Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
demand to surrender had been refused, Jackson ordered his batteries to
open fire.[9] Shepherdstown, a little Virginia town south of the
Potomac, had been repeatedly shelled, even when unoccupied by
Confederate troops. In order to intimate that such outrages must cease
a few shells were thrown into Hancock. The next day the bombardment was
resumed, but with little apparent effect; and strong reinforcements
having joined the enemy, Jackson ceased fire and withdrew. A bridge was
already in process of construction two miles above the town, but to
have crossed the river, a wide though shallow stream, in face of a
considerable force, would have been a useless and a costly operation.
The annihilation of the Federal garrison would have scarcely repaid the
Southerners for the loss of life that must have been incurred. At the
same time, while Jackson’s batteries had been at work, his infantry had
done a good deal of mischief. Two regiments had burned the bridge by
which the Baltimore and Ohio Railway crosses the Great Cacapon River,
the canal dam was breached, and many miles of track and telegraph were
destroyed. The enemy’s communications between Frederick and Romney were
thus effectually severed,
and a large amount of captured stores were sent to Winchester. It was
with the design of covering these operations that the bombardment had
been continued, and the summons to surrender was probably no more than
a ruse to attract the attention of the Federal commander from the
attack on the Cacapon Bridge. On the morning of the 7th Jackson moved
southward to Unger’s Store. Here, however, the expedition came to a
standstill. The precaution of rough-shoeing the horses before leaving
Winchester had been neglected, and it was found necessary to refit the
teams and rest the men.
Jan. 13 After halting for four days the Confederates, on January 13,
renewed their march. The outlook was unpromising. Although cavalry
patrols had been despatched in every direction, a detachment of
militia, which had acted as flank-guard in the direction of Romney
while Jackson was moving to Unger’s Store, had been surprised and
defeated, with the loss of two guns, at Hanging Rock. The weather, too,
grew colder and colder, and the mountain roads were little more than
sheets of ice. The sleet beat fiercely down upon the crawling column.
The men stumbled and fell on the slippery tracks; many waggons were
overturned, and the bloody knees and muzzles of the horses bore painful
witness to the severity of the march. The bivouacs were more
comfortless than before. The provision train lagged far in rear. Axes
there were none; and had not the fence-rails afforded a supply of
firewood, the sufferings of the troops would have been intense. As it
was, despite the example of their commander, they pushed forward but
slowly through the bitter weather. Jackson was everywhere; here,
putting his shoulder to the wheel of a gun that the exhausted team
could no longer move; there, urging the wearied soldiers, or rebuking
the officers for want of energy. Attentive as he was to the health and
comfort of his men in quarters, on the line of march he looked only to
the success of the Confederate arms. The hardships of the winter
operations were to him but a necessary concomitant of his designs, and
it mattered but little if the weak and sickly should succumb.
Commanders who are over-chary of their soldiers’ lives, who forget that
their men have voluntarily offered themselves as food for powder, often
miss great opportunities. To die doing his duty was to Jackson the most
desirable consummation of the soldier’s existence, and where duty was
concerned or victory in doubt he was as careless of life and suffering
as Napoleon himself. The well-being of an individual or even of an army
were as nothing compared with the interests of Virginia. And, in the
end, his indomitable will triumphed over every obstacle.
Jan. 10 Romney village came at length in sight, lonely and deserted
amid the mountain snows, for the Federal garrison had vanished,
abandoning its camp-equipment and its magazines.
No pursuit was attempted. Jackson had resolved on further operations.
It was now in his power to strike at the Federal communications,
marching along the Baltimore and Ohio Railway in the direction of
Grafton, seventy-five miles west of Romney. In order to leave all safe
behind him, he determined, as a first step, to destroy the bridge by
which the Baltimore and Ohio Railway crossed the Potomac in the
neighbourhood of Cumberland. The Federal forces at Williamstown and
Frederick drew the greater part of their supplies from the West; and so
serious an interruption in the line of communication would compel them
to give up all thought of offensive enterprises in the Valley. But the
sufferings that his green soldiers had undergone had sapped their
discipline. Loring’s division, nearly two-thirds of the command, was so
discontented as to be untrustworthy. It was useless with such troops to
dream of further movements among the inhospitable hills. Many had
deserted during the march from Unger’s Store; many had succumbed to the
exposure of the bivouacs; and, more than all, the commander had been
disloyal to his superior. Although a regular officer of long service,
he had permitted himself a license of speech which was absolutely
unjustifiable, and throughout the operations had shown his unfitness
for his position. Placed under the command of an officer who had been
his junior in the Army of the United States, his sense of discipline
was
overborne by the slight to his vanity; and not for the first time nor
the last the resentment of a petty mind ruined an enterprise which
would have profited a nation. Compelled to abandon his projected march
against the enemy, Jackson determined to leave a strong garrison in
Romney and the surrounding district, while the remainder of the force
withdrew to Winchester. The two towns were connected by a good
high-road, and by establishing telegraphic communication between them,
he believed that despite the Federal numbers he could maintain his hold
on these important posts. Many precautions were taken to secure Romney
from surprise. Three militia regiments, recruited in the country, and
thus not only familiar with every road, but able to procure ample
information, were posted in the neighbourhood of the town; and with the
militia were left three companies of cavalry, one of which had already
been employed in this region.
