Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
even his second in command; special correspondents were rigorously
excluded from his camps; and even with his most confidential friends
his reserve was absolutely impenetrable. During his stay at Winchester,
it was his custom directly he rose to repair to headquarters and open
his correspondence. When he returned to breakfast at Dr. Graham’s there
was much anxiety evinced to hear the news from the front. What the
enemy was doing across the Potomac, scarce thirty miles away, was
naturally of intense interest to the people of the border town. But not
the smallest detail of intelligence, however unimportant, escaped his
lips. To his wife he was as uncommunicative as to the rest. Neither
hint nor suggestion made the least impression, and direct
interrogations were put by with a quiet smile. Nor was he too shy to
suggest to his superiors that silence was golden. In a report to
Johnston, written four days after Kernstown, he administered what can
scarcely be considered other than a snub, delicately expressed but
unmistakable:—
“It is understood in the Federal army that you have instructed me to
keep the forces now in this district and not permit them to cross the
Blue Ridge, and that this must be done at every hazard, and that for
the purpose of effecting this I made my attack. I have never so much as
intimated such a thing to anyone.”[38]
It cannot be said that Jackson’s judgment in attacking Shields was at
once appreciated in the South. The defeat, at first, was ranked with
the disasters in the West. But as soon as the effects upon the enemy
were appreciated the tide of popular feeling turned. The gallantry of
the Valley regiments was fully recognised, and the thanks of Congress
were tendered to Jackson and his troops.
No battle was ever yet fought in exact accordance with the demands of
theory, and Kernstown, great in its results, gives openings to the
critics. Jackson, it is said, attacked with tired troops, on
insufficient information, and contrary to orders. As to the first, it
may be said that his decision
to give the enemy no time to bring up fresh troops was absolutely
justified by events. On hearing of his approach to Kernstown, Banks
immediately countermarched a brigade of Williams’ division from
Castleman’s Ferry. A second brigade was recalled from Snicker’s Gap on
the morning of the 24th, and reached Winchester the same evening, after
a march of six-and-twenty miles. Had attack been deferred, Shields
would have been strongly reinforced.
As to the second, Jackson had used every means in his power to get
accurate intelligence.[39] Ashby had done his best. Although the
Federals had 780 cavalry present, and every approach to Winchester was
strongly picketed, his scouts had pushed within the Federal lines, and
had communicated with the citizens of Winchester. Their reports were
confirmed, according to Jackson’s despatch, “from a source which had
been remarkable for its reliability,” and for the last two days a
retrograde movement towards Snicker’s Gap had been reported. The
ground, it is true, favoured an ambush. But the strategic situation
demanded instant action. McClellan’s advanced guard was within fifty
miles of Johnston’s position on the Rapidan, and a few days’ march
might bring the main armies into collision. If Jackson was to bring
Banks back to the Valley, and himself join Johnston before the expected
battle, he had no time to spare. Moreover, the information to hand was
quite sufficient to justify him in trusting something to fortune. Even
a defeat, if the attack were resolutely pushed, might have the best
effect.
The third reproach, that Jackson disobeyed orders, can hardly be
sustained. He was in command of a detached force operating at a
distance from the main army, and Johnston, with a wise discretion, had
given him not orders,
but instructions; that is, the general-in-chief had merely indicated
the purpose for which Jackson’s force had been detached, and left to
his judgment the manner in which that purpose was to be achieved.
Johnston had certainly suggested that he should not expose himself to
the danger of defeat. But when it became clear that he could not retain
the enemy in the Valley unless he closed with him, to have refrained
from attack would have been to disobey the spirit of his instructions.
Again, when Jackson attacked he had good reason to believe that he ran
no risk of defeat whatever. The force before him was reported as
inferior to his own, and he might well have argued: “To confine myself
to observation will be to confess my weakness, and Banks is not likely
to arrest his march to Manassas because of the presence of an enemy who
dare not attack an insignificant rearguard.” Demonstrations, such as
Johnston had advised, may undoubtedly serve a temporary purpose, but if
protracted the enemy sees through them. On the 22nd, for instance, it
was reported to Banks that the Confederates were advancing. The rear
brigade of Williams’ division was therefore countermarched from
Snicker’s Gap to Berryville; but the other two were suffered to
proceed. Had Jackson remained quiescent in front of Shields, tacitly
admitting his inferiority, the rear brigade would in all probability
have soon been ordered to resume its march; and Lincoln, with no fear
for Washington, would have allowed Blenker and McDowell to join
McClellan.
Johnston, at least, held that his subordinate was justified. In
publishing the thanks of the Confederate Congress tendered to Jackson
and his division, he expressed, at the same time, “his own sense of
their admirable conduct, by which they fully earned the high reward
bestowed.”
During the evening of the 23rd the medical director of the Valley army
was ordered to collect vehicles, and send the wounded to the rear
before the troops continued their retreat. Some time after midnight Dr.
McGuire, finding that there were still a large number awaiting removal,
reported the circumstances to the general, adding that he did not know
where to get the means of transport, and that unless some expedient
were discovered the men must be abandoned. Jackson ordered him to
impress carriages in the neighbourhood. “But,” said the surgeon, “that
requires time; can you stay till it has been done?” “Make yourself
easy, sir,” was the reply. “This army stays here until the last man is
removed. Before I leave them to the enemy I will lose many men more.”
