Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Mount Jackson, half-way up the Shenandoah Valley, and his little army,
which had now been increased to three brigades, or 4,600 men all told,
was ordered to break up its camps. 38,000 Federals had gradually
assembled between Frederick and Romney. Banks, who commanded the whole
force, was preparing to advance, and his outposts were already
established on the south bank of the Potomac.
But when the Confederate column filed through the streets of
Winchester, it moved not south but north.
Such was Jackson’s idea of a retreat. To march towards the enemy, not
away from him; to watch his every movement; to impose upon him with a
bold front; to delay him to the utmost; and to take advantage of every
opportunity that might offer for offensive action.
Shortly before their departure the troops received a reminder that
their leader brooked no trifling with orders. Intoxicating liquors were
forbidden in the Confederate lines. But the regulation was
systematically evaded, and the friends of the soldiers smuggled in
supplies. When this breach of discipline was discovered, Jackson put a
stop to the traffic by an order which put the punishment on the right
shoulders. “Every waggon that came into camp was to be searched, and if
any liquor were found it was to be spilled out, and the waggon horses
turned over to the quartermaster for the public service.” Nevertheless,
when they left Winchester, so Jackson wrote to his wife, the troops
were in excellent spirits, and their somewhat hypochondriacal general
had never for years enjoyed more perfect health—a blessing for which he
had more reason to be thankful than the Federals.
Illustration: Map of The Valley For larger view click on image.
NOTE
THE EVILS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL
It is well worth noticing that the interference of both the Union and
Confederate Cabinets was not confined to the movements and location of
the troops. The organisation of the armies was very largely the work of
the civilian authorities, and the advice of the soldiers was very
generally disregarded. The results, it need hardly be said, were
deplorable. The Northern wiseacres considered cavalry an encumbrance
and a staff a mere ornamental appendage. McClellan, in consequence, was
always in difficulties for the want of mounted regiments; and while
many regular officers were retained in the command of batteries and
companies, the important duties of the staff had sometimes to be
assigned to volunteers. The men too, at first, were asked to serve for
three months only; that is, they were permitted to take their discharge
directly they had learned the rudiments of their work. Again, instead
of the ranks of the old regiments being filled up as casualties
occurred, the armies, despite McClellan’s protests, were recruited by
raw regiments, commanded by untrained officers. Mr. Davis, knowing
something of war, certainly showed more wisdom. The organisation of the
army of Northern Virginia was left, in great measure, to General Lee;
so from the very first the Southerners had sufficient cavalry and as
good a staff as could be got together. The soldiers, however, were only
enlisted at first for twelve months; yet “Lee,” says Lord Wolseley,
“pleaded in favour of the engagement being for the duration of the war,
but he pleaded in vain;” and it was not for many months that the
politicians could be induced to cancel the regulation under which the
men elected their officers. The President, too, while the markets of
Europe were still open, neglected to lay in a store of munitions of
war: it was not till May that an order was sent across the seas, and
then only for 10,000 muskets! The commissariat department, moreover,
was responsible to the President and not to the commander of the
armies; this, perhaps, was the worst fault of all. It would seem
impossible that such mistakes, in an intelligent community, should be
permitted to recur. Yet, in face of the fact that only when the
commanders have been given a free hand, as was Marlborough in the Low
Countries, or Wellington in the Peninsula, has the English army been
thoroughly efficient, the opinion is not uncommon in England that
members of Parliament and journalists are far more capable of
organising an army than even the most experienced soldier.
Since the above was written the war with Spain has given further
proof of how readily even the most intelligent of nations can
forget the lessons of the past.
[1] “A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent
detachments. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt
to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with
their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard
against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid
greater.” Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals._
[2] Letter of General G. W. Smith to the author.
[3] O.R., vol. v, p. 909.
[4] Loring was at Huntersville, Johnson on Alleghany Mountain, not far
from Monterey. General Lee, unable with an inferior force to drive the
enemy from West Virginia, had been transferred to South Carolina on
November 1.
[5] _Ante,_ p. 174.
[6] Cooke, p. 87.
[7] O.R., vol. v, p. 965.
[8] Dabney, vol. i, p. 298.
[9] The Federal commander was granted two hours in which to remove the
women and children.
[10] “Any attempt,” Banks reported to McClellan, “to intercept the
enemy would have been unsuccessful. . . . It would have resulted in
almost certain failure to cut him off, and have brought an exhausted
force into his presence to fight him in his stronghold at Winchester.
In any case, it promised no positive prospect of success, nor did it
exclude large chances of disaster.”—O.R., vol. v, p. 694.
[11] Dabney, vol. i, p. 320.
[12] Dabney, vol. i, p. 321.
[13] _Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson._
[14] O.R., vol. v, p. 1053.
[15] _Ibid.,_ pp. 1046–8.
[16] O.R., vol. v, p. 1053.
[17] _Ibid.,_ pp. 702, 703.
