Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
cut off; to prevent stores and sick from falling into the hands of the
enemy.’ Moved with an unusual fire, General Banks, who had met all my
arguments with the single reply, “I must develop the force of the
enemy,’ rising excitedly from his seat, with much warmth and in loud
tones exclaimed, ‘By God, sir, I will not retreat! We have more to
fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of our
enemies!’ The thought,” continues the brigadier, “so long the subject
of his meditations was at last out. Banks was afraid of being thought
afraid. I rose to take my leave, replying, ‘This, sir, is not a
military reason for occupying a false position.’ It was eleven o’clock
at night when I left him. As I returned through the town I could not
perceive that anybody was troubled with anticipation for the morrow.
The antlers were driving sharp bargains with those who had escaped from
or those who were not amenable to military discipline. The strolling
players were moving crowds to noisy laughter in their canvas booths,
through which the lights gleamed and the music sounded with startling
shrillness. I thought as I turned towards my camp, how unaware are all
of the drama Jackson is preparing for us, and what merriment the
morning will reveal!”
Fortunately for his own battalions, the brigadier had his camp equipage
and baggage packed and sent off then and there to Winchester, and
though his men had to spend the night unsheltered under persistent
rain, they had reason to bless his foresight a few nights later.
At midnight a report was received from one of the Front Royal
fugitives: “Kenly is killed. First Maryland cut to pieces. Cavalry
ditto. The enemy’s forces are 15,000 or 20,000 strong, and on the march
to Strasburg.”
In forwarding this despatch to Washington Banks
remarked that he thought it much exaggerated. At 7 a.m. on the 24th he
told Stanton that the enemy’s force was from 6,000 to 10,000; that it
was probably Ewell’s division, and that Jackson was still in his front
on the Valley turnpike.
Three hours later he wrote to Gordon, informing him that the enemy had
fallen back to Front Royal during the night, that ample reinforcements
had been promised from Washington, and that the division would remain
in Strasburg until further orders.
Up to this time he had been convinced that the attack on Front Royal
was merely a raid, and that Jackson would never dare to insert his
whole force between himself and McDowell.[16] Suddenly, by what means
we are not told, he was made aware that the Confederates were in
overwhelming numbers, and that Jackson was in command.
Scarcely had General Gordon digested the previous communication when an
orderly, galloping furiously to his side, delivered a pencil note from
the chief of staff. “Orders have just been received for the division to
move at once to Middletown, taking such steps to oppose the enemy,
reported to be on the road between Front Royal and Middletown, as may
seem proper.” Banks was electrified at last. Three weeks previously, in
writing to Mr. Stanton, he had expressed his regret that he was “not to
be included in active operations during the summer.” His regret was
wasted. He was about to take part in operations of which the activity,
on his part at least, was more than satisfying.
Such blindness as Banks had shown is difficult to explain. His latest
information, previous to the attack on Kenly, told him that Jackson’s
trains were arriving at Harrisonburg on the 20th, and he should
certainly have inferred that Jackson was in advance of his waggons. Now
from Harrisonburg across the Massanuttons to Front Royal is fifty-five
miles; so it was well within the bounds of possibility that the
Confederates might reach the
latter village at midday on the 23rd. Moreover, Banks himself had
recognised that Strasburg was an unfavourable position. It is true that
it was fortified, but therein lay the very reason that would induce the
enemy to turn it by Front Royal. Nor did the idea, which seems to have
held possession of his mind throughout the night, that Ewell alone had
been sent to destroy Kenly, and had afterwards fallen back, show much
strategic insight. Front Royal was the weak point in the Federal
position. It was of all things unlikely that a commander, energetic and
skilful as Jackson was well known to be, would, when he had once
advertised his presence, fail to follow up his first blow with his
whole force and the utmost vigour. It is only fair to add that the
Federal authorities were no wiser than their general. At two a.m. on
the morning of the 24th, although the news of Kenly’s disaster had been
fully reported, they still thought that there was time to move fresh
troops to Strasburg from Baltimore and Washington. It seemed incredible
that Jackson could be at Front Royal. “Arrangements are making,” ran
Stanton’s telegram to Banks, “to send you ample reinforcements. Do not
give up the ship before succour can arrive.”
We may now turn to Jackson.
Up to the present his operations had been perfectly successful. He had
captured over 700 of the enemy, with a loss of only 40 or 50 to
himself. He had seized stores to the value of three hundred thousand
dollars (60,000 pounds), and a large quantity had been burned by the
enemy. He had turned the intrenched position at Strasburg. He
threatened the Federal line of retreat. Banks was completely at his
mercy, and there seemed every prospect of inflicting on that
ill-starred commander a defeat so decisive as to spread panic in the
council chambers of the Northern capital.
