Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
still some miles behind. He proposed, therefore, while his staff
explored the mountains for a track which might lead him the next day to
the rear of the Federal position, merely to hold his ground on
Sitlington’s Hill.
His immediate opponent, however, was a general of more resource and
energy than Banks. Milroy was at least able to supply himself with
information. On May 7 he had been advised by his scouts and spies that
Jackson and Johnson had combined, and that they were advancing to
attack him at M’Dowell. At 10 a.m. the next day Schenck’s brigade
arrived from Franklin, after a march of thirty-four miles in
twenty-three hours, and a little later the enemy’s scouts were observed
on the lofty crest of Sitlington’s Hill. The day wore on. The Federal
battery, with muzzles elevated and the trails thrust into trenches,
threw occasional shells upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers
were sent across the river to develop the Confederate strength.
Johnson, to whom Jackson had confided the defence of
the position, kept his troops carefully concealed, merely exposing
sufficient numbers to repel the Federal patrols. Late in the afternoon
a staff officer reported to Jackson that he had discovered a rough
mountain track, which, passing through the mountains to the north-west,
crossed the Bull Pasture River and came out upon the road between
M’Dowell and Franklin. Orders had just been issued to move a strong
detachment of artillery and infantry by this track during the night,
when the Federal infantry, who had crossed the bridge under shelter of
the woods, advanced in a strong line of battle up the slopes. Their
scouts had observed what they believed to be preparations for
establishing a battery on the heights, and Milroy and Schenck, with a
view of gaining time for retreat, had determined on attack. Johnson had
six regiments concealed behind the crest, in all about 2,800 men. Two
regiments of the enemy, under 1,000 strong, advanced against his front;
and shortly afterwards three regiments, bringing the numbers of the
attack up to 2,500 rifles, assailed his left.
The Ohio and West Virginia Regiments, of which the Federal force was
composed, fought with the vigour which always characterised the Western
troops.[29] The lofty heights held by the Confederates were but an
illusory advantage. So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for
the most part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and
their line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky. “On the
other hand,” says Dabney, “though the Federal troops had to scale the
steep acclivity of the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such
cases, resulting from the high firing of the Confederates.” The 12th
Georgia, holding the centre of Johnson’s line, displayed more valour
than judgment. Having been advanced at first in front of the crest,
they could not be persuaded to retire to the reverse of the ridge,
where other regiments found partial protection without
sacrificing the efficiency of their fire. Their commander, perceiving
their useless exposure, endeavoured again and again to withdraw them;
but amidst the roar of the musketry his voice was lifted up in vain,
and when by passing along the ranks he persuaded one wing of the
regiment to recede, they rushed again to the front while he was gone to
expostulate with the other. A tall Georgia youth expressed the spirit
of his comrades when he replied the next day to the question why they
did not retreat to the shelter of the ridge: “We did not come all this
way to Virginia to run before Yankees.”[30] Nor was the courage of the
other troops less ardent. The 44th Virginia was placed in reserve,
thirty paces in rear of the centre. “After the battle became animated,”
says the brigadier, “and my attention was otherwise directed, a large
number of the 44th quit their position, and, rushing forward, joined
the 58th and engaged in the fight, while the balance of the regiment
joined some other brigade.”[31]
The action gradually became so fierce that Jackson sent his Third
Brigade to support the advanced guard. These nine regiments now engaged
sufficed to hold the enemy in check; the Second Brigade, which moved
towards them as darkness fell, was not engaged, and the Stonewall
regiments were still in rear. No counterstroke was delivered. Johnson
himself was wounded, and had to hand over the command; and after four
hours’ fighting the Federals fell back in perfect order under cover of
the night. Nor was there any endeavour to pursue. The Confederate
troops were superior in numbers, but there was much confusion in their
ranks; the cavalry could not act on the steep and broken ground, and
there were other reasons which rendered a night attack undesirable.
The enemy had been repulsed at every point. The tale of casualties,
nevertheless, was by no means small. 498 Confederates, including 54
officers, had fallen. The 12th Georgia paid the penalty for its useless
display of valour with the loss of 156 men and 19 officers. The
Federals, on the other hand, favoured by the ground, had no more than
256 killed, wounded, and missing. Only three pieces of artillery took
part in the engagement. These were Federal guns; but so great was the
angle of elevation that but one man on Sitlington’s Hill was struck by
a piece of shell. Jackson, in order to conceal his actual strength, had
declined to order up his artillery. The approach to the position, a
narrow steep ravine, wooded, and filled with boulders, forbade the use
of horses, and the guns must have been dragged up by hand with great
exertion. Moreover, the artillery was destined to form part of the
turning column, and had a long night march before it.
