore
determined to concentrate the whole available force at Manassas
Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from
Washington.[12] The difficulty was for the Army of the Shenandoah to
give Patterson the slip. This could easily have been done while that
officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in Lee’s opinion, if the enemy
found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concentrating at
Manassas Junction, the Washington column would remain within its
intrenchments round the capital, and the Confederates “would be put to
the great disadvantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other
points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed.” The concentration,
therefore, was to be postponed until the Washington column
advanced.[13]
But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or threatening
the Manassas Railway. Johnston had thus a most delicate task before
him; and in view of the superior numbers which the Federals could bring
against Manassas, it was essential that not a man should he wasted in
minor enterprises. The defeat of Patterson, even had it been
practicable, would not have prevented the Washington column from
advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the Valley would
be one the less at Manassas.
July 15 On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the
direction of Winchester. On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker’s
Hill, nine miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his
advance, moved to his left and occupied Charlestown. His indecision was
manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His instructions were to
hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against
Beauregard. But his instructions were either too definite or not
definite enough, and he himself was overcautious. He believed, and so
did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by
demonstrations—that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned
attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least
inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his
ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack. Even
in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had an
unenviable reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and their
term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no influence with
them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly refused
to remain with the colours even for a few days over their term of
service. They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they had
received from the Government. The men had received no pay. Many were
without shoes, and others, according to their general, were “without
pants!” “They cannot march,” he adds, “and,
unless a paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and
have just cause of complaint.”[14]
Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous mistake when they
allowed Patterson and his _sans-culottes_ to move to Charlestown.
McDowell marched against Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and
Patterson should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost.
Even had the latter been successful, he could hardly have reinforced
the main army in time to meet McDowell.
July 18 At 1 a.m. on the morning of the 18th Johnston received a
telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell was advancing
on Manassas. Stuart was immediately directed to keep Patterson amused;
and leaving their sick, 1,700 in number, to the care of Winchester, the
troops were ordered to strike tents and prepare to march. No man knew
the object of the movement, and when the regiments passed through
Winchester, marching southward, with their backs to the enemy, the step
was lagging and the men dispirited. A few miles out, as they turned
eastward, the brigades were halted and an order was read to them. “Our
gallant army under General Beauregard is now attacked by overwhelming
numbers. The Commanding General hopes that his troops will step out
like men, and make a forced march to save the country.” The effect of
this stirring appeal was instantaneous. “The soldiers,” says Jackson,
“rent the air with shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation.”
The march was resumed, and as mile after mile was passed, although
there was much useless delay and the pace was slow, the faint outlines
of the Blue Ridge, rising high above the Valley, changed imperceptibly
to a mighty wall of rock and forest. As the night came down a long
reach of the Shenandoah crossed the road. The ford was waist-deep, but
the tall Virginians, plunging without hesitation into the strong
current, gained the opposite shore with little loss of time. The guns
and waggons followed in long succession through the darkling waters,
and still the heavy tramp of the toiling column passed eastward through
the quiet fields.
The Blue Ridge was crossed at Ashby’s Gap; and at two o’clock in the
morning, near the little village of Paris, the First Brigade was halted
on the further slope. They had marched over twenty miles, and so great
was their exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground beside
their muskets.[15] They were already sleeping, when an officer reminded
Jackson that there were no pickets round the bivouac. “Let the poor
fellows sleep,” was the reply; “I will guard the camp myself.” And so,
through the watches of the summer night, the general himself stood
sentry over his unconscious troops.[16]
[1] Strength of the Federal Navy at different periods:—
March 4, 1861: 42 ships in commission.
December 1, 1861: 264 ships in commission.
December 1, 1862: 427 ships in commission.
December 1, 1863: 588 ships in commission.
December 1, 1864: 671 ships in commission.
[2] Even after the Peninsular War had enlarged the experience of the
British army, Sir Charles Napier declared that he knew but one general
who could handle 100,000 men, and that was the Duke of Wellington.
[3] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 168.
[4] Cf. U.S. Census Returns 1860.
[5] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i.
[6] The Virginia troops were merged in the army of the Confederate
States on June 8, 1861. The total strength was 40,000 men and 115
guns. O.R., vol. ii, p. 928.
[7] When the battery arrived at Harper’s Ferry, it was quartered in a