Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
appears from the reports, did not leave Front Royal until 8 a.m.; a
sufficiently early hour, considering the condition of the men and
horses, the absence of the trains, and the fact that one of the
brigades had bivouacked four miles south of
the village.[18] It was not, then, till between nine and ten that the
column cleared Cedarville, and Middletown was distant nearly three
hours’ march, by an exceedingly bad road.
In all probability, if Jackson, at daybreak or soon afterwards, had
marched boldly on Middletown with Ewell’s division, he would have been
able to hold Banks on the Valley turnpike until the rest of his
infantry and artillery arrived. But he had always to bear in mind that
the Federals, finding their retreat on Winchester compromised, might
make a dash for Manassas Gap. Now the road from Strasburg to Manassas
Gap was protected throughout its length by the North Fork of the
Shenandoah; and to attack the Federals on the march, should they take
this road, the Confederates would have to move through Cedarville on
Front Royal. This was the only road by which they could reach the
river, and the bridges at Front Royal were the only available points of
passage. Jackson, it appears, was therefore reluctant to leave
Cedarville, within easy reach of the bridges, until he received
information of his enemy’s designs, and that information, which had to
be sought at a distance, was naturally long in coming.
Criticism, after the event, is easy; but it certainly seems curious,
with his knowledge of Banks, that Jackson should have believed his
opponent capable of so bold a measure as retreat by way of Manassas
Gap. According to his own report, the feasibility of such a course did
cross Banks’ mind; but it might seem that on this occasion Jackson lost
an opportunity through over-caution. Nevertheless, in desperate
situations even the most inert characters are sometimes capable of
desperate resolutions.
Although for the time being Banks was permitted to extricate his
infantry from the toils, the remainder of his command was less
fortunate. The general and his brigades reached Winchester in safety,
but the road between that town and Strasburg was a scene of dire
disaster.
11.30 a.m. Steuart, with the 2nd and 6th Virginia, had struck Newton
before noon, and found a convoy of waggons strung out on the Valley
turnpike. A few shots threw everything into confusion. Many of the
teamsters deserted their posts, and fled towards Winchester or
Strasburg. Waggons were upset, several were captured, and others
plundered. But the triumph of the Confederates was short-lived. The
Federal infantry had already reached Middletown; and Banks sent forward
a regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to clear the way.
Steuart was speedily driven back, and the Northerners resumed their
march.
12.15 p.m. At some distance behind the infantry came the Federal
cavalry, about 2,000 strong, accompanied by a battery and a small party
of Zouaves; but by the time this force reached Middletown, Ashby,
supported by the Louisiana brigade, had driven in the regiment hitherto
opposed to him, and, emerging from the forest, with infantry and guns
in close support, was bearing down upon the village. The batteries
opened upon the solid columns of the Federal horse. The Louisiana
regiments, deploying at the double, dashed forward, and the Northern
squadrons, penned in the narrow streets, found themselves assailed by a
heavy fire. A desperate attempt was made to escape towards Winchester,
and a whirling cloud of dust through which the sabres gleamed swept
northward up the turnpike. But Ashby’s horsemen, galloping across
country, headed off the fugitives; some of the Confederate infantry
drew an abandoned waggon across the road, and others ran forward to the
roadside fences. At such close quarters the effect of the musketry was
terrible. “In a few moments the turnpike, which had just before teemed
with life, presented a most appalling spectacle of carnage and
destruction. The road was literally obstructed with the mingled and
confused mass of struggling and dying horses and riders. Amongst the
survivors the wildest confusion ensued, and they scattered in disorder
in various directions, leaving some 200 prisoners in the hands of the
Confederates.”[19] Part
dashed back to Strasburg, where the teeming magazines of the Federal
commissaries were already blazing; and part towards the mountains,
flying in small parties by every country track. The rear regiments,
however, still held together. Drawing off westward, in the hope of
gaining the Middle road, and of making his way to Winchester by a
circuitous route, General Hatch, commanding the cavalry brigade,
brought his guns into action on a commanding ridge, about a mile west
of the highway, and still showed a front with his remaining squadrons.
Infantry were with them; more horsemen came thronging up; their numbers
were unknown, and for a moment they looked threatening. The Confederate
batteries trotted forward, and Taylor’s brigade, with the Stonewall and
Campbell’s in support, was ordered to attack; whilst Ashby, accompanied
by the Louisiana Tigers and two batteries, pursued the train of waggons
that was flying over the hills towards Winchester.
3 p.m. The question now to be solved was whether the cavalry was the
advanced or the rear guard of the Federal army. No message had arrived
from Steuart. But the people of Middletown supplied the information.
They reported that in addition to the convoy a long column of infantry
had passed through the village; and Jackson, directing his infantry to
follow Ashby, sent a message to Ewell to march on Winchester. Some
delay took place before the three brigades, which had now driven back
the Federal cavalry, could be brought back to the turnpike and
reformed; and it was well on in the afternoon when, with the Stonewall
regiments leading, the Confederate infantry pushed forward down the
pike.
