Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
attributed to the brain of Lee. That the same idea had been uppermost
in Jackson’s mind during the whole course of the campaign is proved not
only by the evidence of his chief of the staff, but by his
correspondence with headquarters. “If Banks is defeated,” he had
written on April 5, “it may directly retard McClellan’s movements.” It
is true that nowhere in his correspondence
is the idea of menacing Washington directly mentioned, nor is there the
slightest evidence that he suggested it to Lee. But in his letters to
his superiors he confines himself strictly to the immediate subject,
and on no single occasion does he indulge in speculation on possible
results. In the ability of the Commander-in-Chief he had the most
implicit confidence. “Lee,” he said, “is the only man I know whom I
would follow blindfold,” and he was doubtless assured that the
embarrassments of the Federal Government were as apparent to Lee as to
himself. That the same idea should have suggested itself independently
to both is hardly strange. Both looked further than the enemy’s camps;
both studied the situation in its broadest bearings; both understood
the importance of introducing a disturbing element into the enemy’s
plans; and both were aware that the surest means of winning battles is
to upset the mental equilibrium of the opposing leader.
Before he reached Mount Solon Jackson had instructed Ewell to call up
Branch’s brigade from Gordonsville. He intended to follow Banks with
the whole force at his disposal, and in these dispositions Lee had
acquiesced. Johnston, however, now at Richmond, had once more resumed
charge of the detached forces, and a good deal of confusion ensued.
Lee, intent on threatening Washington, was of opinion that Banks should
be attacked. Johnston, although at first he favoured such a movement,
does not appear to have realised the effect that might be produced by
an advance to the Potomac. Information had been received that Banks was
constructing intrenchments at Strasburg, and Johnston changed his mind.
He thought the attack too hazardous, and Ewell was directed to cross
the Blue Ridge and march eastward, while Jackson “observed” Banks.
These orders placed Ewell in a dilemma. Under instructions from Lee he
was to remain with Jackson. Under instructions from Jackson he was
already moving on Luray. Johnston’s orders changed his destination.
Taking horse in haste he rode across the Valley from Swift Run Gap to
Jackson’s camp at Mount Solon. Jackson at once telegraphed to Lee: “I
am of opinion
that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under instructions
from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty to make an attack.
Please answer by telegraph at once.” To Ewell he gave orders that he
should suspend his movement until a reply was received. “As you are in
the Valley district,” he wrote, “you constitute part of my command. . .
. You will please move so as to encamp between New Market and Mount
Jackson on next Wednesday night, unless you receive orders from a
superior officer and of a date subsequent to the 16th instant.”
This order was written at Ewell’s own suggestion. It was for this he
had ridden through the night to Jackson’s camp.
May 18 Lee’s reply was satisfactory. Johnston had already summoned
Branch to Richmond, but Ewell was to remain; and the next morning, May
18, the Confederates moved forward down the Valley. The two days’ rest
which had been granted to Jackson’s troops had fallen at a useful time.
They had marches to look back on which had tried their endurance to the
utmost. In three days, before and after Kernstown, they had covered
fifty-six miles, and had fought a severe engagement. The struggle with
the mud on the Port Republic was only surpassed by the hardships of the
march to Romney. From Elk Run to Franklin, and from Franklin to Mount
Solon, is just two hundred miles, and these they had traversed in
eighteen days. But the exertions which had been then demanded from them
were trifling in comparison with those which were to come. From Mount
Solon to Winchester is eighty miles by the Valley pike; to Harper’s
Ferry one hundred and ten miles. And Jackson had determined that before
many days had passed the Confederate colours should be carried in
triumph through the streets of Winchester, and that the gleam of his
camp-fires should be reflected in the waters of the Potomac.
Johnston believed that Banks, behind the earthworks at Strasburg, was
securely sheltered. Jackson saw that his enemy had made a fatal
mistake, and that his earthworks, skilfully and strongly constructed as
they were, were no more than a snare and a delusion.
Ashby had already moved to New Market; and a strong cordon of pickets
extended along Pugh’s Run near Woodstock, within sight of the Federal
outposts, and cutting off all communication between Strasburg and the
Upper Valley. Ewell’s cavalry regiments, the 2nd and 6th Virginia, held
the Luray Valley, with a detachment east of the Blue Ridge.
May 20 On the 20th Jackson arrived at New Market, thirty miles from
Mount Solon. Ewell had meanwhile marched to Luray, and the two wings
were now on either side of the Massanuttons. On his way to New Market
Jackson had been joined by the Louisiana brigade of Ewell’s division.
This detachment seems to have been made with the view of inducing Banks
to believe, should information filter through Ashby’s pickets, that the
whole Confederate force was advancing direct on Strasburg.
The Army of the Valley numbered nearly 17,000 officers and men.[3]
Ewell’s effective strength was 7,500; Johnson’s 2,500; Jackson’s 6,000;
and there were eleven batteries.
The troops were now organised in two divisions:—
JACKSON’S DIVISION
First (Stonewall) Brigade, General Winder: 2nd Virginia, 4th
Virginia, 5th Virginia, 27th Virginia, 33rd Virginia.
Second Brigade, Colonel Campbell: 21st Virginia, 42nd Virginia,
48th Virginia, 1st Regulars (Irish).
