Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
his merits that he must be advanced, or the interests of the service
must suffer. . . . My desire is to make merit the basis of my
recommendations.”
Social claims had no weight with him whatever. He felt that the
interests at stake were too great to be sacrificed to favouritism or
friendship, and he had seen enough of war to know the importance of
staff work. Nor was he in the unfortunate position of being compelled
to accept the nominees of his superiors. The Confederate authorities
were wise enough to permit their generals to choose for themselves the
instruments on which they would have to rely for the execution of their
designs. Wellington, in 1815, had forced on him by the Horse Guards, in
the teeth of his indignant remonstrances, incompetent officers whom he
did not know and whom he could not trust. Jackson, in a country which
knew little of war, was allowed to please himself. He need appoint no
one without learning all about him, and his inquiries were searching.
Was he intelligent? Was he trustworthy? Was he industrious? Did he get
up early? If a man was wanting in any one of these qualifications he
would reject him, however highly recommended. That his strict
investigations and his insistence on the possession of certain
essential characteristics bore good fruit it is impossible to gainsay.
The absence of mishaps and errors in his often complicated manœuvres is
sufficient proof that he was exceedingly well served by his
subordinates. The influence of a good staff is seldom apparent except
to the initiated. If a combination succeeds, the general gets all the
credit. If it fails, he gets all the blame; and while no agents,
however efficient, can compensate by their own efforts for the weakness
of a conception that is radically unsound, many a brilliant plan has
failed in execution through the inefficiency of the staff. In his
selection of such capable men as his assistants must needs have been
Jackson gave proof that he possessed one at least of the attributes of
a great leader. He was not only a judge of character, but he could
place men in the positions to which they were best suited. His personal
predilections were never allowed to interfere. For some months his
chief of the staff was a Presbyterian clergyman, while his chief
quartermaster was one of the hardest swearers in Virginia. The fact
that the former could combine the duties of spiritual adviser with
those of his official position made him a congenial comrade; but it was
his energy and ability rather than this unusual qualification which
attracted Jackson; and although the profanity of the quartermaster
offended his susceptibilities, their relations were always cordial. It
was to the intelligence of his staff officers, their energy and their
loyalty, that he looked; for the business in hand these qualities were
more important than their morals.
That a civilian should be found serving as chief of the staff to a
general of division, one of the most important posts in the military
hierarchy, is a curious comment on the organisation of the Confederate
army. The regular officers who had thrown in their lot with the South
had, as a rule, been appointed to commands, and the generals of lower
rank had to seek their staff officers amongst the volunteers. It may be
noticed, however, that Jackson was by no means bigoted in favour of his
own cloth. He showed no anxiety to secure their services on his staff.
He thought many of them unfitted for duties which brought them in
immediate contact with the volunteers. In dealing with such troops,
tact and temper are of more importance than where obedience has become
mechanical, and the claims of rank are instinctively reflected. In all
his campaigns, too, Jackson was practically his own chief of the staff.
He consulted no one. He never divulged his plans. He gave his orders,
and his staff had only to see that these orders were obeyed. His
topographical engineer, his medical director, his commissary and his
quartermaster, were selected, it is true, by reason of their special
qualifications. Captain Hotchkiss, who filled the first position, was a
young man of
twenty-six, whose abilities as a surveyor were well known in the
Valley. Major Harman, his chief quartermaster, was one of the
proprietors of a line of stage coaches and a large farmer, and Major
Hawks, his commissary, was the owner of a carriage manufactory. But the
remainder of his assistants, with the exception of the chief of
artillery, owed their appointments rather to their character than to
their professional abilities. It is not to be understood, at the same
time, that Jackson underrated soldierly acquirements. He left no
complaints on record, like so many of his West Point comrades, of the
ignorance of the volunteer officers, and of the consequent difficulties
which attended every combination. But he was none the less alive to
their deficiencies. Early in 1862, when the military system of the
Confederacy was about to be reorganised, he urged upon the Government,
through the member of Congress for the district where he commanded,
that regimental promotion should not be obtained by seniority, unless
the applicant were approved by a board of examination; and it was due
to his representations that this regulation, to the great benefit of
the army, was shortly afterwards adopted. With all his appreciation of
natural aptitude for the soldier’s trade, so close a student of
Napoleon could scarcely be blind to the fact that the most heroic
character, unsustained by knowledge, is practically useless. If
Napoleon himself, more highly endowed by nature with every military
attribute than any other general of the Christian era, thought it
essential to teach himself his business by incessant study, how much
more is such study necessary for ordinary men?