[18] “I have taken special pains,” he writes on January 17, “to obtain
information respecting General Banks, but I have not been informed of
his having gone east. I will see what can be effected through the
Catholic priests at Martinsburg.”—O.R., vol. v, p. 1036.
[19] O.R., vol. v, pp. 1057, 1058.
[20] O.R., vol. v, pp. 1059, 1060.
[21] _Memoirs,_ pp. 232, 233.
[22] Dabney, vol. i, p. 327.
[23] The inexpediency of evacuating Romney was soon made apparent. The
enemy reoccupied the village, seized Moorefield, and, with the valley
of the South Branch in their possession, threatened the rear of Edward
Johnson’s position on the Alleghany Mountain so closely that he was
compelled to retreat. Three fertile counties were thus abandoned to
the enemy, and the Confederate sympathisers in North-west Virginia
were proportionately discouraged.
[24] Fortunately for the Confederates this army had been reduced to
18,000 men, and the want of transport, together with the condition of
the mountain roads, kept it stationary until the weather improved.
Chapter VIII
KERNSTOWN
1862. Feb. 27 By the end of February a pontoon bridge had been thrown
across the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and Banks had crossed to the
Virginia shore. An army of 38,000 men, including 2,000 cavalry, and
accompanied by 80 pieces of artillery, threatened Winchester.
President Lincoln was anxious that the town should be occupied. Banks
believed that the opportunity was favourable. “The roads to
Winchester,” he wrote, “are turnpikes and in tolerable condition. The
enemy is weak, demoralised, and depressed.”
But McClellan, who held command of all the Federal forces, had no mind
to expose even a detachment to defeat. The main Confederate army at
Centreville could, at any moment, dispatch reinforcements by railway to
the Valley, reversing the strategic movement which had won Bull Run;
while the Army of the Potomac, held fast by the mud, could do nothing
to prevent it. Banks was therefore ordered to occupy the line
Charlestown to Martinsburg, some two-and-twenty miles from Winchester,
to cover the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to
accumulate supplies preparatory to a further advance. The troops,
however, did not approve such cautious strategy. “Their appetite for
work,” according to their commander, “was very sharp.” Banks himself
was not less eager. “If left to our own discretion,” he wrote to
McClellan’s chief of staff, “the general desire will be to move early.”
March 9 On March 7 General D. H. Hill, acting under instructions, fell
back from Leesburg, and two days later Johnston,
destroying the railways, abandoned Centreville. The Confederate
General-in-Chief had decided to withdraw to near Orange Court House,
trebling his distance from Washington, and surrendering much territory,
but securing, in return, important strategical advantages. Protected by
the Rapidan, a stream unfordable in spring, he was well placed to meet
a Federal advance, and also, by a rapid march, to anticipate any force
which might be transported by water and landed close to Richmond.
Jackson was now left isolated in the Valley. The nearest Confederate
infantry were at Culpeper Court House, beyond the Blue Ridge, nearly
sixty miles south-east. In his front, within two easy marches, was an
army just seven times his strength, at Romney another detachment of
several thousand men, and a large force in the Alleghanies. He was in
no hurry, however, to abandon Winchester.
Johnston had intended that when the main army fell back towards
Richmond his detachments should follow suit. Jackson found a loophole
in his instructions which gave him full liberty of action.
“I greatly desire,” he wrote to Johnston on March 8, “to hold this
place [Winchester] so far as may be consistent with your views and
plans, and am making arrangements, by constructing works, etc., to make
a stand. Though you desired me some time since to fall back in the
event of yourself and General Hill’s doing so, yet in your letter of
the 5th inst. you say, ‘Delay the enemy as long as you can;’ I have
felt justified in remaining here for the present.
“And now, General, that Hill has fallen back, can you not send him over
here? I greatly need such an officer; one who can be sent off as
occasion may offer against an exposed detachment of the enemy for the
purpose of capturing it. . . . I believe that if you can spare Hill,
and let him move here at once, you will never have occasion to regret
it. The very idea of reinforcements coming to Winchester would, I
think, be a damper to the enemy, in addition to the fine effect that
would be produced on our own troops, already in fine spirits. But if
you cannot spare
Hill, can you not send me some other troops? If we cannot be successful
in defeating the enemy should he advance, a kind Providence may enable
us to inflict a terrible wound and effect a safe retreat in the event
of having to fall back. I will keep myself on the alert with respect to
communications between us, so as to be able to join you at the earliest
possible moment, if such a movement becomes necessary.”[1]
This letter is characteristic. When Jackson asked for reinforcements
the cause of the South seemed well-nigh hopeless. Her Western armies
were retiring, defeated and demoralised. Several of her Atlantic towns
had fallen to the Federal navy, assisted by strong landing parties. The
army on which she depended for the defence of Richmond, yielding to the
irresistible presence of far superior numbers, was retreating into the
interior of Virginia. There was not the faintest sign of help from
beyond the sea. The opportunity for a great counterstroke had been
suffered to escape. Her forces were too small for aught but defensive