Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
No sooner, however, had he reached Elk Run Valley than the telegraph
brought most welcome news. In a moment of unwonted wisdom the
Confederate President had charged General Lee with the control of all
military operations in Virginia, and on April 21 came a letter to
Jackson which foreshadowed the downfall of McClellan and the rout of
the invaders.
April 21 McDowell’s advance from Manassas had already become known to
the Confederates, and Lee had divined what this movement portended. “I
have no doubt,” he wrote to Jackson, “that an attempt will be made to
occupy Fredericksburg and use it as a base of operations against
Richmond. Our present force there is very small, (2,500 men under
General Field), and cannot be reinforced except by weakening other
corps. If you can use General Ewell’s division in an attack on Banks,
it will prove a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg.”[19]
This view of the situation was in exact agreement with Jackson’s own
views. He had already made preparation for combined action with Ewell.
For some days they had been in active correspondence. The exact route
which Ewell should take to the Blue Ridge had been decided on. The
roads had been reconnoitred. Jackson had supplied
a map identical with his own, and had furnished an officer to act as
guide. A service of couriers had been established across the mountains,
and no precaution had been neglected. Ewell was instructed to bring
five days’ rations. He was warned that there would be no necessity for
a forced march; he was to encamp at cross-roads, and he was to rest on
Sunday.[20]
April 23 Jackson, replying to Lee, stated that he was only waiting a
favourable occasion to fall on Banks. “My object,” he wrote, “has been
to get in his rear at New Market or Harrisonburg, if he gives me an
opportunity, and this would be the case should he advance on Staunton
with his main body. It appears to me that if I remain quiet a few days
more he will probably make a move in some direction, or send a large
force towards Harrisonburg, and thus enable me, with the blessing of
Providence, to successfully attack his advance. If I am unsuccessful in
driving back his entire force he may be induced to move forward from
New Market, and attempt to follow me through this Gap, where our forces
would have greatly the advantage. . . .
“Under all the circumstances I will direct General Ewell to move to
Stanardsville. Should Banks remain in the position of yesterday
[cavalry at Harrisonburg; infantry, etc., at New Market] I will try and
seek an opportunity of attacking successfully some part of his army,
and if circumstances justify press forward. My instructions from
General Johnston were to unite with General Ewell near the top of the
Blue Ridge, and give battle. The course I propose would be departing
from General Johnston’s instructions, but I do not believe that Banks
will follow me to the Blue Ridge unless I first engage him, and I doubt
whether he will then.”
But although authorised to draw Ewell to himself, and to carry out the
project on which his heart was set, he still kept in view the general
situation. After he had dispatched the above letter, a report came in
which led him to believe that Ewell was more needed on the Rappahannock
than in
the Valley. Lee had already informed him that McDowell’s advanced guard
had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank of the river, opposite
Fredericksburg, on April 19, and that General Field had fallen back.
Jackson, in consequence, permitted Ewell to remain near Gordonsville,
close to the railway; assuring Lee that “he would make arrangements so
as not to be disappointed should Ewell be ordered to
Fredericksburg.”[21]
Nor was this the only instance in which he demonstrated his breadth of
view. In planning co-operation with Ewell, that general had suggested
that he should take a different road to that which had been recommended
by General Johnston, should necessity for a combined movement arise.
Jackson protested against the route being altered. “General Johnston,”
he wrote, “does not state why he desires you to go (by this road), but
it may be for the purpose of deceiving the enemy with regard to your
ultimate destination, to be more distant from the enemy during the
movement, and also to be in a more favourable position for reinforcing
some other points should it be necessary.” The interests of his own
force, here as always, were subordinated to those of the army which was
defending Richmond.