Third Brigade, Colonel Taliaferro: 10th Virginia, 23rd Virginia,
37th Virginia.
Cavalry, Colonel Ashby: 7th Virginia.
Artillery: 5 batteries (1 horse-artillery), 22 guns.
EWELL’S DIVISION
Taylor’s Brigade: 6th Louisiana, 7th Louisiana, 8th Louisiana, 9th
Louisiana, Wheat’s Battalion (Louisiana Tigers).
Trimble’s Brigade: 21st North Carolina, 21st Georgia, 15th Alabama,
16th Mississippi.
Elzey’s Brigade and Scott’s Brigade: 13th Virginia, 31st Virginia,
25th Virginia, 12th Georgia. (late Johnson’s), 44th Virginia, 52nd
Virginia, 58th Virginia.
Maryland Line: 1st Maryland.
Cavalry, General G. H. Steuart: 2nd Virginia, Colonel Munford: 6th
Virginia, Colonel Flournoy.
Artillery: 6 batteries, 26 guns.
For the first time in his career Jackson found himself in command of a
considerable force. The greater part of the troops were Virginians, and
with these he was personally acquainted. The strange contingents were
Taylor’s and Trimble’s brigades, and Steuart’s cavalry. These had yet
to be broken to his methods of war and discipline. There was no reason,
however, to fear that they would prove less efficient than his own
division. They had as yet seen little fighting, but they were well
commanded. Ewell was a most able soldier, full of dash and daring, who
had seen much service on the Indian frontier. He was an admirable
subordinate, ready to take responsibility if orders were not
forthcoming, and executing his instructions to the letter. His
character was original. His modesty was only equalled by his
eccentricity. “Bright, prominent eyes, a bomb-shaped bald head, and a
nose like that of Francis of Valois, gave him a striking resemblance to
a woodcock; and this was increased by a bird-like habit of putting his
head on one side to utter his quaint speeches. He fancied that he had
some mysterious internal malady, and would eat nothing but frumenty, a
preparation of wheat; and his plaintive way of talking of his disease,
as if he were someone else, was droll in the extreme. “What do you
suppose President Davis made me a major-general for?” beginning with a
sharp accent, ending with a gentle lisp, was a usual question to his
friends. Superbly mounted, he was the boldest of horsemen, invariably
leaving the roads to take timber and water; and with all his oddities,
perhaps in some measure because of them, he was adored by officers and
men.”[4] To Jackson he must have been peculiarly acceptable; not indeed
as an intimate, for Ewell, at this period of the war, was by no means
regenerate, and swore like a cowboy: but he knew the value of time, and
rated celerity of movement as high as did Napoleon. His instructions to
Branch, when the march against Banks was first projected, might have
emanated from Jackson himself: “You cannot bring tents; tent-flies
without poles, or tents cut down to that size, and only as few as are
indispensable. No mess-chests, trunks, etc. It is better to leave these
things where you are than to throw them away after starting. We can get
along without anything but food and ammunition. The road to glory
cannot be followed with much baggage.”[5]
Trimble, too, was a good officer, an able tactician and a resolute
leader. He had hardly, however, realised as yet that the movements of a
brigade must be subordinated to those of the whole army, and he was
wont to grumble if his troops were held back, or were not allowed to
pursue some local success. Steuart was also a West Pointer, but with
much to learn. Taylor and his Louisianians played so important a part
in the ensuing operations that they deserve more detailed mention. The
command was a mixed one. One of the regiments had been recruited from
the roughs of New Orleans. The 7th and 9th were composed of planters
and sons of planters, the majority of them men of fortune. “The 6th,”
writes the brigadier, “were Irishmen, stout, hardy fellows, turbulent
in camp and requiring a strong hand, but responding to justice and
kindness, and ready to follow their officers to the death. The 8th were
from the Attakapas—Acadians, the race of whom Longfellow sings in
“Evangeline”—a home-loving, simple people; few spoke English, fewer
still had ever moved ten miles from their native cabanas; and the war
to them was a liberal education. They had all the light gaiety of the
Gaul, and, after the manner of their ancestors, were born cooks. A
capital regimental band accompanied them, and whenever weather and
ground permitted, even after long marches, they would waltz and polk in
couples with as much zest as if their arms encircled the supple waists
of the Celestines and Melazies of their native Teche. The Valley
soldiers were largely of the Presbyterian faith, and of a solemn, pious
demeanour,
and looked askance at the caperings of my Creoles, holding them to be
“devices and snares.”’[6]
Taylor himself had been educated at West Point. He was a man of high
position, of unquestioned ability, an excellent disciplinarian, and a
delightful writer. More than other commanders he had paid great
attention to the marching of his men. He had an eye to those practical
details which a good regimental officer enforces with so much effect.
Boots were properly fitted; the troops were taught the advantages of
cold water, and how to heal abrasions; halts upon the march were made
at frequent intervals, and the men soon held that to fall out on the
march was a disgrace. Before a month “had passed,” he says, “the
brigade had learned how to march, and in the Valley with Jackson
covered long distances without leaving a straggler behind.”[7]
Jackson’s first meeting with the Louisiana troops has been described by
their commander:—
“A mounted officer was dispatched to report our approach and select a