The troops had been on their legs since dawn; some of them, who had
bivouacked south of Front Royal, had already marched sixteen miles, the
Federals had more than two hours’ start, and Winchester was still
twelve miles distant. But the enemy’s cavalry had been routed, and such
as remained of the waggons were practically without a guard. Ashby and
Steuart, with three fine regiments of Virginia cavalry, supported by
the
horse-artillery and other batteries, were well to the front, and “there
was every reason to believe,” to use Jackson’s own words, “that if
Banks reached Winchester, it would be without a train, if not without
an army.”
But the irregular organisation of the Valley forces proved a bar to the
fulfilment of Jackson’s hopes. On approaching Newtown he found that the
pursuit had been arrested. Two pieces of artillery were engaging a
Federal battery posted beyond the village, but the Confederate guns
were almost wholly unsupported. Ashby had come up with the convoy. A
few rounds of shell had dispersed the escort. The teamsters fled, and
the supply waggons and sutlers’ carts of the Federal army, filled with
luxuries, proved a temptation which the half-starving Confederates were
unable to resist. “Nearly the whole of Ashby’s cavalry and a part of
the infantry under his command had turned aside to pillage. Indeed the
firing had not ceased, in the first onset upon the Federal cavalry at
Middletown, before some of Ashby’s men might have been seen, with a
quickness more suitable to horse-thieves than to soldiers, breaking
from their ranks, seizing each two or three of the captured horses and
making off across the fields. Nor did the men pause until they had
carried their illegal booty to their homes, which were, in some
instances, at the distance of one or two days’ journey. That such
extreme disorders could occur,” adds Dabney, “and that they could be
passed over without a bloody punishment, reveals the curious
inefficiency of officers in the Confederate army.”[20]
Banks, when the pursuit had so suddenly ceased, had determined to save
the remnant of his train. Three regiments and a couple of batteries
were ordered back from Bartonsville, with Gordon in command; and this
rearguard had not only shown a formidable front, but had actually
driven the infantry that still remained with Ashby out of Newtown, and
into the woods beyond. General Hatch, who had regained the turnpike
with part of his brigade, had now come up; and the addition of six
squadrons of cavalry rendered Gordon’s force capable of stout
resistance. The Federals held a strong position. The Confederates had
present but 50 cavalry, 150 infantry, and 5 guns. Nor was there any
hope of immediate support, for the remainder of the troops were still
several miles in rear, and Steuart’s two regiments appear to have
rejoined General Ewell on the road for Nineveh.
Shortly before sunset the Confederate artillery was reinforced. The
Stonewall Brigade had also arrived upon the scene; and Gordon, firing
such waggons as he could not carry off, as well as the pontoons, fell
back on Winchester as the night closed in.
The Confederates had now marched from sixteen to twenty miles, and the
men had not eaten since the early morning. But Jackson had determined
to press the march till he was within striking distance of the hills
which stand round Winchester to the south. It was no time for repose.
The Federals had a garrison at Harper’s Ferry, a garrison at Romney,
detachments along the Baltimore and Ohio Railway; and Washington,
within easy distance of Winchester by rail, was full of troops.[21] A
few hours’ delay, and instead of Banks’ solitary division, a large army
might bar the way to the Potomac. So, with the remnant of Ashby’s
cavalry
in advance, and the Stonewall Brigade in close support, the column
toiled onward through the darkness. But the Federal rear-guard was
exceedingly well handled. The 2nd Massachusetts regiment held the post
of honour, and, taking advantage of stream and ridge, the gallant New
Englanders disputed every mile of road. At Bartonsville, where the
Opequon, a broad and marshy creek, crosses the turnpike, they turned
stubbornly at bay. A heavy volley, suddenly delivered, drove the
Confederate cavalry back in confusion on the infantry supports. The
33rd Virginia was completely broken by the rush of flying horsemen; the
guns were overridden; and Jackson and his staff were left alone upon
the turnpike. In the pitch darkness it was difficult to ascertain the
enemy’s numbers, and the flashes of their rifles, dancing along the top
of the stone walls, were the only clue to their position. The
Confederate column was ordered to deploy, and the Stonewall Brigade,
pushing into the fields on either flank, moved slowly forward over the
swampy ground. The stream proved an impassable obstacle both below and
above the Federal position; but the 27th Virginia, attacking the enemy
in front, drove them back and crossed to the further bank.
The pursuit, however, had been much delayed; and the Massachusetts
regiment, although ridden into by their own cavalry, fell back in good
order, protected by a strong line of skirmishers on either side of the
turnpike. The Confederate order of march was now changed. Three
companies, who were recruited from the district and knew the ground,
were ordered to the front. The 5th Virginia, four or five hundred yards
from the skirmish line, were to follow in support. The cavalry and guns
were left in rear; and the troops once more took up the line of march.
For more than an hour they tramped slowly forward. The darkness grew
more intense, and the chaff and laughter—for the soldiers, elated by
success, had hitherto shown no sign of fatigue—died gradually away.
Nothing was to be heard but the clang of accoutrements, the long rumble