April 25 The next information received from General Lee was that the
enemy was collecting in strong force at Fredericksburg. “For this
purpose,” he wrote, “they must weaken other points, and now is the time
to concentrate on any that may be exposed within our reach.” He then
suggested that, if Banks was too strong in numbers and position,
Jackson and Ewell combined should move on Warrenton, where a Federal
force was reported; or that Ewell and Field should attack
Fredericksburg. “The blow,” he added, “wherever struck, must, to be
successful, be sudden and heavy. The troops must be efficient and
light. I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending
on circumstances unknown to me, and requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment as to time and
execution, but submit these ideas for your consideration.”[22]
April 26 On April 26, when Banks moved two brigades to Harrisonburg,
Ewell was at once called up to Stanardsville, twelve miles south-east
of Swift Run Gap. No opportunity as yet had offered for attack. “I have
reason to believe,” wrote Jackson to Lee on the 28th, “that Banks has
21,000 men within a day’s march of me.[23] He has moved his main body
from New Market to Harrisonburg, leaving probably a brigade at New
Market, and between that town and the Shenandoah (Luray Gap), to guard
against a force getting in his rear. . . . On yesterday week there were
near 7,000 men in the neighbourhood of Winchester, under Blenker; as
yet I have not heard of their having joined Banks. . . . I propose to
attack Banks in front if you will send me 5,000 more men. . . . Now, as
it appears to me, is the golden opportunity for striking a blow. Until
I hear from you I will watch an opportunity for striking some exposed
point.”[24]
April 29 The next day, April 29, Jackson suggested, if reinforcements
could not be spared, that one of three plans should be adopted. “Either
to leave Ewell here (Swift Run Gap) to threaten Banks’ rear in the
event of his advancing on Staunton, and move with my command rapidly on
the force in front of General Edward Johnson; or else, co-operating
with Ewell, to attack the enemy’s detached force between New Market and
the Shenandoah, and if successful in this, then to press forward and
get in Banks’ rear at New Market, and thus induce him to fall back; the
third is to pass down the Shenandoah to Sperryvile (east of the Blue
Ridge), and thus threaten Winchester _viâ_ Front Royal. To get in
Banks’ rear with my present force would be rather a dangerous
undertaking, as I would have to cross the river and immediately cross
the Massanutton Mountains, during which the enemy would have the
advantage of position. Of the three plans I give the preference to
attacking the force west of Staunton [Milroy], for, if successful, I
would afterward only have Banks to contend with, and in doing this
would be reinforced by General Edward Johnson, and by that time you
might be able to give me reinforcements, which, united with the troops
under my control, would enable me to defeat Banks. If he should be
routed and his command destroyed, nearly all our own forces here could,
if necessary, cross the Blue Ridge to Warrenton, Fredericksburg, or any
other threatened point.”
Lee’s reply was to the effect that no reinforcements could be spared,
but that he had carefully considered the three plans of operations
proposed, and that the selection was left to Jackson.
The Army of the Valley, when the Commander-in-Chief’s letter was
received, had already been put in motion. Three roads lead from
Conrad’s store in the Elk Run Valley to Johnson’s position at West
View; one through Harrisonburg; the second by Port Republic, Cross
Keys, and Mount Sidney; the third, the river road, by Port Republic and
Staunton. The first of these was already occupied by the Federals; the
second was tortuous, and at places almost within view of the enemy’s
camps; while the third, though it was nowhere less than ten miles
distant, ran obliquely across their front. In fact, to all appearance,
Banks with his superior force blocked Jackson’s march on Staunton more
effectively than did Jackson his.
On the 29th, Ashby, continually watching Banks, made a demonstration in
force towards Harrisonburg.
April 30 On the 30th he drove the Federal cavalry back upon their
camps; and the same afternoon Jackson, leaving Elk Run Valley, which
was immediately occupied by Ewell, with 8,000 men, marched up the river
to Port
Republic. The track, unmetalled and untended, had been turned into a
quagmire by the heavy rains of an ungenial spring, and the troops
marched only five miles, bivouacking by the roadside. May 1 was a day
of continuous rain. The great mountains loomed dimly through the dreary
mist. The streams which rushed down the gorges to the Shenandoah had
swelled to brawling torrents, and in the hollows of the fields the
water stood in sheets. Men and horses floundered through the mud. The
guns sunk axle-deep in the treacherous soil; and it was only by the
help of large detachments of pioneers that the heavy waggons of the
train were able to proceed at all. It was in vain that piles of stones
and brushwood were strewn upon the roadway; the quicksands dragged them
down as fast as they were placed. The utmost exertions carried the army
no more than five miles forward, and the troops bivouacked once more in
the dripping woods.
May 2 The next day, the third in succession, the struggle with the
elements continued. The whole command was called upon to move the guns
and waggons. The general and his staff were seen dismounted, urging on
the labourers; and Jackson, his uniform bespattered with mud, carried
stones and timbers on his own shoulders. But before nightfall the last
ambulance had been extricated from the slough, and the men, drenched to
the skin, and worn with toil, found a halting-place on firmer ground.
But this halting-place was not on the road to Staunton. Before they
reached Port Republic, instead of crossing the Shenandoah and passing
through the village, the troops had been ordered to change the
direction of their march. The spot selected for their bivouac was at
the foot of Brown’s Gap, not more than twelve miles south-west of the
camp in Elk Run Valley.
May 3 The next morning the clouds broke. The sun, shining with summer
warmth, ushered in a glorious May day, and the column, turning its back
upon the Valley, took the stony road that led over the Blue Ridge.
Upward and eastward the battalions passed, the great forest of oak and
pine rising high on either hand, until from the eyry of the
mountain-eagles they looked down upon the wide Virginia plains. Far
off, away to the south-east, the trails of white smoke from passing
trains marked the line of the Central Railroad, and the line of march
led directly to the station at Mechum’s River. Both officers and men
were more than bewildered. Save to his adjutant-general, Jackson had
breathed not a whisper of his plan. The soldiers only knew that they
were leaving the Valley, and leaving it in the enemy’s possession.
Winchester, Strasburg, Front Royal, New Market, Harrisonburg, were full
of Northern troops. Staunton alone was yet unoccupied. But Staunton was