Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
reclaim the whole country, and summon the inhabitants of Southern
sentiment to join his army. His information was extensive and reliable,
and he did not doubt his ability to recruit between 15,000 and 20,000
men, enough for his designs. These were bold and simple. While the
enemy was under the impression that his only object was to reclaim and
occupy North-west Virginia, he would move his whole force rapidly
across to the Monongahela, march down upon Pittsburg, destroy the
United States arsenal, and then, in conjunction with Johnston’s army
(which was to cross the Potomac at Leesburg), advance upon Harrisburg,
the
capital of Pennsylvania. From Harrisburg he proposed that the army
should advance upon Philadelphia.”[6]
These suggestions, however, went no further than his friends in the
Legislative Assembly. Although, for his conduct at Bull Run, he had now
been promoted to major-general, the Lexington professor had as yet no
voice in the councils of the young republic. Nevertheless, the
President read and approved the less ambitious proposal for an attack
on the Federal force at Romney.
Romney, the county seat of Hampshire, lies in a rich district watered
by the South Branch of the Potomac. For more than a hundred miles, from
source to mouth, the river is bordered by alluvial meadows of
extraordinary fertility. Their prodigal harvests, together with the
sweetness of the upland pastures, make them the paradise of the
grazier; the farms which rest beneath the hills are of manorial
proportions, and the valley of the beautiful South Branch is a land of
easy wealth and old-fashioned plenty. From Romney an excellent road
runs south-east to Winchester, and another south-west by Moorefield and
Franklin to Monterey, where it intersects the great road, constructed
by one of Napoleon’s engineers, that leads from Staunton in the Valley
to Parkersburg on the Ohio.
When Jackson advocated the occupation of this important point the whole
of West Virginia, between the Alleghenies and the Ohio, was in
possession of the Federals. The army of occupation, under General
Rosecrans, amounted to 27,000 men and over 40 guns; but the troops were
dispersed in detachments from Romney to Gauley Bridge, a distance of
near two hundred miles, their communications were exposed, and, owing
to the mountains, co-operation was almost impracticable.
5,000 men, based on Grafton, occupied Romney.
18,700, based on Clarksburg, occupied the passes south-east of
Beverley.
9,000, based on the Ohio, were stationed on the Great
Kanawha, a river which is navigable for small steamers to within a few
miles of Gauley Bridge.
4,000 protected the lines of communication.
Jackson’s letter to the Secretary of War was as follows:—
Nov. 20 “Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy
respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say but
little respecting my proposed movements in the event of sufficient
reinforcements arriving, but since conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel
Preston [his adjutant-general], upon his return from General Loring,
and ascertaining the disposition of the general’s forces, I venture to
respectfully urge that after concentrating all his troops here, an
attempt should be made to capture the Federal forces at Romney. The
attack on Romney would probably induce McClellan to believe that
General Johnston’s army had been so weakened as to justify him in
making an advance on Centreville; but should this not induce him to
advance, I do not believe anything will, during this winter.
“Should General Johnston be attacked, I would be at once prepared to
reinforce him with my present force, increased by General Loring’s.
After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, let the troops that marched on
Romney return to the Valley, and move rapidly westward to the waters of
the Monongahela and Little Kanawha. I deem it of very great importance
that North-western Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this
winter. At present it is to be presumed that the enemy are not
expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region, necessary
for the subsistence of our troops, are in greater abundance than in
almost any other season of the year. Postpone the occupation of that
section until spring, and we may expect to find the enemy prepared for
us, and the resources to which I have referred greatly exhausted. I
know that what I have proposed will be an arduous undertaking and
cannot be accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort;
but I feel that the troops will be prepared to make the sacrifice when
animated by the prospects of important
results to our cause, and distinction to themselves. It may be urged
against this plan that the enemy will advance [from Beverley and the
Great Kanawha] on Staunton or Huntersville. I am well satisfied that
such a step would but make their destruction sure. When North-western
Virginia is occupied in force, the Kanawha Valley, unless it be the
lower part of it, must be evacuated by the Federal forces, or otherwise
their safety will be endangered by forcing a column across from the
Little Kanawha between them and the Ohio River.
“Admitting that the season is too far advanced, or that from other
causes all cannot be accomplished that has been named, yet through the
blessing of God, who has thus far wonderfully prospered our cause, much
more may be expected from General Loring’s troops, according to this
programme, than can be expected from them where they are.”[7]
This scheme was endorsed by Johnston. “I submit,” he wrote, “that the
troops under General Loring might render valuable services by taking
the field with General Jackson, instead of going into winter quarters
as now proposed.”
