Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Point, the terminus of the York River Railroad, within thirty miles of
Richmond, transporting his supplies by water. Washington, with the
garrison he would leave behind, would in his opinion be quite secure.
The Confederates would be compelled to concentrate for the defence of
their capital, and a resolute endeavour on their part to cross the
Potomac was forbidden by every rule of strategy. Had not Johnston, in
his retreat, burnt the railway bridges? Could there be a surer
indication that he had no intention of returning?
Such was McClellan’s reasoning, and, putting politics aside, it was
perfectly sound. Lincoln reluctantly yielded, and on March 17 the Army
of the Potomac, withdrawing by successive divisions from Centreville to
Alexandria, began its embarkation for the Peninsula, the region, in
McClellan’s words, “of sandy roads and short land transportation.”[13]
The vessels assembled at Alexandria could only carry 10,000 men, thus
involving at least fifteen voyages to and fro. Yet the
Commander-in-Chief was full of confidence. To the little force in the
Shenandoah Valley, flying southward before Shields, he gave no thought.
It would have been nothing short of miraculous had he even suspected
that 4,500 men, under a professor of the higher mathematics, might
bring to naught the operations of his gigantic host. Jackson was not
even to be followed. Of Banks’ three divisions, Shields’, Sedgwick’s,
and Williams’, that of Shields alone was considered sufficient to
protect Harper’s Ferry, the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and the
Chesapeake Canal.[14] Banks, with the remainder of his army, was to
move at once to Manassas, and cover the approaches
to Washington east of the Blue Ridge. Sedgwick had already been
detached to join McClellan; and on March 20 Williams’ division began
its march towards Manassas, while Shields fell back on Winchester.
March 21 On the evening of the 21st Ashby reported to Jackson that the
enemy was retreating, and information came to hand that a long train of
waggons, containing the baggage of 12,000 men, had left Winchester for
Castleman’s Ferry on the Shenandoah. Further reports indicated that
Banks’ whole force was moving eastward, and Jackson, in accordance with
his instructions to hold the enemy in the Valley, at once pushed
northward.[15]
March 22 On the 22nd, Ashby, with 280 troopers and 3 horse-artillery
guns, struck Shields’ pickets about a mile south of Winchester. A
skirmish ensued, and the presence of infantry, a battery, and some
cavalry, was ascertained. Shields, who was wounded during the
engagement by a shell, handled his troops ably. His whole division was
in the near neighbourhood, but carefully concealed, and Ashby reported
to Jackson that only four regiments of infantry, besides the guns and
cavalry, remained at Winchester. Information obtained from the
townspeople within the Federal lines confirmed the accuracy of his
estimate. The enemy’s main body, he was told, had already marched, and
the troops which had opposed him were under orders to move to Harper’s
Ferry the next morning.
March 23 On receipt of this intelligence Jackson hurried forward from
his camp near Woodstock, and that night reached Strasburg. At dawn on
the 23rd four companies were despatched to reinforce Ashby; and under
cover of this advanced guard the whole force followed in the direction
of Kernstown, a tiny village, near which the Federal outposts were
established. At one o’clock the three brigades, wearied by a march of
fourteen miles succeeding one of twenty-two on the previous day,
arrived
upon the field of action. The ranks, however, were sadly weakened, for
many of the men had succumbed to their unusual exertions. Ashby still
confronted the enemy; but the Federals had developed a brigade of
infantry, supported by two batteries and several squadrons, and the
Confederate cavalry were slowly giving ground. On reaching the field
Jackson ordered the troops to bivouac. “Though it was very desirable,”
he wrote, “to prevent the enemy from leaving the Valley, yet I deemed
it best not to attack until morning.” An inspection of the ground,
however, convinced him that delay was impracticable. “Ascertaining,” he
continued, “that the Federals had a position from which our forces
could be seen, I concluded that it would be dangerous to postpone the
attack until next day, as reinforcements might be brought up during the
night.”[16] Ashby was directed to detach half his cavalry[17] under
Major Funsten in order to cover the left flank; and Jackson,
ascertaining that his men were in good spirits at the prospect of
meeting the enemy, made his preparations for fighting his first battle.
The position occupied by the Federals was by no means ill-adapted for
defence. The country round Winchester, and indeed throughout the Valley
of the Shenandoah, resembles in many of its features an English
landscape. Low ridges, covered with open woods of oak and pine,
overlook green pastures and scattered copses; and the absence of
hedgerows and cottages gives a park-like aspect to the broad acres of
rich blue grass. But the deep lanes and hollow roads of England find
here no counterpart. The tracks are rough and rude, and even the pikes,
as the main thoroughfares are generally called, are flush with the
fields on either hand. The traffic has not yet worn them to a lower
level, and Virginia road-making despises such refinements as cuttings
or embankments. The highways, even the Valley pike itself, the great
road which is inseparably linked with the fame of Stonewall Jackson
and his brigade, are mere ribbons of metal laid on swell and swale.
Fences of the rudest description, zigzags of wooden rails, or walls of
loose stone, are the only boundaries, and the land is parcelled out in
more generous fashion than in an older and more crowded country. More
desirable ground for military operations it would be difficult to find.