But no man was less likely than Jackson to place an exaggerated value
on theoretical acquirements. No one realised more fully that Napoleon’s
character won more victories than Napoleon’s knowledge. The qualities
he demanded in his subordinates were those which were conspicuous in
Napoleon. Who was more industrious than the great Corsican? Who
displayed an intenser energy? Whose intelligence was brighter? Who
understood human nature better, or handled men with more consummate
tact?
These were the very attributes which distinguished Jackson himself.
They are the key-note to his success, more so than his knowledge of
strategy and tactics, of the mechanism of march and battle, and of the
principles of the military art. In selecting his staff officers,
therefore, he deemed character of more importance than erudition.
The men of the Stonewall Brigade had a saying that Jackson always
marched at dawn, except when he started the night before, and it was
perhaps this habit, which his enemies found so unreasonable, that led
him to lay so much stress on early rising. It is certain that, like
Wellington, he preferred “three o’clock in the morning men.” In a
letter to his wife he says:—
“If you will vouch for your brother’s being an early riser during the
remainder of the war, I will give him an aide-ship. I do not want to
make an appointment on my staff except of such as are early risers; but
if you will vouch for him to rise regularly at dawn, I will offer him
the position.”
Another characteristic he looked for was reticence; and it was
undeniably of the utmost importance, especially in an army which spoke
the same language as the enemy, where desertion was not uncommon, and
spies could easily escape detection, that the men who might become
cognisant of the plans of the commander should be gifted with
discretion. Absolute concealment is generally impracticable in a camp.
Maps must be drawn, and reports furnished. Reconnoitring parties must
be sent out, roads examined, positions surveyed, and shelter and
supplies requisitioned in advance. Thus the movements of staff officers
are a clue to the projected movements of the army, and the smallest
hint may set a hundred brains to the work of surmise. There will always
be many who are just as anxious to discover the general’s intentions as
he is to conceal them; and if, by any possibility whatever, the gossip
and guesses of the camp may come to the enemy’s ears, it is well that
curiosity should be baulked. Nor is it undesirable that the privacy of
headquarters should be respected. The vanity of a little brief
authority has before now tempted subordinate officers
to hint at weaknesses on the part of their superiors. Ignorance of war
and of the situation has induced them to criticise and to condemn; and
idle words, greedily listened to, and quickly exaggerated, may easily
destroy the confidence of the soldiery in the abilities of their
leader.
By the middle of December Jackson’s small army had become fairly
effective. Its duties were simple. To watch the enemy, to keep open the
communication with Manassas, so as to be ready to join the main army
should McClellan advance—such were Johnston’s orders. The Upper Potomac
was held by the enemy in force. General Banks, a volunteer officer, who
was yet to learn more of Stonewall Jackson, was in command. The
headquarters of his division, 18,000 strong, were at Frederick City in
Maryland; but his charge extended seventy-five miles further west, as
far as Cumberland on the Potomac. In addition to Banks, General Kelly
with 5,000 men was at Romney, on the South Branch of the Potomac,
thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester by a good road. The Federal
troops guarding the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and that portion of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which was still intact were necessarily
much dispersed, for the Confederate guerillas were active, and dam and
aqueduct, tunnel and viaduct, offered tempting objectives to Ashby’s
cavalry. Still the force which confronted Jackson was far superior to
his own; the Potomac was broad and bridgeless, and his orders appeared
to impose a defensive attitude. But he was not the man to rest
inactive, no matter what the odds against him, or to watch the enemy’s
growing strength without an endeavour to interfere. Within the limits
of his own command he was permitted every latitude; and he was
determined to apply the aggressive strategy which he was so firmly
convinced should be adopted by the whole army. The Secretary of War,
Mr. Benjamin, in detaching him to the Valley, had asked him to “forward
suggestions as to the means of rendering his measures of defence
effectual.”[3]
The earliest information he had received on his arrival
at Winchester pointed to the conclusion that the enemy was meditating
an advance by way of Harper’s Ferry. His first suggestion thereupon was
that he should be reinforced by a division under General Loring and a
brigade under Colonel Edward Johnson, which were stationed within the
Alleghanies on the great highways leading to the Ohio, covering
Staunton from the west.[4] His next was to the effect that he should be
permitted to organise an expedition for the recapture and occupation of
Romney. If he could seize this village, the junction of several roads,
more decisive operations would at once become feasible. It has been
said that the force of old associations urged Jackson to drive the
invader from the soil which held his mother’s grave; but, even if we
had not the evidence of his interview with General G. W. Smith,[5] a
glance at the map would in itself be sufficient to assure us that
strategy prevailed with him rather than sentiment.
The plan of campaign which first suggested itself to him was
sufficiently comprehensive.
“While the Northern people and the Federal authorities were still a
prey to the demoralisation which had followed Bull Run, he proposed to
advance with 10,000 troops into north-west Virginia, where he would