In detailing Loring’s division as the garrison of Romney Jackson seems
to have made a grave mistake. He had much reason to be dissatisfied
with the commander, and the men were already demoralised. Troops unfit
to march against the enemy were not the men to be trusted with the
security of an important outpost, within thirty miles of the Federal
camps at Cumberland, far from their supports, and surrounded by bleak
and lonely mountains. A man of wider sympathy with human weakness, and
with less rigid ideas of discipline, might possibly have arranged
matters so that the Stonewall Brigade might have remained at Romney,
while Loring and his division were transferred to less exacting duties
and more comfortable quarters. But Loring’s division constituted
two-thirds of Jackson’s force, and Romney, more exposed than
Winchester, required the stronger garrison. A general of Loring’s
temper and pretensions would scarcely have submitted to the separation
of his brigades, and would probably have become even more discontented
had Garnett, the leader of the Stonewall Brigade, been left in command
at Romney, while he himself played a subordinate part at Winchester. It
is only too possible, however, that matters
were past mending. The feeble discipline of Loring’s troops had broken
down; their enthusiasm had not been proof against the physical
suffering of these winter operations.
The Stonewall Brigade, on the other hand, was still staunch. “I am well
assured,” wrote Jackson at this time, “that had an order been issued
for its march, even through the depth of winter and in any direction,
it would have sustained its reputation; for although it was not under
fire during the expedition at Romney, yet the alacrity with which it
responded to the call of duty and overcame obstacles showed that it was
still animated by the same spirit that characterised it at Manassas.”
But Jackson’s old regiments were now tried soldiers, inspirited by the
memories of the great victory they had done so much to win, improved by
association with Johnston’s army, and welded together by a discipline
far stricter than that which obtained in commands like Loring’s.
Jan. 24 On January 24 Jackson returned to Winchester. His strategy had
been successful. He had driven the enemy across the Potomac. He had
destroyed for a time an important line of supply. He had captured a few
prisoners and many stores; and this with a loss of 4 men killed and 28
wounded. The Federal forces along the border were far superior to his
own. The dispersion of these forces from Cumberland to Frederick, a
distance of eighty miles, had doubtless been much in his favour. But
when he marched from Winchester he had reason to believe that 8,000 men
were posted at Frederick, 2,000 at Hagerstown, 2,000 at Williamsport,
2,000 at Hancock, and 12,000 at Cumberland and Romney. The actual
effective strength of these garrisons may possibly have been smaller
than had been reported, but such were the numbers which he had to take
into consideration when planning his operations. It would appear from
the map that while he was at Romney, 12,000 Federals might have moved
out from Williamsport and Harper’s Ferry and have cut him off from
Winchester. This danger had to be kept in view. But the enemy had made
no preparations
for crossing the Potomac; the river was a difficult obstacle; and Banks
was not the man to run risks.[10]
At the same time, while Jackson was in all probability perfectly aware
of the difficulties which Banks refused to face, and counted on that
commander’s hesitation, it must be admitted that his manœuvres had been
daring, and that the mere thought of the enemy’s superior numbers would
have tied down a general of inferior ability to the passive defence of
Winchester. Moreover, the results attained were out of all proportion
to the trifling loss which had been incurred. An important
recruiting-ground had been secured. The development of Union sentiment,
which, since the occupation of Romney by the Federals, had been
gradually increasing along the Upper Potomac, would be checked by the
presence of Southern troops. A base for further operations against the
Federal detachments in West Virginia had been established, and a
fertile region opened to the operations of the Confederate
commissaries. These strategic advantages, however, were by no means
appreciated by the people of Virginia. The sufferings of the troops
appealed more forcibly to their imagination than the prospective
benefit to be derived by the Confederacy. Jackson’s secrecy, as
absolute as that of the grave, had an ill effect. Unable to comprehend
his combinations, even his own officers ascribed his manœuvres to a
restless craving for personal distinction; while civilian wiseacres,
with their ears full of the exaggerated stories of Loring’s stragglers,
saw in the relentless energy with which he had pressed the march on
Romney not only the evidence of a callous indifference to suffering,
but the symptoms of a diseased mind. They refused to consider that the
general had shared the hardships of the troops, faring as simply and
roughly as any private in the ranks. He was charged with partiality to
the Stonewall Brigade. “It was said that he kept it in the rear, while
other troops were constantly thrust into danger; and that now, while