Illustration: Map of the Battle of Mc.Dowell, Va., Thursday, May 8th,
1862. For larger view click on image.
“By nine o’clock,” says Dabney, “the roar of the struggle had passed
away, and the green battle-field reposed under the starlight as calmly
as when it had been occupied only by its peaceful herds. Detachments of
soldiers were silently exploring the ground for their wounded comrades,
while, the tired troops were slowly filing off to their bivouac. At
midnight the last sufferer had been removed and the last picket posted;
and then only did Jackson turn to seek a few hours’ repose in a
neighbouring farmhouse. The valley of M’Dowell lay in equal quiet. The
camp-fires of the Federals blazed ostentatiously in long and regular
lines, and their troops seemed wrapped in sleep. At one o’clock the
general reached his quarters, and threw himself upon a bed. When his
mulatto servant, knowing that he had eaten nothing since morning, came
in with food, he said, ’I want none; nothing but sleep,’ and in a few
minutes he was slumbering like a healthy child.”
It seems, however, that the march of the turning column had already
been countermanded. Putting himself in his enemy’s place, Jackson had
foreseen Milroy’s movements. If the one could move by night, so could
the other; and when he rode out at dawn, the Federals, as he
anticipated, had disappeared. The next day he sent a laconic despatch
to Richmond: “God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday.”
This announcement was doubtless received by the people of Virginia, as
Dabney declares, with peculiar delight.
On May 4 Johnston had evacuated Yorktown. On the 5th he had checked the
pursuit at Williamsburg, inflicting heavy losses, but had continued his
retreat. On the 9th Norfolk was abandoned; and on the 11th the
“Merrimac,” grounding in the James, was destroyed by her commander.
“The victory of M’Dowell was the one gleam of brightness athwart all
these clouds.” It must be admitted, however, that the victory was
insignificant. The repulse of 2,500 men by 4,000 was not a remarkable
feat; and it would even appear that M’Dowell might be ranked with the
battles of lost opportunities. A vigorous counterstroke would probably
have destroyed the whole of the attacking force. The riflemen of the
West, however, were not made of the stuff that yields readily to
superior force. The fight for the bridge would have been fierce and
bloody. Twilight had fallen before the Confederate reinforcements
arrived upon the scene; and under such conditions the losses must have
been very heavy. But to lose men was exactly what Jackson wished to
avoid. The object of his manœuvres was the destruction not of Frémont’s
advanced guard, but of Banks’ army; and if his numbers were seriously
reduced it would be impossible to attain that end. Frémont’s brigades,
moreover, protected no vital point. A decisive victory at M’Dowell
would have produced but little effect at Washington. No great results
were to be expected from operations in so distant a section of the
strategic theatre; and Jackson aimed at nothing more than driving the
enemy so far back as to isolate him from Banks.
May 9 The next morning the small force of cavalry crossed the bridge
and rode cautiously through the mountain passes. The infantry halted
for some hours in M’Dowell in order that rations might be issued, but
the Federals made three-and-twenty miles, and were already too far
ahead to be overtaken. On the 10th and the 11th the Confederates made
forced marches, but the enemy set fire to the forests on the
mountain-side, and this desperate measure proved eminently successful.
“The sky was overcast with volumes of smoke, which wrapped every
distant object in a veil, impenetrable alike to the eyes and telescopes
of the officers. Through this sultry canopy the pursuing army felt its
way cautiously, cannonaded by the enemy from every advantageous
position, while it was protected from ambuscades only by detachments of
skirmishers, who scoured the burning woods on either side of the
highway. The general, often far in advance of the column in his
eagerness to overtake the foe, declared that this was the most adroit
expedient to which a retreating army could resort, and that it entailed
upon him all the disadvantages of a night attack. By slow approaches,
and with constant skirmishing, the Federals were driven back to
Franklin village, and the double darkness of the night and the smoke
arrested the pursuit.”[32]
May 12 On May 12 Jackson resolved to return to the Valley. Frémont,
with Blenker’s division, was at hand. It was impossible to outflank the
enemy’s position, and time was precious, “for he knew not how soon a
new emergency at Fredericksburg or at Richmond might occasion the
recall of Ewell, and deprive him of the power of striking an effective
blow at Banks.”[33] Half the day was granted to the soldiers as a day
of rest, to compensate for the Sunday spent in the pursuit, and the
following order was issued to the command:—
“I congratulate you on your recent victory at M’Dowell. I request you
to unite with me in thanksgiving to Almighty God for thus having
crowned your arms with success; and in praying that He will continue to
lead you on from victory to victory, until our independence shall be
established; and make us that people whose God is the Lord. The
chaplains will hold divine service at 10 a.m. on this day, in their
respective regiments.”
Shortly after noon the march to M’Dowell was resumed.
May 15 On the 15th the army left the mountains and encamped at Lebanon
Springs, on the road to Harrisonburg. The 16th was spent in camp, the
Confederate President having appointed a day of prayer and
fasting. On the 17th a halt was made at Mount Solon, and here Jackson
was met by Ewell, who had ridden over from Elk Run Valley. Banks had
fallen back to Strasburg, and he was now completely cut off from
Frémont. On the night of the engagement at McDowell Captain Hotchkiss
had been ordered back to the Valley, and, accompanied by a squadron of
Ashby’s cavalry, had blocked the passes by which Frémont could cross