There are few obstacles to the movement of cavalry and artillery, while
the woods and undulations, giving ample cover, afford admirable
opportunities for skilful manœuvre. In the spring, however, the
condition of the soil would be a drawback. At the date of the battle
part of the country round Kernstown was under plough, and the whole was
saturated with moisture. Horses sank fetlock-deep in the heavy meadows,
and the rough roads, hardly seen for mud, made marching difficult.
The Federal front extended on both sides of the Valley turnpike. To the
east was a broad expanse of rolling grassland, stretching away to the
horizon; to the west a low knoll, crowned by a few trees, which goes by
the name of Pritchard’s Hill. Further north was a ridge, covered with
brown woods, behind which lies Winchester. This ridge, nowhere more
than 100 feet in height, runs somewhat obliquely to the road in a
south-westerly direction, and passing within a mile and a half of
Pritchard’s Hill, sinks into the plain three miles south-west of
Kernstown. Some distance beyond this ridge, and separated from it by
the narrow valley of the Opequon, rise the towering bluffs of the North
Mountain, the western boundary of the Valley, sombre with forest from
base to brow.
On leaving Winchester, Williams’ division had struck due east, passing
through the village of Berryville, and making for Snicker’s Gap in the
Blue Ridge. The Berryville road had thus become of importance to the
garrison of Winchester, for it was from that direction, if they should
become necessary, that reinforcements would arrive. General Kimball,
commanding in Shields’ absence the division which confronted Ashby, had
therefore posted the larger portion of his troops eastward of the pike.
A strong force of infantry, with waving colours, was plainly visible to
the Confederates, and it was seen that the extreme left was protected
by several guns. On the right of the road was a line of skirmishers,
deployed along the base of Pritchard’s Hill, and on the knoll itself
stood two batteries. The wooded ridge to westward was as yet
unoccupied, except by scouting parties.
Jackson at once determined to turn the enemy’s right. An attack upon
the Federal left would have to be pushed across the open fields and
decided by fair fighting, gun and rifle against gun and rifle, and on
that flank the enemy was prepared for battle. Could he seize the wooded
ridge on his left, the initiative would be his. His opponent would be
compelled to conform to his movements. The advantages of a carefully
selected position would be lost. Instead of receiving attack where he
stood, the Federal general would have to change front to meet it, to
execute movements which he had possibly not foreseen, to fight on
ground with which he was unfamiliar; and, instead of carrying out a
plan which had been previously thought out, to conceive a new one on
the spur of the moment, and to issue immediate orders for a difficult
operation. Hesitation and confusion might ensue; and in place of a
strongly established line, confidently awaiting the advance, isolated
regiments, in all the haste and excitement of rapid movement, or
hurriedly posted in unfavourable positions, would probably oppose the
Confederate onset. Such are the advantages which accrue to the force
which delivers an attack where it is not expected; and, to all
appearance, Jackson’s plan of battle promised to bring them into play
to the very fullest extent. The whole force of the enemy, as reported
by Ashby, was before him, plainly visible. To seize the wooded ridge,
while the cavalry held the Federals fast in front; to pass beyond
Pritchard’s Hill, and to cut the line of retreat on Winchester, seemed
no difficult task. The only danger was the possibility of a
counterstroke while the Confederates were executing their turning
movement. But the enemy, so far as Jackson’s information went, was
rapidly withdrawing from the Valley. The force confronting him was no
more than a rear-guard; and it was improbable in
the extreme that a mere rear-guard would involve itself in a desperate
engagement. The moment its line of retreat was threatened it would
probably fall back. To provide, however, against all emergencies,
Colonel Burks’ brigade of three battalions was left for the present in
rear of Kernstown, and here, too, remained four of the field batteries.
With the remainder of his force, two brigades of infantry and a
battery, Jackson moved off to his left. Two companies of the 5th
Virginia were recruited from Winchester. Early in the day the general
had asked the regiment for a guide familiar with the locality; and,
with the soldier showing the way, the 27th Virginia, with two of
Carpenter’s guns as advanced guard, struck westward by a waggon track
across the meadows, while Ashby pressed the Federals in front of
Kernstown.
3.45 p.m. The main body followed in two parallel columns, and the line
of march soon brought them within range of the commanding batteries on
Pritchard’s Hill.[18] At a range of little more than a mile the enemy’s
gunners poured a heavy fire on the serried ranks, and Carpenter,
unlimbering near the Opequon Church, sought to distract their aim.
The Confederate infantry, about 2,000 all told, although moving in
mass, and delayed by fences and marshy ground, passed unscathed under
the storm of shell, and in twenty minutes the advanced guard had seized
the wooded ridge.
Finding a rocky clearing on the crest, about a mile distant from
Pritchard’s Hill, Jackson sent back for the artillery. Three batteries,
escorted by two of Burke’s battalions, the 21st Virginia and the
Irishmen, pushed across the level as rapidly as the wearied teams could
move. Two guns were dismounted by the Federal fire; but, coming into