But the problem was not so simple as it seemed. In the first place,
although the positions of the Federals had been thoroughly examined,
both by staff officers and scouts, the information as to their numbers
was somewhat vague. Banks had actually about 8000 effectives at
Strasburg;
but so far as the Confederates knew it was quite possible that he had
from 12,000 to 15,000. There is nothing more difficult in war than to
get an accurate estimate of the enemy’s numbers, especially when
civilians, ignorant of military affairs, are the chief sources of
information. The agents on whom Jackson depended for intelligence from
within the enemy’s lines were not always selected because of their
military knowledge. “On the march to Front Royal,” says General Taylor,
“we reached a wood extending from the mountain to the river, when a
mounted officer from the rear called Jackson’s attention, who rode back
with him. A moment later there rushed out of the wood a young, rather
well-looking woman, afterwards widely known as Belle Boyd. Breathless
with speed and agitation, some time elapsed before she found her voice.
Then, with much volubility, she said we were near Front Royal; that the
town was filled with Federals, whose camp was on the west side of the
river, where they had guns in position to cover the bridge; that they
believed Jackson to be west of the Massanuttons, near Harrisonburg;
that General Banks was at Winchester, where he was concentrating his
widely scattered forces to meet Jackson’s advance, which was expected
some days later. All this she told with the precision of a staff
officer making a report, and it was true to the letter. Jackson was
possessed of this information before he left New Market, and based his
movements on it; but it was news to me.”
In the second place, Banks had still the means of escape. He could
hardly prevent the Confederates from seizing Winchester, but he might
at least save his army from annihilation. Jackson’s men were exhausted
and the horses jaded. Since the morning of the 19th the whole army had
marched over eighty, and Ewell’s division over ninety miles. And this
average of seventeen miles a day had been maintained on rough and muddy
roads, crossed by many unbridged streams, and over a high mountain. The
day which had just passed had been especially severe. Ewell, who was in
bivouac at Cedarville, five miles north of Front Royal on the
Winchester
turnpike, had marched more than twenty miles; and Jackson’s own
division, which had made four-and-twenty, was on foot from five in the
morning till nine at night.
Banks’ natural line of retreat led through Winchester, and the
Confederate advanced guard at Cedarville was two miles nearer that town
than were the Federals at Strasburg. But it was still possible that
Banks, warned by Kenly’s overthrow, might withdraw by night; and even
if he deferred retreat until daylight he might, instead of falling back
on Winchester, strike boldly for Front Royal and escape by Manassas
Gap. Or, lastly, he might remain at Strasburg, at which point he was in
communication, although by a long and circuitous road, with Frémont at
Franklin.
Jackson had therefore three contingencies to provide against, and
during the night which followed the capture of Front Royal he evolved a
plan which promised to meet them all. Ashby, at daybreak, was to move
with the 7th Virginia cavalry in the direction of Strasburg; and at the
same hour a staff officer, with a small escort, supported by Taylor’s
Louisianians, was to ride towards Middletown, a village five miles
north of Strasburg and thirteen from Winchester, and to report
frequently. The 2nd and 6th Virginia cavalry, under General Steuart,
were to advance to Newtown, also on the Valley turnpike, and eight
miles from Winchester; while Ewell, with Trimble’s brigade and his
artillery, was to move to Nineveh, two miles north of Cedarville, and
there halt, awaiting orders. The remainder of the command was to
concentrate at Cedarville, preparatory to marching on Middletown; and
strong cavalry patrols were to keep close watch on the Strasburg to
Front Royal road.[17]
6 a.m. From Cedarville to Middletown is no more than seven miles, and
Taylor’s brigade is reported to have moved at six a.m., while Ashby had
presumably already marched. But notwithstanding the fact that Banks’
infantry did not leave Strasburg till ten a.m., and
that it had five miles to cover before reaching Middletown, when the
Confederates reached the turnpike at that village the Federal main body
had already passed, and only the rear-guard was encountered.
It seems evident, therefore, that it was not till near noon that
Jackson’s patrols came in sight of Middletown, and that the Confederate
advanced guard had taken at least six hours to cover seven miles. The
country, however, between Cedarville and the Valley turnpike was almost
a continuous forest; and wood-fighting is very slow fighting. The
advance had met with strong resistance. General Gordon had prudently
sent the 29th Pennsylvania to Middletown at an early hour, with orders
to reconnoitre towards Front Royal, and to cover Middletown until the
army had passed through.
7 a.m. Supported by a section of artillery, the regiment had moved
eastward till it struck the Confederate scouts some four miles out on
the Cedarville road. After a long skirmish it was withdrawn to
Middletown; but the 1st Maine cavalry, and a squadron of the 1st
Vermont, about 400 strong, which had been ordered by Banks to proceed
in the same direction, made a vigorous demonstration, and then fell
back slowly before the advanced guard, showing a bold front, using
their carbines freely, and taking advantage of the woods to impose upon
the enemy.
10.15 a.m. These manœuvres succeeded in holding the Confederates in
check till after ten o’clock, for the heavy timber concealed the real
strength of the Federals, and although Ashby, with the 7th Virginia,
had marched to the scene of action, the infantry was not yet up. It is
to be remembered that at daybreak the Valley army was by no means
concentrated. Jackson had with him at Cedarville only Ewell’s division,
his own division having halted near Front Royal. This last division, it