Fortunately, before daylight the work was finished.
NOTE
The exact losses at Kernstown were as follows:—
CONFEDERATES
_By brigade_ _Killed_ _Wounded_ _Missing_ _Total_
Stonewall Brigade
Burks’ Brigade
Fulkerson’s Brigade
Cavalry
Artillery 40 24 15 1 151 114 76 17 17 152 39 71
1 343 177 162 18 18 _By regiments _
2nd Va.
4th Va.
5th Va.
27th Va.
33rd Va.
21st Va.
42nd Va.
1st Va.
23rd Va.
27th Va. _Strength_
320 N.C.O. and men
203 N.C.O. and men
450 N.C.O. and men
170 N.C.O. and men
275 N.C.O. and men
270 officers and men
293 officers and men
187 officers and men
177 officers and men
397 N.C.O. and men
6
5
9
2
18
7
11
6
3
12
33
23
48
20
27
44
50
20
14
62
51
48
4
35
14
9
9
21
32
39
90
76
61
57
59
60
70
47
49
113
Total casualties=718 80 k.
375 w.
263 m. including 5 officers
including 22 officers
including 10 officers 13% k. and w. 20% k., w. and m.
FEDERALS
Total casualties=590 118 k.
450 w.
22 m. including 6 officers
including 27 officers
6%
According to the reports of his regimental commanders, Jackson took
into battle (including 48th Virginia) 3,087 N.C.O. and men of
infantry, 290 cavalry, and 27 guns. 2,742 infantry, 290 cavalry,
and 18 guns were engaged, and his total strength, including
officers, was probably about 3,500. Shields, in his first report of
the battle, put down the strength of his own division as between
7,000 and 8,000 men. Four days later he declared that it did not
exceed 7,000, namely 6,000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 guns. It
is probable that only those actually engaged are included in this
estimate, for on March 17 he reported the strength of the troops
which were present at Kernstown six days later as 8374 infantry,
608 artillerymen, and 780 cavalry; total, 9,752.[40]
[1] O.R., vol. v, p. 1094.
[2] Letter from Major Hotchkiss to the author.
[3] Jackson, 4,600; Hill, 3,000.
[4] Johnston’s _Narrative._
[5] _Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia,_ chap. ii.
[6] _Ibid._
[7] _Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,_ General G. H. Gordon, p. 136.
[8] Major Harman, of Jackson’s staff, writing to his brother on March
6, says: “The general told me last night that the Yankees had 17,000
men at the two points, Charlestown and Bunker Hill.” On March 8 he
writes: “3,000 effective men is about the number of General Jackson’s
force. The sick, those on furlough, and the deserters from the
militia, reduce him to about that number.”—MS.
[9] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 164.
[10] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 26.
[11] General G. H. Gordon.
[12] For an interesting exposition of the views of the soldiers at
Washington, see evidence of General Hitchcock, U.S.A., acting as
Military Adviser to the President, O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 221.
[13] O.R., vol. xi, part 333, p. 7.
[14] _Ibid.,_ p. 11.
[15] A large portion of the Army of the Potomac, awaiting embarkation,
still remained at Centreville. The cavalry had pushed forward towards
the Rapidan, and the Confederates, unable to get information, did not
suspect that McClellan was moving to the Peninsula until March 25.
[16] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 381. The staff appears to have been at
fault. It was certainly of the first importance, whether battle was
intended or not, to select a halting-place concealed from the enemy’s
observation.
[17] 140 sabres.
[18] No hidden line of approach was available. Movement to the south
was limited by the course of the Opequon. Fulkerson’s brigade, with
Carpenter’s two guns, marched nearest to the enemy; the Stonewall
Brigade was on Fulkerson’s left.
[19] The Confederate advance was made in the following order:—
__________
23rd Va. __________
37th Va. __________ 4th Va.
__________ 33rd Va. __________ 27th Va. __________ 2nd Va.
__________ 21st Va. __________ Irish Battn.
[20] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341.
[21] Colonel E. H. C. Cavins, 14th Indiana. _Battles and Leaders,_
vol. ii, p. 307.
[22] _Jackson’s Valley Campaign,_ Colonel William Allan, C.S.A., p.
54.
[23] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 341.
[24] Abercrombie’s, 4,500 men and a battery. The brigade marched to
Warrenton, where it remained until it was transferred to McDowell’s
command.
[25] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 16.
[26] Blenker’s division was at Hunter’s Chapel, south of Washington,
when it received the order.
[27] Report of General Wadsworth; O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 225.
[28] Letter of Mr. Stanton; O.R., vol. xix, part ii, p. 726.
[29] O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 382.
[30] _Ibid,_ part iii, p. 844.
[31] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 46.
[32] He was aware, moreover, that supports were coming up, for the
order to the 5th Virginia was sent through him. Report of Colonel W.
H. Harman, 5th Virginia, O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 391, 392.
[33] On March 5, 1811, in the battle fought on the arid ridges of
Barossa, the numbers were almost identical with those engaged at
Kernstown. Out of 4,000 British soldiers there fell in an hour over
1,200, and of 9,000 French more than 2,000 were killed or wounded; and
yet, although the victors were twenty-four hours under arms without
food, the issue was never doubtful.
[34] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 18, 19.