In accordance with Jackson’s suggestion, Loring was ordered to join
him. Edward Johnson, however, was withheld. The Confederate authorities
seem to have considered it injudicious to leave unguarded the mountain
roads which lead into the Valley from the west. Jackson, with a wider
grasp of war, held that concentration at Winchester was a sounder
measure of security. “Should the Federals” (at Beverley), he said,
“take advantage of the withdrawal of Johnson’s troops, and cross the
mountains, so much the worse for them. While they were marching
eastwards, involving themselves amongst interminable obstacles, he
[Jackson] would place himself on their communications and close in
behind them, making their destruction the more certain the further they
advanced towards their imaginary prize.”[8]
While waiting for Loring, Jackson resolved to complete the education of
his new battalions in the field. The raw
troops who garrisoned the Northern border were not formidable enemies,
and a sudden rush upon some ill-defended post would give to the staff
and soldiery that first taste of success which gives heart and backbone
to inexperienced troops.
Dec. 6–9 The first enterprise, however, was only partially successful.
The destruction of a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, one of the
main arteries of communication between Washington and the West, by
which coal, hay, and forage reached the Union capital, was the result
of a few days’ hard marching and hard work. Two companies of the
Stonewall Brigade volunteered to go down by night and cut the cribs.
Standing waist deep in the cold water, and under the constant fire of
the enemy, they effected a partial breach; but it was repaired by the
Federals within two days. Jackson’s loss was one man killed. While
engaged in this expedition news reached him of the decisive repulse by
Colonel Edward Johnson of an attack on his position on Alleghany
Mountain. Jackson again asked that this brigade might be sent to his
support, but it was again refused, notwithstanding Johnston’s
endorsement of his request.
Loring reached Winchester on Christmas Day. Once more the enemy
threatened to advance, and information had been received that he had
been largely strengthened. Jackson was of opinion that the true policy
of the Federals would be to concentrate at Martinsburg, midway between
Romney and Frederick, and “to march on Winchester over a road that
presented no very strong positions.” To counteract such a combination,
he determined to anticipate their movements, and to attack them before
they received additional reinforcements.
1862. Jan. 1 On January 1, 1862, 9,000 Confederates marched from
Winchester towards the Potomac. Jackson’s first objectives were the
villages of Bath and Hancock, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, held
by Federal garrisons. By dispersing these detachments he would prevent
support being sent to Romney; by cutting the telegraph along the
railroad he would sever the communication between Banks at Frederick
and Rosecrans
in West Virginia, and compel Kelly either to evacuate Romney or fight
him single-handed. To deal with his enemy in detail, to crush his
detachments in succession, and with superior force, such was the
essence of his plan.
The weather when the expedition started was bright and pleasant, so
much so that the troops, with the improvidence of young soldiers, left
their coats and blankets in the waggons. That very afternoon, however,
the temperature underwent a sudden change. Under cold grey skies the
column scaled the mountain ridges, and on the winter wind came a fierce
storm of snow and hail. In order to conceal the march as far as
possible from the enemy’s observations the brigades had marched by
country roads, and delayed by steep gradients and slippery tracks, it
was not till the next morning that the supply waggons came up. The
troops, hurried suddenly from comfortable winter quarters, suffered
much. The bivouac was as cheerless as the march. Without rations and
without covering, the men lay shivering round the camp fires. The third
day out, even the commander of the Stonewall Brigade took it upon
himself to halt his wearied men. Jackson became restive. Riding along
the column he found his old regiments halted by the roadside, and asked
the reason for the delay.
“I have halted to let the men cook their rations,” was General
Garnett’s reply. “There is no time for that.” “But it is impossible for
the men to march further without them.” “_I_ never found anything
impossible with this brigade!” and Jackson rode on. His plans admitted
of no delay. He intended to surprise the enemy. In this expectation,
however, he was disappointed.
Jan. 3 A few miles distant from Bath his advanced guard fell in with a
Federal reconnaissance, and at nightfall the Confederates had not yet
reached the outskirts of the town. Once more they had to bivouac in the
open, and rations, tents, and blankets were still behind. When the day
broke over the Shenandoah Mountains the country was white with snow,
and the sleeping soldiers were covered as with a winding-sheet. After a
hasty meal an attempt was made to surround the village, and to cut off
the retreat
of the garrison. The outflanking movements, made in a blinding storm,
failed in combination. The roads were too bad, the subordinate
commanders too inexperienced; the three hostile regiments escaped
across the river in their boats, and only 16 prisoners were captured.
Still, the advantages of their unexpected movement were not altogether
lost to the Confederates. The Federals, ignorant as yet of the restless
energy of the foe who held command at Winchester, had settled
themselves cosily in winter quarters. The intelligence of Jackson’s
march had come too late to enable them to remove the stores which had
been collected at Bath, and on the night of January 4 the Virginians
revelled in warmth and luxury. The next morning they moved forward to
the river.
Jan. 5 On the opposite bank stood the village of Hancock, and after a